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2ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the international boundaries of the Nile Basin and 
discusses them in the context of inter-state cooperation. The first 
aim of the study is to decide how far the boundaries have or have not 
been responsible for any difficulties in relations between the 
various states. This question is a central one in political geography. 
Many writers have noted that the rapid and arbitrary nature of boundary- 
making by European colonial powers in Africa has left independent 
African states with serious and intractable problems associated with 
their unsatisfactory colonial boundaries, drawn up with little or 
no reference to the geographical realities - both physical and human - 
in an area. While some writers suggest that the international 
boundaries can actually cause inter-state conflict - others argue 
that such conflict is unlikely ever to result from the nature of the 
boundary itself. The present study aims to examine the evidence about 
this issue in a specific geographical area in Africa r the Nile 
Basin - where the circumstances, both physical and human, surrounding 
the international boundaries are very varied and where there are 
several classic instances of so-called 'bad1 boundaries which ignore 
natural and human considerations and so create tension between states.
The second aim of the thesis is to place the evidence and 
conclusions about the significance of international boundaries in 
the context of inter-state relations and cooperation in the Nile 
Basin. How can governments ensure that their boundaries function 
solely as the territorial limits of administration and not as 
barriers to all movement and contact between states? This question is 
examined with reference to attempts at inter-state cooperation for 
the use of the Nile waters and, more generally, within the context 
of regional and supra-regional organizations, notably the Organization 
of African Unity.
3'aghlab al-duwal al-jadida qahilat al-hudud al-lati faradaha 
Tl-istiCmar, wa-tamassakat biha ka-ma law kanat irthan muqaddasan, 
al-amr al-ladhi a ta ’l-a€da’ al-fursa li'ttiham al-wataniyyac 
fiha bi-annaha la^sat akthar min mujarrad radd fi 1 li'l-isti mar 
la'nbithaqan tabi iyyian hamimank
Translation: 'Most of the new states accepted the boundaries
imposed by colonialism, and they hold them as if they were a sacred 
heritage. This enables their enemies to accuse them of the kind 
of patriotism that is no more than a mere reaction to colonialism 
and not a natural and sincere emergence of national feeling'.
Hamdan, G., istirhtijiyyat al-istl cmar wa'1-tahrir, Cairo, 1983, pp.240-41.
4ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S
I am grateful to my supervisor Professor B,W. Rodder, to whom I am 
greatly indebted for his guidance and encouragement during my study. 
I must also thank Dr J.A. Allan of the Department of Geography at 
SOAS for his advice. I am also indebted to numerous Egyptian 
colleagues and officials who have made it possible for me to under­
take this task,
Mrs Mary O’Shea kindly undertook the typing of the 
manuscript and I am grateful to her for her patience. The maps have 
been drawn by Miss Elizabeth Johnson and I wish to express my thanks 
to her.
I should also like to express my deepest gratitude to my 





CHAPTER ONE Some Conceptual Issues 14
CHAPTER TWO Relevant Geographical Eeatures 40
CHAPTER THREE The International Boundaries 56
CHAPTER FOUR The Evidence and Hypothesis 112
Re-Examined
CHAPTER FIVE The Nile Waters and Cooperation 134







1 Butalinga and Bwamba 35
2 The Nile Basin - Relief and Drainage 39
3 Climatic Data for Selected Stations 41
4 Major Ethnic Divisions 44
5 History of European Contact 48
6 Egypt-Sudan Boundary 55
7 Sudan-Ethiopia Boundary 64
8 Sudan-Uganda Boundary 69
9 Sudan-Kenya Boundary 72
10 Sudan-Zaire Boundary 75
11 Uganda-Kenya Boundary 77
12 Uganda-Kenya Boundary (2) 81
13 Uganda-Kenya Boundary - Tribal Groups 82
14 Uganda-Zaire Boundary 86
15 Uganda-Tanzania Boundary 90
16 Kenya-Tanzania Boundary 95
17 Kenya-Tanzania Boundary - Tribal Groups 97
18 Tanzania-Rwanda Boundary 101
19 Tanzania-Burundi Boundary 103
20 Rwanda-Burundi Boundary 106
21 Uganda-Rwanda Boundary 108
22 The Nile Basin - Water Elements 135
7DIAGRAMS
Diagram Number Page
oj Model of Geographical Effects of Boundary 31
2 Contrasting models at a Boundary 131
3  Diagram of Major Nile Projects 136
8TABLES
Table Number Page
1 List of Tribes cut by Boundaries 2 9
2 Length and Status of Boundaries ^2
2 Nile Basin States: Areas and Populations 54
4 Access Routes for Land-Locked States 155
9INTRODUCTION
Aims of Thesis This thesis examines the international boundaries that 
occur within the Nile Basin and discusses them in the context of inter­
state cooperation. The first aim of the study is to decide how far they 
have or have not been responsible for any difficulties in relations 
between the various states. This question is a central one in political 
geography. Many writers have noted that the rapid and arbitrary nature 
of boundary-making by European colonial powers in Africa has left independent 
African states with serious and intractable problems associated with their 
unsatisfactory colonial boundaries, drawn up with little or no reference 
to the geographical realities - both physical and human - in an area.
Associated with this view is the belief that international boundaries 
are always intrinsically critical phenomena of central significance to 
inter-state relations. On the other hand, some writers argue that the cause 
of any problems that have arisen or are likely to arise between African 
states is rarely, if ever, the nature of the international boundary itself.
This view suggests that an international boundary is simply the 1 frame' of 
a state and, by itself, is unlikely ever to be the cause of inter-state 
friction: that all such friction is caused by much more fundamental 
differences of opinion between nations.
The present study aims to examine the evidence about this issue in a 
specific geographical area in Africa - the Nile Basin - where the circumstances, 
both physical and human, surrounding the international boundaries are very 
varied and where there appear to be blatant examples of 'bad* boundaries which 
ignore natural and human considerations and so create tension between states.
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The second aim of the thesis is to place the evidence and conclusions 
about the significance of international boundaries in the context of 
inter-state relations and cooperation in the Nile Basin* If it is true 
that the international boundaries are not by themselves major causes 
of interstate friction, is it possible to suggest that these 
boundaries can be used as bases for inter-state cooperation? How can 
governments ensure that boundaries between their states function solely 
as the territorial limits of administration and not as barriers to all 
movement and contact between states? These questions are examined with 
reference to attempts at inter-state cooperation for the allocation and 
utilisation of the Nile waters and, more generally, within the context 
of regional and supra-regional organizations, notably the Organization 
of African Unity*
This thesis does not claim originality in the sense of presenting 
many new facts. From the nature of the material this would have involved 
a careful examination of the historical evidence, sifting through the 
primary sources relating to the allocation, delimitation and demarcation 
of the specific international boundaries - something that has been done, 
mostly very adequately, by other scholars, particularly historians*
Rather is the present study concerned to attempt an original interpretation 
of facts that are already known. This seems especially relevant at a time 
when the gap between the perception of European scholars and the perception 
of African peoples themselves is so wide. While European analysts still 
focus on the negative effects of the international boundaries they 
imposed on African societies - and a sense of guilt or a particular 
political ideological stance are common causes of this ♦European* view - 
the view of most Africans, expressed so eloquently through the Organization 
of African Unity, is much more positive and realistic: that the boundaries 
exist and can and must be made to work by independent African governments.
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Sources The bibliography at the end of this thesis contains all the 
written (English and Arabic) sources used in the study# Primary sources 
of particular importance to the discussion are best consulted in 
Hertslet (1909 and 196?) and Brownlie (1979)* Maps have been taken from 
various sources, the most important and easily available being found in 
Hertslet, Brownlie and McEwen (1971)* As for the distribution and 
classification of ethnic, tribal, ethno-linguistic or linguistic groups 
in relation to the international boundaries, several sources have been 
used and cited where appropriate. Dalby’s (1977) work is a generally 
accepted source, though the necessarily purely linguistic criteria pose 
some difficulties for his work in the present study. Another especially 
important source is the series of relevant Ethnographic Monographs 
published (with maps) by the International African Institute and 
referred to in the bibliography.
Much of the source material is unsatisfactory, especially that relating 
to the tribes, ethnic groups, ethno-linguistic groups and linguistic 
groups; it is often very confused and contradictory so that for comparative 
purposes its value is limited, both spatially and temporally. This is 
to be expected, of course. Information about the various groups of 
people in the Nile Basin has increased dramatically since Europeans first 
made contact, and the names, classifications, judgements and criteria 
differ markedly from one authority to another. Moreover, it is now 
becoming almost fashionable to suggest that to describe groups of people 
in terms of their tribe, ethnic group, or culture is unacceptable 
as it possesses derogatory connotations. It is difficult to find any two 
authorities who agree on any of these matters. There is therefore 
inevitably a good deal of subjective judgement in the choice of names and 
communities, tribes* ethnic groups or linguistic groups to be found in the 
present thesis; and this must be borne in mind throughout. Wherever 
possible, the author has preferred names and interpretations given to him
by people on the ground in the area concerned*
Finally, it is necessary to point out that during the writing of 
this thesis the author has been an Attache at the Egyptian Embassy in 
London. He was born and has lived most of his life in Egypt and has 
travelled extensively, both professionally and privately, in most parts 
of the Nile Basin.
Definitions In these pages an international boundary is defined as a line 
representing the legal territorial limits of a state. It is sometimes 
distinguished from a frontier, defined as a zone of varying width 
separating the effective territories occupied by adjacent states (Fawcett, 
1918); but this distinction between boundary and frontier seems now to 
be of little value, and Allott (1969, P*9) is probably justified in 
refusing to distinguish between them on the grounds that all boundaries 
involve drawing imaginary lines rather than zones. In this thesis the 
terms ’boundary* and * frontier* are used synonymously, except where the 
context demands otherwise. A clear distinction, however, is and must be 
made between boundary delimitation, which refers to the selection of a 
boundary and its definition by treaty or otherwise, and boundary demarcation, 
which refers to the actual laying down of a boundary line in the landscape 
by boundary pillars or other physical means (McMahon, 1897, Curzon, 1907; 
Holdich, 1916).
Hypothesis and Plan of Thesis The argument in the present thesis is 
focussed on an hypothesis which may be stated as follows: ’The international 
boundaries of the Nile Basin are unsatisfactory in that they do not accord 
with geographical realities. For this reason they are a cause of tension 
between the states and so militate against effective inter-state 
cooperation in the region*•
After a discussion on several relevant conceptual issues, the study
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turns to a brief review of the main relevant geographical features of 
the Nile Basin* The various international boundaries of the region are 
then examined in turn* The study then faces up to the hypothesis stated 
above and reaches some conclusions about its validity in terms of the 
evidence provided in the earlier chapters* The thesis concludes with 
a discussion on the implications of these findings: first for inter-state 
arrangements for the effective utilisation of the water resources of 





To some extent it seems inappropriate to talk of theory in political 
geography, especially in the field of international boundaries. For, 
as many writers have noted CLapradelle, 1928; Siegfried, in Ancel, 
1938; Prescott, 1978) this is essentially a practical rather than 
a theoretical area of study, where subjective judgements are common 
and where objectivity is difficult if not impossible to achieve. The 
points of view presented in this thesis are certainly no exception 
to this statement. All one can hope to do is, on the basis of the 
evidence examined, to reach conclusions which seem to arise from one’s 
own interpretation of the material available. In the case of the 
present writer, these interpretations are necessarily affected by 
the fact that he is an Egyptian working for the Egyptian government 
as an embassy official, though he is putting forward what are 
strictly his own views on all the matters discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Yet both the conclusions and the interpretations of the 
evidence are more likely to be sensible and credible if they are 
written against the background of an awareness of the relevant 
literature in the field. The purpose of the present chapter, there­
fore, is to provide a brief review of the literature - whether by 
geographers, statesmen, international lawyers, historians or political 
scientists - bearing on the study of international boundaries where 
such literature is relevant to the general argument pursued in later 
chapters. Some attention is also given to the discussion in the 
literature of other major concepts of particular relevance to the 
present study.
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Boundary Disputes and Inter-State Conflicts First, however, It 
might be useful to expand a little on exactly what question is being 
addressed in this thesis. As its simplest the question is; ’to what 
extent are the international boundaries of the Nile Basin in Africa 
the cause of disputes or conflict between the constituent states of 
the region’? In the literature review that follows attention will 
be focusshd on those authors; who have expressed an opinion on this 
question, ranging from those who believe that boundaries in Africa 
are mostly ’bad’ boundaries and the cause of much inter-state conflict 
to those who believe that boundaries.are. never the root cause of 
inter-state difficulties of any moment. Much of the discussion on 
this point, however, is confused by problems of terminology. Thus 
frontiers, defined as zones having territorial breadth, and boundaries., 
defined only as lines, and therefore largely abstractions, are fre­
quently used differently. More importantly, there is some confusion 
over what is meant by an international dispute. One author (Prescott, 
1978) has suggested a useful classification of boundary disputes. 
Prescott (1978, pp.90-131) identifies four types. First, there are 
those disputes which may be called territorial boundary disputes 
which result from ’some quality of the neighbouring borderland which 
makes it attractive to the country initiating the dispute’ (ibid, 
p.90). And, as all boundaries are to some degree compromises between 
strategic, economic, ethnic and other requirements of neighbouring 
states it is always possible for a state to make a territorial claim 
by ’emphasising some pattern in the borderland that was discounted 
during the boundary’s construction’ (jbid, p,94). Secondly, there is 
the type called the positional boundary dispute, referring to 
differences in the exact interpretation of the boundary line in the 
relevant documentation. Both these types of disputes can only be
16
'solved.' by changing the location of the boundary. The third 
type of boundary dispute is the functional boundary dispute which 
arises over state functions applied at the boundary - to customs 
control and the like. Finally, there is the resource development 
boundary dispute, which is usually directed at trying to govern 
the use of a particular resource, notably water bodies, water 
resources or mineral resources.
The problem with this kind of classification is that it 
does not direct attention to the true cause of a dispute and fails to 
recognise that any of these types may be artificially manipulated 
in order to express a quite different kind or degree of disagreement 
between two neighbouring states.
Similar objections can also be made about Allott's view that 
one should distinguish between at least two types of disputes - 
boundary disputes (about exactly where the line should be drawn) and 
territorial disputes (about which piece of territory should be 
allocated to which country) (Allott, 1969? P«B). This seems an 
unreal distinction, because trying to decide where to place a 
boundary (as an abstraction) is exactly the same as trying to 
decide which country has which piece of territory (as reality).
In the present thesis, therefore, no such distinction is made.
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Brief Review of the Relevant Literature The present section 
is not designed to examine the literature written specifically 
with Africa - especially north-east Africa - in mind (for example 
Widstrand, 196 9; Touval, 1972? McEwen, 1971? Hertslet, 1909?
Brownlie, 1979)* The work of these and other authors will he 
incorporated into the discussion in later chapters as appropriate,
The purpose of the present section is rather an attempt to give 
a succinct account of some of the more important and relevant ideas 
expressed by various authors about international boundaries.
It seems appropriate to begin with Lord Curzon, a statesman 
with a strong professional interest in boundaries, especially in the 
Indian sub-continent, Curzon uses the terms ’frontier1 and 
’boundary’ interchangeably, as is done in the present thesis.
But he also believed strongly that boundaries are critical in the 
relations between states: his most famous phrase - indeed perhaps 
the most well-known phrase in the political geography of boundaries - 
is that 'frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang 
suspended the modern issues of war and peace, the life and death 
to nations' (Curzon, 1907 > P.7). Understandably, therefore, for 
him some boundaries are 'good', especially if they are 'natural
18
■boundaries' such as defensible mountain ranges or deserts; and some are
'bad', especially those that are artificial, like lines of latitude,
longitude or straight lines. His views on 'good' and ’had1 boundaries
were subsequently criticised on the grounds that such value judgements
depend on the times and circumstances of each particular case; and many
authors have refused to accept Curzon's distinction between 'natural'
and’artificial1 boundaries - all boundaries, it is argued,are artificial
in that a line has to be drawn somewhere by man on a map and if possible
1demarcated on the ground, Holdich was also a practical man - a soldier 
and a member of several boundary commissions - and he placed great 
stress on the need for boundaries to be strong in the defensive 
sense. Boundaries, for Holdich, are so critical in international 
relations that they had, if possible, to be barriers (like mountain 
ranges and deserts): if not, then they must be made as 'strong as 
military device can make them' (Holdich, 1916, p.46). Curzon and 
Holdich represent perhaps the extreme end of the continuum between 
those, like these writers, who give priority to the boundary as an 
important cause of inter-state strife and so should be as far as 
possible 'natural' and defensible, and those who, at the other extreme, 
view boundaries solely as the territorial limits to administration of 
states and never as the cause of international conflict.
At the other end of the continuum perhaps the most significant 
name is still that of Ancel who was responsible for the statement - 
1 There are no problems of boundaries. There are only problems of 
Nations' (Ancel, 1938, p.196). Ancel, then, attributed very little 
significance to the boundary per se and much more to the state itself.
In this he followed Febvre ; 'The bound frame or margin, matters
little. The inside is the important part, and must remain the chief
1. 'All boundaries are artificial, even those which are linked to natural 
features, or so far as they represent a transcendental and invisible 
expression of power' (Allott, 19^9) P«12),
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consideration1 (Febvre, 1932, p.309). It is the relationships between 
neighbouring groups (defined by boundaries) that matter and on which 
depend conflict or cooperation, Ancel’s writings are clearly central 
to the main thrust of the argument examined in the present thesis.
He concentrates on ’the boundaries of types of states rather than 
types of boundaries’ (Prescott, 1978, p.23),0f special interest to the 
present study of the Nile Basin are two types of amorphous states - 
molecular societies and nomadic societies - both of which are wide­
spread in our region. For Ancel, boundaries are lines of equilibrium, 
reflecting the relative pressures exerted from either side of a 
boundary; Ancel rejected the concept of a static, linear boundary.
In between these two widely divergent views of, on the one 
hand, Curzon and Holdich and, on the other, Ancel, there are many 
other writers who represent a wide spectrum of views. Ancel himself 
was very much concerned to rebut the views of Ratzel, who viewed the 
state as a living organism and its boundary as governing the strength 
or weakness of a state. Unlike the situation in most parts of our 
region in the Nile Basin, for Ratzel the boundary represented the 
expanding or contracting frontier of growing or declining ’organic' 
states, whereas in most parts of Africa the boundaries were imposed 
from outside and states were expected to grow and adapt arid fuse within 
these boundaries. For Ratzel the border fringe was the reality 'and 
the border line the abstraction thereof' (Ratzel, 1897, p.538). For 
Ratzel, then, borders were dynamic features, reflecting the expansion 
or retraction of state power. The reality for Ratzel was therefore 
the ’border fringe’ which consists of three zones - the two peri­
pheries of adjoining states and the central zone through which the 
boundary is drawn. Like Ratzel, Lapradelle (1928) - an international 
lawyer - agreed that the boundary ’cannot be considered out of the
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context of the "borderland, and to allow this he distinguishes clearly 
"between frontiers and "boundaries’ (Prescott, 1978, P.20), Fawcett 
(1918) makes the same distinction and concludes that one should 
distinguish "between frontiers of * separation' and frontiers of 
5 contact*5 like Curzon, Fawcett used the threefold system of 
artificial "boundaries proposed earlier "by Curzon, "but of particular 
interest here was his view that there was an increasing coincidence 
"between political "boundaries and linguistic limits, drawing on 
evidence from Europe where there was a tendency to place "boundaries 
within ’frontiers of separation’. Lyde (1915) expressed much the 
same view, arguing that boundaries giving states maximum ethnic 
homogeneity were the most likely to be ’good' boundaries. Boggs (1940) 
made valiant attempts to make international comparisons and general­
izations about international boundaries, but the chief importance of 
his work for us here is the seminal work he accomplished on boundaries 
in relation to water bodies. Jones (1945) was particularly concerned 
to consider the stages of boundary evolution and the techniques 
of boundary making. The importance of his work is that Jones 
emphasised the idiographic as distinct from the nomothetic 
nature of boundary studies in political geography - 'each boundary 
is almost unique and therefore many generalizations are of doubtful 
validity' (Jones, 1945j p.vi,). For this reason Jones eschews any 
attempt to classify boundaries.
Other writers who take a middle road through the widely 
divergent views of Curzon/Holdich and Ancel include TSgil (1969? p.25). 
TSgil accepts that a government may use a boundary question as a 
pretext for starting a conflict, when the primary reasons are 
perhaps on a quite different level, A boundary dispute exists, 
he argues, 'when the territorial ambitions of at least two parties 
are irreconcilable' (p.24). But T&gil rejects Ancel's notion 
that all boundary disputes are caused by state interests and 
disagreements over something other than the boundary. T&gil 
believes that Ancel's theory 'cannot be upheld,,.Empirical 
investigations show clearly that boundaries can in themselves give 
rise to conflict'. Perhaps significantly, however, TUgil does not 
offer any empirical evidence to support his viewpoint
Many of the authors mentioned above have clearly been 
interested in the origins of boundaries, and in their evolution as 
an expression of the relative growth and decline of state territorial 
limits. In this they were clearly influenced by their choice of 
boundaries for study, by their own experience and focus, and more 
especially by their interest in the evolution of boundaries in 
Europe, The point that must be made about the boundaries of most
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of Africa - and certainly of the Nile Basin area with which the 
present study is most particularly concerned - is that the inter­
national boundaries there were, at least according to conventional 
wisdom, drawn without reference to the patterns, genesis or 
evolution of indigenous states but were imposed arbitrarily upon 
existing state patterns by European colonial powers towards the end 
of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth 
century.
Problems of Specific Types of Boundaries It will be necessary in 
the chapters that follow to make qualitative and evaluative judge­
ments about specific types of boundaries, especially in so far as 
they refer to inter-state relations. The purpose of the present 
section is to introduce briefly some of the ideas, principles and 
views about the different types of boundaries. To avoid too lengthy 
a discussion, only those types of boundaries which figure significantly 
in later chapters will be mentioned.
1, Physical Features
(I) Mountain and Hill Boundaries It has already been noted that 
according to some authorities, such as Curzon and Holdich, conspicuous 
natural features such as mountains, mountain ranges or hills provide 
the most efficient type of boundary. They are mutually recognizable, 
relatively permanent and defensible or, to use Holdich's term, they 
are ’barriers’. In practice, however, the zonal nature of such 
features means that the boundary has still to be demarcated by a line, 
and this line is most commonly the watershed. But not only is the 
watershed often difficult to discern on the ground - and at the time 
of delimitation in Africa there was often no accurate idea of where
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the watershed actually lay — hut exactly what is meant hy a watershed 
is by no means clear (Ward, 1232). There are. two generally accepted 
definitions. The first refers to the line separating the headstreams 
of waters that flow into different rivers or river basins.., and this is 
the common interpretation in boundary making. The second meaning of 
watershed - common in America and in United Nations; agencies - includes 
the entire catchment basin of rivers or lakes. But even excluding this 
second meaning of .the term, a watershed is certainly an ambiguous 
concept. The line joining the highest peaks or crests is commonly not 
the same as the watershed (or what McEwen, 1971, p66 suggests should 
perhaps best be called the waterparting). Many international disputes - 
Argentina-Chile and Cambodia"Thailand - have arisen over this problem. 
Then there are difficulties in deciding exactly where the watershed is, 
both in theory and in practice. Adami (1927), as an international 
lawyer, identifies three ways of defining the watershed - the true 
topographic watershed, the true watershed, and the apparent topographic 
watershed. In any one area, he points out, each of these three inter­
pretations could produce different results on the ground or on a map, 
though in practice the last - the apparent topographic watershed - is 
usually the most acceptable to boundary commissioners (McEwen, 1971, 
p.70).
The use of the term crest or, more commonly, a line joining 
several crests, is common in African boundary definitions but again 
there are several problems associated with the term. Exactly where the 
crest is thought to be depends to some extent on the angle from which 
it is viewed, even if the definition is used to describe a crest as 
the general line formed by joining the summits of the main ridge of a 
chain of mountains (Adami, op.cit.). In Africa, too, delimitation 
sometimes avoided the difficulties by describing a boundary as a series 
of straight lines joining the summits of named peaks or,in some cases,
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isolated hills or rocks. In other cases, as McEwen (op.cit. p.73) 
points out, surveying problems even justify the practice of using the 
terms crest and watershed interchangeably.
A third type of mountain boundary appears particularly vague - 
the drawing of a boundary line along a foothill. There is, after all, 
no way of defining the foothill precisely as a line - it is clearly 
a zone. Yet, as we shall see, there are many examples of the use 
of foothills to define boundaries in our study area.
(ii) Rivers The use of a river as a boundary line has obvious 
attractions but numerous disadvantages; nevertheless rivers are very 
commonly referred to in descriptions of boundaries. Early penetration 
and exploration in Africa was commonly along rivers or by reference 
to rivers: they were often the only reasonably accurate topographical
lines to be found on early maps. As Holdich (op.cit., p.156) put it, 
a river ’is a God-sent feature for boundary making, and requires no 
assistance from man'. On the other hand, the sociological and ethno­
logical difficulties raised by using rivers as boundaries are many 
and obvious, especially perhaps in Africa, for rivers are frequently 
the magnet for peoples, transport, trade and economic life; moreover, 
a river basin is commonly the home of the same group of people or 
tribes who occupy both banks of the river (Boggs, op.cit., Jones, 1945). 
But there are other, more technical, problems relating to the river 
itself, over exactly what line is to be chosen as representing the 
international boundary in a legal sense. Again, it is partly a matter 
of terminology, for many of the possible river boundary lines are in­
capable of precise definition,
A commonly used term in boundary definition - of particular 
significance to our study area - is the thalweg, which may be defined 
as the line of greatest depth of the main channel of a river or stream. 
This, however, is an imprecise definition, covering both the line of
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deepest soundings of a river and the axis of the safest and most 
accessible channel for the largest ships (Lapradelle, op.cit., p. 202).
In Africa it is particularly imprecise because the term is used for 
small, unnavigable streams as well as for navigable rivers. At the 
same time, some documents- refer to the ’median line' of a river or 
stream, or to a river's 'centre line1. Clearly the centre or median 
line of a river is not the same as the thalweg and in a strict legal 
sense the median of a navigable river should be termed the thalweg.
Another term used in connection with river boundaries is 
the bank. Apart from the problems associated with accurate bank 
identification, especially where there is high and low water, or severe 
erosion, the major issue concerns- the mutual enjoyment of the river’s 
economic benefits by states on both'banks of the river: this is why
the thalweg is deemed to be more satisfactory as a boundary line.
Similar objections apply to the use of a river mouth in defining a 
boundary line, for it does not always have a precise or permanent 
location, especially where swamps or deltas occur. Where such river 
mouths are used, however, the thalweg of the main stream is commonly 
adopted (Jones, op.cit.). In the study area this last problem does 
not seem to arise, though the river mouth is used in boundary de­
limitation. Vagueness and imprecision are also characteristic of those 
boundaries which use (in some cases as tripoints) the source of a 
river or rivers. This is a very difficult point to determine - indeed 
it is often quite impossible- especially where there are dramatic 
seasonal changes, where the source lies in a swamp, or where the main 
stream of a river is a matter of opinion. Any significant river may have 
several sources. Similarly, there are difficulties arising from a 
river changing its course - either dramatically, as when an ox-bow 
lake is formed, or more slowly by erosion and accretion. As
26
Schwarzenberger (1957) points out, however, international law 
accepts the right of a state to include areas of accretion. But in the 
case of a dramatic change in a river's course then the thalweg of 
the original course remains the legal boundary.
Finally, there is the problem arising from islands in
rivers - and there are several instances of this in our study area. 
Strictly speaking the ownership of such an island should reflect the 
thalweg or median line of the river referred to earlier. But in 
practice the island may simply be between two branches of the same 
river, and the difficulty is to determine which of these is the major 
course (Boggs, op,cit.).
(iii) Lakes The problems of international boundaries and lakes are 
very important for our purposes here. As to what exactly constitutes 
a lake is not easy to define, because of the fluctuations in size and
shape that occur over time, and especially between seasons - a matter
of real significance in a continent like Africa where seasonality of 
rainfall is often so marked. Moreover, lakes may merge into swamps and 
it is difficult to determine the edge of any dry land there may be. 
Together with this problem is the difficulty of defining a lake shore 
or shore line. For even though a lake may be non-tidal, it commonly 
has periodic rises and falls affecting the location of the water's edge; 
in practice, however, the low water line tends to be accepted in internat­
ional law as the fairest line to use as a boundary. A further 
problem is how to draw an international boundary through a lake where 
markers cannot be laid down. The concept of the 'median line' can be 
used in some cases - as in some of the lakes in the study area - but 
equitable sharing of a lake's resources is never an easy task (Boggs, 
op.cit.). McEwen (1971) believes tha$ an 'arbitrary mathematical
median' - such as that adopted in Lake Albert - is probably better than
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a simple median line. The case of Lake Victoria is a special one and 
will be dealt with as part of the detailed study of the Nile Basin 
in a later chapter.
2. Mathematical Lines
Little need be said here about this group of international boundaries* 
though they are very common indeed and may be divided into four types - 
lines of longitude, lines of latitude, straight lines between specified 
points, and other lines (such as arcs) draim geometrically in 
relation to specificied points. The difficulty with such lines is 
that originally they were often decided upon without knowing much about 
the territory through which they passed and without having any certain 
knowledge that the line chosen was accurately described - for instance 
without scientific proof of the exact location of a specified line 
of longitude. A further difficulty with other straight lines and geo- 
metricallly determined arcs is that they have to be determined by re­
ference to specified points which normally have to be physical features 
and so possess some of the difficulties of physical features as boundary 
lines referred to above. But perhaps the greatest objection commonly 
made of boundaries of this type is that they are ’arbitrary’, ignoring 
all other features of the physical and, especially, of the human geo­
graphy of an area. It may be that this judgement is wrong, and that 
straight lines of this kind are the ’best’ kind of boundary in our 
study area. More will be said on this point in a later chapter.
3. Non-Physical Features
It will be apparent that human, social, political and economic problems 
of many kinds arise from the use of physical features as international 
boundaries. To take the last case of mathematical lines, the literature
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is full of criticisms of such, boundaries, arguing that they cut 
arbitrarily and ruthlessly through, for instance, homogeneous ethnic 
groups. Similar criticisms can to varying degrees be levelled at most 
physical feature boundaries. Mineral, forest, agricultural or human 
resources and groups may be split by watershed, crest or foothill 
boundaries, either permanently or seasonally. Rivers and lakes are 
commonly magnets for populations, agriculture, stock, transport and 
commerce and many examples are cited in the literature documenting 
the hardship caused by the use of such features as international 
boundaries. These comments will be tested in the context of the study 
area in a later chapter. The present section, however, must confine 
itself to noting a few of the non-physical features that are used for 
international boundary-making. The distribution and density of pop­
ulation appears on the surface of it to be a useful basis for boundary 
drawing: after all an 'empty area', such as a desert, is likely to 
prove unobjectionable. The problem is that even desert fringes are 
hard to define permanently, partly for ecological reasons and because 
of the movements of nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who may use 
such lands whether seasonally or in relatively moist years. The 
problem is even more difficult when attempts are made to determine 
the limits of a particular group, or tribe, for the purposes of 
boundary delimitation. The notion of a'homogenous tribal group' is 
commonly little more than an abstraction and has little geographical 
validity. Internal divisions and mixings, both from within and from 
without, are common, and even where groups are not pastoralists the 
difficulty of trying to decide on the ground where group A finishes 
and group B starts is very great, if not impossible (Hodder, 1968).
Yet even this may be easier than trying to define exactly what is 
meant by group A - how to determine the criteria on which the identifi-
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TABLE I
K,M*Barbour*s List of Tribes whose territories are cut 





































cation of group A should be based. Then migration introduces for­
midable problems into the use of human population distributions and 
composition as bases for determining boundary locations. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note - in contradiction to opposite views expressed 
so widely in the literature - that in drawing up their original 
colonial boundaries in Africa, Europeans did frequently try to consider 
non-physical features - especially tribal affiliations, historical 
traditions and agricultural practices - in delimiting their respective 
territories. The difficulty - as will be apparent from our case study 
area - was not that negotiators ruthlessly ignored human groups, but 
that their knowledge of human distributions and characteristics was, 
at the time of drawing up the boundaries, even less accurate than their 
knowledge of the physical features of their territories. Moreover, 
name.s, criteria and distributions in relation to boundaries have varied 
greatly over the last twenty-five years. Thus Barbour (l96l) shows 
twenty-two 'tribal’ groups cut through by the international boundaries 
in the study area (Table l); but subsequent writings and maps by 
geographers, anthropologists and others all differ in some respects from 
Barbour's early list. Bach scholar prefers his own classification and 









Entirely rural, dispersed 
villages, little increase, 
some emigration
Tracks and local paths
Pastoralism and some 
subsistence farming, 
only very local exchange, 
no markets
Virtually non-existent
Left on the periphery, 
no integration with 'centre'
Colonial Power B
Trading centres developing, 
one town, increase in number 
of people, some immigration
Some tarred roads, rail link 
to national centre (eastwards)
Increased sedentarization, cash 
crops and trade with other areas, 
rural and urban markets
Considerable investment from 
national centre
Well integrated with 'centre1, 
considerable politicization
Diagram I. Model of Geographical Effects 
of International. Boundary.
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Geographical Effects of International Boundaries
One of the most
powerful arguments for emphasising the role of international 
boundaries in creating inter-state conflict is believed by many 
writers to arise from the wide range of geographical effects the 
drawing of such boundaries has on the landscape, peoples, ways of 
life on either side of the boundary. And it is certainly true that 
international boundaries in Africa, as elsewhere, may well represent 
lines across which very great differences in economic, social and political 
geography occur. Looking at this issue theoretically, Diagram L (A and B) 
assumes two adjacent areas, with identical physical environmental 
conditions and only one ethnic group occupying both areas. Yet the 
differences summarized in the diagram and the descriptions underneath 
reveal startling contrasts between A and B, This model represents of 
course an extreme case in which all the disadvantages are with A and 
all the advantages are possessed by B. In terms of the contemporary 
human geography it is area B that has all the investment, infrastructure, 
economic and social development, the growth of urban centres and a 
certainty of being incorporated in and integrated with the nation’s 
space economy. Area A, on the other hand, shows no signs of any 
development - however defined - and remains on the rejected periphery 
of the national economy in every sense.
Clearly the international boundary in Diagram I does reflect 
great geographical differences between the areas on opposite sides of the 
boundary. But it is difficult to see how the argument can be sustained 
that the international boundary has itself caused these differences.
More logically, it seems clear that it is differences in government 
policies that are responsible for the contrasts across the boundary.
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In case A the government in which the area lies has, for whatever 
reason, not chosen to invest in the area nor to incorporate it into 
the national economy: the periphery remains poor and divorced from 
the ’centre1. In the case of area B, the government is clearly 
concerned - for whatever reason - to incorporate the area into
its national development planning: the periphery is Being kept in close
touch with the 'centre1. Differences in the contemporary human 
geography across the Boundary are caused, not By the international 
Boundary, nor By the environment, nor By the people - the first is only
an abstraction, the other two are identical on Both sides of the
Boundary, The differences are the result entirely of different 
policies towards their peripheral areas adopted By their respective 
governments.
That this notion is not entirely imaginary or theoretical 
is evidenced By simple observation as well as By a number of students.
In the field, for instance, the difference in the human and economic 
landscape as one crosses the international boundary Between Lesotho 
and South Africa is immediate and dramatic. On the Lesotho side 
the agricultural landscape is poor, disordered and clearly suffering from 
lack of water; human settlements are very small and subsistence- 
oriented; roads are few and poor, On the western Bank of the Caledon 
river, which forms the western Boundary Between Lesotho and South Africa 
at this point, there is an immediate change to an apparently suddenly 
fertile land, watered By expensive irrigation schemes, with large, 
ordered fields and evidence of prosperity in the farm settlements. The 
difference is, of course, that South Africa and its white farming 
community has the capital and the markets for heavy investment in 
farming and is supported By a strong infrastructural Back-up from the
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government. Exactly the opposite occurs across the boundary in 
Lesotho.
In West Africa studies along the Slave Coast (Newbury, I960; 
Newbury and Hodder, 1962) indicate the geographical changes that have 
occurred along a stretch of the coastal plain lying behind the 
Slave Coast. Here a fairly uniform set of environmental conditions 
are divided .by international boundaries representing the colonial 
territories of the British, French and Germans, All the international 
boundaries of what are now independent states cut through homogeneous 
tribal territories of one kind or another. The geographical contrasts 
that occur as one moves westwards from Nigeria along the Slave Coast 
are very striking - in crops and types of agriculture, in forms of 
rural and urban settlement, and in ways of life discussed in detail 
in Newbury and Hodder (1962), Moreover, in the case of the Ewe, lying 
athwart the boundary between Ghana and Togo there is an excellent 
example of how on one side of the border (in Ghana) the Ewe are 
disadvantaged and feel peripheral to the 'centre' in Ghana as far as 
economic, social and political development are concerned. On the other 
side of the international boundary (in Togo), however, the Ewe are 
not only fully integrated but in fact themselves form more or less the 
'core' or 'centre' of Togolese economic, social and political life.
Within the Nile Basin there are many cases of the same point 
to be made. One of the clearest analyses of the geographical effects 
of an international boundary known to the author is that by Kibulya (1967) 
who examines the geographical contrasts on a small section of the Uganda- 






























On the Uganda side of the "boundary the name Bwamba has been retained as 
the name for the administrative country while the adjacent area of 
Zaire is now called Butalinga (Pig, I ), The Amba people are isolated - 
to the west by the Parc National and to the east by the Ruwenzori range* 
The boundary line here follows the thalweg of the River Lamya, crossed 
by only the one road bridge, though water crossings are possible, 
especially during the dry season, This boundary between Zaire and 
Uganda has never been paid much attention by either administration 
and traditionally, of course, Zaire has been occupied with the 
development of Katanga (Shaba) and other regions of the country while 
Uganda was for long concerned primarily with developments in Buganda.
The Amba country, then, has been and still is very peripheral to the 
main interests of both national governments.
However, the degree of isolation or remoteness has differed on 
either side of the boundary. The British introduced coffee as a cash 
crop into the Bwamba country in 1922 and cotton, manilla hemp and other 
crops followed in the 1930s. By 1953 the road from Port Portal had 
reached the boundary and Bwamba became one of the richest rural areas 
in Uganda, On the western side of the boundary, however, no such 
developments took place, the Belgians being interested primarily in 
facilitating administration and tax collecting. The Amba of Butalinga 
were therefore encouraged to move into large clustered villages- in any 
case their traditional settlement form - and each village head was 
responsible for tax collection! this tax necessitated the local Amba 
selling part of their rice crop to make enough money to pay these taxes. 
To the east of the boundary, in Bwamba, the different political policy 
led to a different settlement pattern - dispersed farming settlements 
with, eventually, small urban centres developing around cooperatives 
and parish centres (muluka),
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Communications 'became much better in Bwamba than in Butalinga 
and, together with the other improvements and opportunities provided 
in Bwamba, the population density is now much higher than in Butalinga 
(over, two'and a half times). Trading centres, together with markets, 
have attracted urban-style services and in Bwamba a completely different 
way of life has developed. Land-use, social services, economic 
infrastructure, settlement characteristics - all these show increasing 
contrasts, fostered by their different links with different faiths 
(Catholic in Butalinga, Protestant in Bwamba) and economic and political 
orientations.
Prom the point of view of the present thesis, the case of 
the Amba is an interesting one in that it reveals clearly how an 
international boundary can lead to formerly homogenous areas becoming 
quite startlingly different and perpetuating' this difference up to the 
present day, Differences in the cultural landscapes on either side 
of the border are obvious and increasing. However, ICibulya, like 
most geographers making this kind of analysis, does not go beyond 
describing and explaining these differences to address the central 
question which concerns us here* does this boundary cause any 
problems between the two states? At the national level the answer is 
clearly in the negative. On the other hand, the movement of people 
across the boundary for trade and other visits is sometimes easy, 
sometimes difficult if not impossible; and this depends entirely on the 
relations between the two governments. Economic and political 
circumstances in Zaire and Uganda have of course changed frequently and 
dramatically over the years, The boundary itself here is not 
demarcateds it is simply the river across which people can often wade.
It is only when one or other of the two governments tries to close this 
boundary that any inconvenience is caused. And, with its remoteness and
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with the experience of the local people in night-time smuggling across 
the river, even this inconvenience is never significant.
The case of the Amha people can he replicated from almost 
every boundary in the Nile Basin and generally the same kind of 
conclusion can he drawn. This is only one of the innumerable cases 
where the geographically arbitrary nature of an international boundary 
matters little to the people living on either side of it. Certainly 
it appears to be as true of the Amba as of the Ewe that ’they seem 
content to leave the boundary where it is, and have no strong desire for 
Ewe unity as such' (Hodder, 1978* P*35). Not that such movements have 
not emerged in the past, especially during and immediately after the 
independence period: Pan-Ewe, Pan-Masai, Pan-Karamojong - such 
movements were common, The point is that after two decades or so of 
independence and in the context of national political realities, 
such movements are no longer significant - at least in the Nile Basin, 
where they are seen to be anachronistic and disruptive as well as 
pointless. The academic analysis of state boundaries by geographers 
can easily produce formidable lists of the ’effects’ of boundaries on 
the life, work and movement of peoples and goods% and the usual 
implication is that these 'effects’ are undesirable and could only be 
remedied by the re-drawing of boundaries. Such an implication and such 
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CHAPTER TWO
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF THE NILE BASIN STATES
Aspects of Physical and Human Geography The Nile Basin, as defined
in Figure 2 (Hurst, 1944; Mohamed, 1956; Megahed, 1973; Waterbury,
1979) is the most significant geographical feature of north-eastern
2Africa and covers an area of some 2.9 million kms . This is roughly
one-tenth of the area of the African continent. As a river basin,
its central element is of course the Nile river system. From its
most distant source, the Nile flows for about 6,700 kms to the
Mediterranean Sea through the Nile Delta. It is the second largest
river in the world and the whole system contains several lakes,
including Lake Victoria, the largest freshwater lake in the
1
continent, and lakes Albert, Edward and Kioga, as well as the great 
man-made lake of Lake Nasser, lying athwart the Egypt-Sudan boundary.
Physically,the basin is defined by the maximum watershed 
limits of the whole Nile Basin, though these watersheds are often 
difficult to discern on the ground. Only in Ethiopia, where the 
Blue Nile rises in Lake Tana, and on the mountainous western and 
eastern rift-valley limits of the Lake Plateau, centred on Lake 
Victoria, are there very clear topographical watershed limits to the 
Nile Basin. Otherwise the Nile Basin averages up to 400 metres 
above sea level in Egypt and much of the Sudan, rising to an average 
of over 1,000 metres in Ethiopia and the Lake Plateau, though higher
1. For the purposes of this thesis the more modern names of lakes 
and other features are not used unless their permanence is 
assured.
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elevations are common in Ethiopia and on the edges of the rift valleys 
bounding the Lake Plateau to the east and west. On the Lake Plateau 
lie Mount Elgon (5,321 m.) and the peaks of the Ruwenzori range 
(Mount Margharita, 5,124 m.).
As the basin extends over such a wide range of latitude 
and altitude, it includes many different climatic zones, determined 
primarily by rainfall amounts and seasonal regimes ("Pig* 3 ), though 
the higher plateau and mountain fringes reveal often startling 
temperature contrasts. Vegetation in the basin includes the alpine 
flora of the snow-capped peaks of the Ruwenzori, the tropical savannas 
of the Lake Plateau, limited areas of tropical forests, widespread 
papyrus swamps, the swamp forests of southern Sudan, and the semi- 
desert and desert lands of the northern part of the Nile Basin.
It is here, in the northern half of the basin, that life and agri­
culture depend so heavily on irrigation by water from the Nile, 
whereas in the south it is rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism 
that dominate.
Erom north to south, the Nile Basin may be divided 
roughly into four regions based primarily on the main river and 
drainage features. In the north, to as far south as the confluence 
with the Atbara River, the Nile has no significant tributaries, so 
that the basin is contained within a relatively narrow strip of up 
to 750 kms wide. The second region includes the river systems, 
basins and lake associated with the Atbara and Blue Nile rivers, 
both of them having their sources in Ethiopia and producing a large 
eastwards bulge in the shape of the Nile Basin lands (figure 2).
West and south of this region lie the moister lands of southern 
Sudan, culminating in the great western bulge in the shape of the 
Nile Basin caused by the spreading and often indeterminate lines of
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drainage fingering out from the main channel of the White Nile 
(Bahr el Jebel) through the sudd and such rivers as the Bahr el- 
Ghazal. Finally, in the south lies the source of the Nile on the 
Lake Plateau, with its gigantic inland lakes of Victoria, Kioga,
Albert and Edward.
Neither the four drainage regions outlined above, nor
indeed the Nile Basin itself, are in any way coincident with the
international boundaries, which form the central interest of the
present study. The states concerned - known collectively in Egypt
2as 'The Nile Basin States' — are Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, and some parts 
of Ethiopia, Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, though the 
countries with the most substantial interest in the Nile waters are 
Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, the last being the only country 
entirely within the Nile Basin. Otherwise, only varying proportions 
of the states under consideration lie within the Nile Basin, ranging 
from perhaps two-thirds of Rwanda, half of Burundi and a third of 
Ethiopia, to only narrow border strips in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zaire.
On the other hand, virtually all the population of Egypt and Sudan 
live within the Nile Basin as defined in this thesis.
This lack of coincidence between the Nile Basin as a drain­
age feature, the four drainage regions identified above, and the Nile 
Basin states as defined in the preceding paragraph is, however, not 
only to be expected: it is central to the arguments about internation­
al boundaries considered in these pages.
The same lack of coincidence is found when considering the
salient facts of the human geography of the Nile Basin. By far the
greatest concentration of human populations, with associated high
levels of urbanisation, is in the narrow belt along the banks of the
%. The author, in his work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Egypt, 
is particularly concerned with 'The Nile BasinSt'ates1 in the Africa 
Department; they are defined as stated here.
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Nile downstream from Lake Nasser and spreading throughout the delta 
at the river*s mouth. There are other areas of relatively high 
densities in Rwanda and Burundi, the northern shores of Lake Victoria, 
around the confluence of the Blue and White Niles and in pockets of 
the Ethiopian Highlands, Otherwise the Nile Basin lands are generally 
very sparsely populated or completely unpopulated. Economies and 
ways of life differ widely. But from our point of view here the 
most significant fact about the human geography refers to the 
’tribal* ethnic or linguistic pattern of the area and the way in 
which the international boundaries are believed for the most part to 
ignore such a pattern. At this stage in the thesis there is no point 
in presenting any more detailed account of the ethno-linguistic 
groups than that presented in Figure 4j just as there is little 
point in detailing here the drainage, watershed and topographical 
features most relevant to the issue of international boundaries.
These will be presented together with the facts on the delimitation, 
demarcation and problems of the international boundaries of the 
Nile Basin in subsequent chapters,
3, The terms 'tribal1 and ’ethnic1 are used synonymously in this thesis.
Nevertheless it will be convenient at this stage to say a little 
more about two matters* First, it is important to recognise some of 
the more significant groups affected by boundary delimitations in 
the Nile Basin. Among the Bantu, found in the south-west of the Basin, 
are many groups belonging to important kingdom-states around the 
northern, western and southern shores of Lake Victoria and in the 
area between Lake Victoria and the chain of lakes associated with the 
western rift valley system: lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu and Tanganyika 
(Fallers, I960). Ethnographically the most famous of these Bantu states 
are Buganda, Bunyoro and Ankole, but others such as Busoga and, in the 
west, Toro, Rwanda, Burundi and many others are significant. The 
Nilo-Saharan peoples include important pastoralist groups such as 
the Masai, Turkana, Karamoja and Suk (Pokot) of importance to our study 
here, as their search for water and grazing lands as well as their 
whole nomadic or semi-nomadic ways of life frequently mean that they 
find it peculiarly difficult to keep within territorial limits based 
on political boundaries at the international level. Finally, in the 
north, are the Afro-Asiatic groups, notably the numerous Arabic groups, 
the Tigrinya, Amharic (in Ethiopia) and Fula#
Secondly, the whole question of migration is clearly central to 
our study, including as it does the movements of people across 
international boundaries in the region. Historically, migrations of 
all kinds have been an important factor in producing the present 
population distribution and ethnic mix in the Nile Basin. Before 
European colonial boundaries were imposed on the region migration - 
both forced and unforced, short-term and long-term - was a feature of 
human population movements as indigenous groups and/or states waxed
and waned in power and influence. Pastoralism, too, has always been 
an important - in some areas the important - economic way of life 
and the continuous movements in search of pasture could never be 
expected to operate within strictly observed territorial limits.
With the drawing of colonial boundaries camirestrictions on 
movement, though these have never been of great dimensions. More 
important have been the stimuli provided to migration by the new 
opportunities provided by European control of the lands and economies 
they began to control. Rwanda and Burundi, for example, were 
looked upon as labour reservoirs for both the former Belgian Congo 
(for raining and land development schemes ) and for the European 
planters of the Usumburu Highlands.; andKilimanjaro. Other 
opportunities for work have been provided in Uganda and at 
independence, according to Nyerere,1numerous tribes now live in at 
least two countries or have their origins in some other area 
of Africa*(Nyerere, 1963, p.2).
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Historical Aspects The European-imposed boundaries with which we
are concerned here are in no case more than one hundred years old
and in most cases the boundaries are considerably more recent (Figure 5).
At the time of the Conference and Treaty of Berlin (1884-5) the only
area of alien rule in the Bile Basin was Egypt (British): otherwise
indigenous rule held sway, notably under the Mahdi, in what was
to become the Sudan, and in Ethiopia. By 1895 Italian presence around
the edges of Ethiopia had established some sort of boundary with the non-
European controlled lands of Sudan; but it was in the south that the
greatest changes had taken place, the Congo Free State (Belgium),
British East Africa and German East Africa having made inroads into most
of the southern parts of the Nile Basin, By the 1914 war the international
boundaries in the region were more or less firmly drawn. The First World
War resulted in changes in the extreme south, where German East Africa
was mandated to Britain (Tanganyika) and Belgium (Ruandi-Urundi),
though the actual boundary lines were not changed. Within the Nile Basin
subsequent changes in the general alignment of the international
boundaries have been small and localised and these detailed changes
will be referred to in the analysis of specific boundaries in later
chapters. The point to be emphasised here is that in the long
perspective of African history the present-day boundaries are relatively
recent in origin and that they resulted initially from European
imposition, often with apparently little or no knowledge of the physical
and human circumstances of the areas through which these boundaries were
drawn. Thus, though the boundaries were in fact often drawn initially
with agreement or negotiation with local chiefs, neither their precise
location nor the precise authority vested in the 1 chief1 chosen to make
1, Tanganyika remained the name of the country until 19^4> when Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar were combined in a united republic called Tanzania.
TABLE II
Length and Status of Boundaries
Boundary Length (kms) Status
Egypt-Sudan (international) 126*f Delimited
(administrative) 1210 -
Sudan-Ethiopia 2336 Demarcated
Uganda-Sudan k k o Delimited
Sudan-Kenya 22k Delimited
Sudan-Zaire 62k Demarcated









Source; Several, including Widstrand, 1969*
such agreements coull be accepted with any great confidence.
The International Boundaries of the Rile Basin
The thirteen international boundaries of the Nile Basin 
will be examined in the next chapter in the order given below. This is in 
no sense in order of importance, but it seems useful simply to list the 
boundaries at this point in the order in which they will be treated 






















Egypt 1,001,449 43,290 43.2
Sudan 2,505,813 19,240 7.7
Ethiopia 1,221,900 31,800 26,0
Uganda 236,036 13,050 55-3
Kenya 582,645 17,360 29.8
Tanzania 945,087 19,140 20.3
Burundi 27,834 4,230 152.0
Rwanda 26,338 5,350 203.1
Zaire 2,354,409 29,780 12.6



















(*■) THE EGYPT-SUDAN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
The international boundary between Egypt and Sudan follows 
the 22° H. parallel more or less throughout its course (Figure 6) and 
would seem therefore to be very simple, clear and unambiguous, in spite 
of its clearly artificial character. In fact, however, the boundary 
has in the past been associated with a number of difficulties in 
relations between the two countries.
Before examining the boundary in more detail, however, it is 
important to note that Egypt and Sudan have not always been quite 
separate countries with completely separate legal identities. Originally 
part of the Turkish Empire (Figure 5), Egypt was occupied by Britain in 
1 8 8 2 , In 1883, however, the Mahdi set up a state in the Sudan provinces 
until, in l896-99> joint Anglo-Egyptian military operations reconquered 
the provinces. In 1899 an agreement between the British Government 
and the Khedive of Egypt created the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In reality 
this was a condominium in which Britain and Egypt had joint sovereignty. 
Whereas Egyptian independence was recognised quite soon, in 1922,
the Sudan did not achieve its own independence until 1956*
The first definition of the Egypt-Sudan international 
boundary dates back to the 1 8 9 9  agreement referred to above which 
states that the term Soudan (sic) means all the territories south 
of the 2 2 nd parallel of latitude which fulfilled three criteria:
(i) all territories which had never been evacuated 
^y Egyptian troops since 1882;
(ii) all territories which, previously administered by 
the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt and 
subsequently reconquered by Britain and Egypt;
(iii) all territories which may hereafter be reconquered by 
Britain and Egypt acting together. Since 1956, 
when Sudan became independent, Egypt has always 
interpreted the international boundary in 
exactly this way.
Three specific boundary questions have arisen, however, The 
first refers to the Wadi Haifa salient (FigureS ), which fingers
northwards into Egypt along both sides of what is now Lake Nasser.
There is some difference of interpretation over this salient, both 
in the 1899 agreement and in the Egyptian arrete later the same year 
which created the salient. The arrete established the salient to as 
far north as the Faras terminus, Faras being a village just north 
of Birba, and was accomplished, according to subsequent Egyptian 
interpretation, for purely administrative reasons; it is clear from 
reading the text of this arrete*" that Egypt realised that there were 
no Arabs in the salient area and so to have included this area in their 
administrative responsibilities would have been inconvenient at that 
time. Some authorities have argued that the 1899 arr&te definitely 
transferred the salient area to Sudan (Brownlie, 1979), but Egypt 
has consistently claimed that the salient represents only an admin­
istrative line - not an international boundary (Abdalla, 1958) .
The second dispute has centred on a similar ambiguity over 
the international boundary in the east. As Figure 6 shows, the 
administrative boundary here lies partly south and partly north 
of the parallel 22° N. The section lying south of the parallel and 
placed under Egyptian administration was defined as including the 
lands and wells of the Ababda tribe, whereas the section lying north 
of the parallel was defined as including the grazing grounds and 
wells of the Beja (Bedawye-speaking peoples) (Figure 6) , This arrange­
ment dates from an arrete" and decree of 1902 in which it was considered 
necessary ’to determine definitely the region of the bedouin tribes 
of Egypt and the Sudan’. Here again, then, ’tribal’ or 'ethnic' 
distributions - this time concerning nomadic pastoralists - were 
explicitly given as the reason for re-drawing the boundary. In this
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case, the map evidence seems to establish that the new eastern 
section boundary was purely administrative in character. However, 
there developed a clear difference of opinion on this matter.
Both of these issues - the Wadi Haifa salient and the 
eastern section of the international boundary - derived clearly 
from different interpretations of the various documents and maps 
on which the agreements, arretes and decrees were based. But it was 
not until 1958 that these disputed areas seemed likely to damage 
relations between Egypt and Sudan. In 1958 - two years after 
independence - Sudan took steps to hold elections in the area 
north of the 22° N. parallel in the eastern section. Egypt replied 
by proposing a restoration of the respective Sudanese and Egyptian 
administered areas; in other words Egypt proposed and still maintains 
that the legal international boundary follows the 22° N. parallel 
throughout its length (Reyner, 196^) . This dispute remains unsolved 
today, but is not now alluded to by either side.
The other important issue between Egypt and Sudan arose 
quite simply and understandably from the fact that the waters of the 
Nile in Egypt originate far to the south, not only beyond its own 
borders but also beyond the borders of Sudan with Ethiopia (the Blue 
Nile) and Uganda (the White or Victoria Nile). As ’the gift of the 
Nile’, utterly dependent on its water, Egypt has perhaps the greatest 
vested interests in resolving any disputes with its upstream neighbour. 
Indeed, up to just before Sudan’s independence in 1956 many writers 
and politicians on both sides of the border argued strongly for some 
form of unity between the two countries; and it was the mutuality of 
interests over the Nile waters that initiated and perpetuated such 
movements for Egyptian-Sudanese unity. As one writer put it, ’in 
modern times an ideology arose, inspired by the Egyptians and Sudanese,
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that all people of the Nile valley are one. A transboundary river or 
body of water is more difficult to manage than one that falls entirely 
or predominantly within the frontiers of a single state1 (Waterbury, 
1979, p.43).
The imminence of independence in Sudan destroyed hopes of 
unity between these two riparian states and from 1956 friction between 
Egypt and Sudan - caused mainly by the question of the Nile waters - 
developed, often to serious levels, resulting in the breaking-off of 
negotiations between the two governments concerned. In November 1958, 
however, the Sudanese army took over the government of the country 
in a coup d’etat and negotiations between the two governments were 
quickly resumed. Three ad hoc committees were set up - for trade, 
financial matters and the Nile waters. The question of the Nile was 
therefore now to be linked with trade and financial relations between 
the two countries - matters of urgent importance to Sudan which had 
suffered seriously from the disruption of trade and financial rela­
tions during its period of dispute with Egypt (Megahed, 1973). By 
November 1959 these agreements were successfully concluded: the Trade and 
Payments Agreement, the Customs Agreement and the .Agreement for the Full 
Utilisation of the Nile Waters. The last and most important of these 
three agreements deserves particular attention in the context of the 
present study.
This 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan 
provided for the formation of a Permanent Joint Technical Commission 
with the object of maintaining technical cooperation between the govern­
ments of Sudan and Egypt, and to continue the research work and studies 
required for the projects aiming at harnessing the river and increas­
ing the available volume of its waters. Important points included in 
this 1959 Agreement were:
(i) It maintained the principle of respecting established rights to
3 . 3the waters of the Nile (.4 billion m for Sudan and 48 billion m
for Egypt, amounts to be measured at Aswan.
(ii) Egypt and Sudan agreed on the construction of a High Dam at Aswan 
in order to harness- the river’s waters. Sudan was also to con­
struct the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile and anywhere else where 
the Sudanese government saw an opportunity to exploit its share 
of the waters.
(iii) The net increase (after evaporation) of water resulting from the
construction of the High Dam would be distributed between the two
3 3countries (14g billion m for Sudan and billion m for Egypt).
These shares were to be added to the respective acquired rights
3of both parties, resulting in a total of 18g billion m for
3Sudan and 55 g billiom m for Egypt.
(iv) Egypt agreed to pay the Sudan a sum amounting to LE 15m in
sterling as compensation for the damage that would be done to 
existing Sudanese property as a result of storage on the High Dam. 
The Sudanese government agreed to be responsible for resettling 
population displaced by the High Dam waters in Haifa and 
elsewhere.
(v) Sudan agreed to undertake with Egypt any necessary projects to
prevent loss or wastage of water in the marshlands of southern
Sudan and in the Sobat and its tributaries. Both countries will 
share the costs and revenues incurred.
(iv) In the case of any country other than Egypt and Sudan requesting 
a share in the Nile waters, unity of opinion between the two 
countries must first be reached.
The Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 seemed finally to solve 
the question of the Nile waters and related disputes between the two
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countries. It provided for full cooperation between the two countries 
and so initiated a new era in Egyptian-Sudanese relations,
The great success of the Nile Waters agreement has completely 
defused the boundary problems as matters of dispute between the two 
countries. And it is significant that what is certainly on all geo­
graphical grounds a wholly unsatisfactory boundary between the two 
states so dependent on the Nile waters has not destroyed relations 
between the two states concerned. Indeed it could be argued that the 
very serious nature of the difficulties arising from the boundary 
have forced a quick and permanent solution to the dispute. Yet it 
has not produced - and may never produce - any ’union', however defined, 
between the two states. After 1959 the vital interests revolving 
around the water supply and economic integration were safeguarded, 
but serious consideration of political union was not revived until 
ten years later, in 1969, when 'a beleagured Nasser, an upwardly 
mobile Qaddafi, and a tenuously seated Nimeirj?, sired the Federation 
of Arab Republics' (Waterbury, 1979, p.55). This federation, however, 
did not last.
More recently, in 1982, President Mubarak of Egypt paid a 
visit to Khartoum. By the time he left the Sudanese capital he had 
signed an agreement known as the 'Charter of Integration' with his 
Sudanese counterpart, Nimeiry. Among other things, the agreement 
calls for the establishment of an'economic unity' between the two 
countries over a 10-year transitional period. Citizens of the two 
countries will be allowed to live and work freely in either country. 
Tariffs will be abolished and policies on transport, communications, 
industry and irrigation will be coordinated. Both currencies will be 
accepted in the two countries as a step towards the unification of 
the currency. A joint parliament composed of 30 members each, which
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will meet twice a year, is formed. The agreement also calls for 
close coordination in foreign affairs, in national defence and in 
social programmes.
In short, the agreement is a step on the road to an 
eventual political fusion of the two Nile valley countries (Africa Mag., No.135 
1982). As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Egypt and the 
Sudan will coordinate all their international relations, and moves 
and will introduce the process of integration to diplomatic represent­
ation abroad (Egyptian Gazette, October 11, 1982). The Deputy Premier, 
moreover, emphasised the need to unify the policies and systems of 
education in the two countries so as to achieve fuller cultural 
unity between the two peoples (Egyptian Gazette, October 13, 1982).
These new relations between Egypt and the Sudan may be expressed as 
a pattern of co-operation between the two Nile basin countries, or 
at least a step that enables the riparian states to overcome their 





































(il) THE SUDAN-KTHIQPIA BOUNDARY
This long boundary (Figure 7 ) tends to be given relatively little 
attention in the literature in English., especially considering the 
fact that some two-thirds of the Nile waters originate on the 
Ethiopian side of the boundary. One major reason for this must be 
the tendency to view the Nile Basin as consisting largely of the 
former British controlled or administered areas — notably Egypt,
Sudan and Uganda. 'The Nile* still means to many people primarily 
that part of the Nile which rises on th.e Lake Plateau of East Africa. 
However, from the point of view of the Nile water resources, the 
contribution made by Ethiopia is critical and so, therefore, are the 
relations between Sudan and Ethiopia.
In the latter part of the nineteenth, century, the ancient 
Empire of Ethiopia was faced with. Egyptian territorial designs along 
its western frontiers, however imprecisely defined (Abir, 1967), In 
the last years of the century European colonial expansion established 
general areas of influence, leaving Ethiopia within the Italian 
sphere, making the extinction of Ethiopia apparently imminent (Brownlie, 
1979, p.855). However, Italian expansion from Eritrea proved 
difficult, as did British expansion in the Sudan and East Africa.
For this reason the British, French, and Italians made a series of 
arrangements between 1898-1907 which recognised the existence and 
territorial integrity of Ethiopia, At this stage, however, the Sudan- 
Ethiopia boundary was described as the eastern frontier of Egypt, for 
at that time Britain upheld the rights of Egypt in the Nile Valley, 
including what is now Sudan. As noted in the section on the Egypt- 
Sudan international boundary, it was not until later that Sudan acquired
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separate status and finally, in 1956, independence as: the Republic 
of Sudan. The main change to the territory of Ethiopia occurred a 
few years earlier, in 1952, when Eritrea, formerly an Italian colony, 
was transferred to Ethiopia b.y the United Nations (Brownlie, op. cj.t., 
p.856; Al-Nur, 1971; Hussein, 19.77).
The international boundary as it exists today dates bach 
to between 1891 and 1909, depending on the section of this very 
long boundary, stretching as it does from 18° N, to 4g° N, at the 
northern tip of Lake Rudolf. Treating the boundary from north to 
south, the following points are of interest. The first section, from 
the Red Sea to just south of Kassala, formerly constituteda major 
part of the frontier between Eritrea and the Sudan, It is a varied 
boundary, following natural features and straight lines, and different 
parts of it were established at different times. However, it is now 
well demarcated and has apparently never been the cause of any 
problem in that it is mutually recognised by all the border peoples 
which are certainly very numerous along much of the boundary
(Brownlie, 1979, p.856), This is an important point because this 
section of the boundary reveals once again the trouble taken from 
the outset to avoid causing too many difficulties for the local 
populations. Hertslet (.Vol.Ill, 1909, p. 1108) refers to the Egyptian- 
Italian Agreement of 1895 *for regulating the dependence of the semi- 
nomadic tribes, and for redefining their respective frontiers1.
Article II of this agreement defines these tribes who acknowledge 
the authority of the various sheiks and divides them accordingly into 
dependence on Eritrea or tEgyptl:. At the same time the two govern­
ments undertook to allow legitimate movement across the border within 
limits specified in the agreement.
The. second section - a much, shorter stretch reaching 
south to the River Setit near Uiribxega -■* was for some long time the 
subject of confused and often technical discussion between Ethiopia, 
Britain and Italy: indeed it was not finally accepted as confirmed 
in principle until as late as 1972. By itself, however, it does 
not appear to raise any difficulties today.
From the Setit River southwards stretches the long third 
section of the boundary to as far south as 6° N, The reason for 
treating this section separately is that, based on the 1902 Treaty, 
the boundary was demarcated by Gwynn, a British Boundary Commissioner 
in 1903 and is still known as the 'Gwynn Line'. Ethiopia and Sudan 
accepted this boundary as valid in a Joint Communique^ of 1967, but 
an agreement of 1972 allows for the rectification of the boundary 
to eradicate any problems arising in the B'aro Salient region. Here 
there are two groups - the Annuak and the Nuer - split by the inter­
national boundary. The other interesting point about this section of 
the boundary is that it includes the exits from Ethiopia of the Blue 
Nile and Sobat rivers. In the 19.02 Agreement, Article III refers 
specifically to the importance of these water resources: Ethiopia
undertook ’not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work 
across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat which would arrest the 
flow of their waters into the Nile’ except in agreement with the 
governments of Britain and Sudan.
The final section of the boundary extends to the tripoint 
at Lake Rudolf and was the result of the ’lack of partition between 
Ethiopia and the Sudan to the West and between Ethiopia and British 
East Africa to the South' (Brownlie, 1979, p.857), Again, this 
section of the boundary was left without precise definition or agree­
ment until 1972.
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In conclusion, it seems important to make further reference 
to the Joint Communique, of the Ethiopia-Sudanese Border Talks (Addis 
Ababa, 1967) and the Joint Consultative Committee (Addis Ababa, 1972).
The first refers to an agreement that ’farmers should continue farming 
their present land on either side of the frontier so long as they 
respected the laws of the Government of the side on which they live' 
(Brownlie, 1979, p.882), The second committee considered increased 
cooperation between the two countries in economic, culture, transport 
and communications; it also reviewed trade relations between the two 
countries as well as all outstanding disputes over the exact de­
marcation of the boundary.
This long boundary is clearly interesting from many points 
of view, but one of these not frequently mentioned is that here is a 
boundary which was not negotiated between two European powers, This is 
one reason why, as we shall see later, Ethiopia is a strong supporter 
of the status quo in African boundaries, At the time of boundary-making 
Ethiopia was already an independent state. For Ethiopia, all its 
boundaries established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
are regarded as an achievement of Ethiopian diplomacy in its struggle 
























(iii) THE UGANDA-SUDAN BOUNDARY
There are still many uncertainties about the Uganda—Sudan international 
boundary and the reason for this is that to the British a politically 
exact boundary between the two administrative units was of little 
importance - both territories being British - and that in any case the 
border area was a particularly difficult one to monitor successfully. 
Moreover, a number of changes in the allocation of territory took 
place between the Congo, Sudan and Uganda. In 1910 the Lado Enclave 
became part of Sudan, but in 1912 the southern part of this enclave 
was transferred to Uganda ("West Nile District) while Sudan took the 
Bari - Lotulca area in the north east. This gave Uganda contol over both 
banks of the Nile down to Nimule (Collins, 1968). it was not until 
1914 that any clearly defined Uganda-Sudan boundary emerged, and it 
was 1926 before the present boundary was finally described and de­
limitated (Figure 8 ) though it is still little demarcated.
West of the point where the Nile crosses the international 
boundary the Uganda-Sudan-Congo tripoint is on the Congo-Nile water­
shed nearest to the source of the River Kaia (Kaya). From there it 
follows the river upstream before striking out in a series of straight 
lines until, just before reaching the Nile, it turns south-eastwards, 
parallel to the Nile to Nimule.
East of the Nile, the original boundary commission in 1913 
examined tribal lands and natural features, attempting to avoid as far 
as possible cutting across existing tribal divisions. However, in 
practice it was found possible only to delimit the boundary in terms 
of straight lines between prominent hills (jebels): ’thence following 
a straight line to the summit of Jebel Lanhia; thence following a
straight line to the summit of Jebel Ilala; thence following a
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straight line to summit of Jebel Aggu.,,1 (.Uganda Off. Gaz.
1914). As Stigand 0-923) noted, however, these ’arbitrary1- straight 
lines severed villages, from their water and cultivation as well as 
chiefs from their dependents. Hore seriously, the Acholi of Uganda 
were thereby - at least in theory - severed from their kinsmen in 
Sudan. But no change in the boundary occurred here, though a minor 
change in the boundary was made in 192b when part of Uganda (Chua 
District) was transferred to Sudan, partly to reunite the Lango with 
their kinsmen in Sudan and also to facilitate the control of sleeping 
sickness (Collins, 196 8). it must also be remembered that the eastern 
section of the 1914 Uganda-Sudan boundary became the Kenya-Sudan 
boundary, when, in 1926, Uganda’s Rudolf Province was transferred from 
Uganda to Kenya so that the 19.14 line to the east of the Kenya tri­
point became the Kenya-Sudan boundary.
Since independence - Sudan in 19.56 and Uganda in 1962 - 
there have been no boundary disputes between the two countries, though 
Amin made the same kind of comments about this boundary in 1976 as he
did about the Uganda-Kenya boundary.
Perhaps the most important point to stress about this 
boundary is that its delimitation illustrates very well the dangers 
of retrospective value judgements about the achievements of the bound­
ary commissioners. The commissioners were clearly anxious to avoid 
cutting through tribal lands. The difficulty was that they could not 
possibly visit all areas, their information about the peoples and 
their distributions was often wrong or unreliable, and among constantly 
moving groups living at low densities of population it was - and is -
impossible to determine on the ground exactly where one tribal area
stops and another starts. Indeed, perhaps no such line can ever exist 






















(iv) THE SUDAN-KENYA BOUNDARY
This boundary did not exist between Sudan and Kenya until 1926 when, 
as described in the sections on the Uganda—Kenya and Uganda—Sudan 
boundaries, the Rudolf Province of Uganda was transferred to Kenya.
The present Sudan-Kenya boundary therefore dates back to 1914 and 
follows spurs, hills and straight lines eastwards from the northern 
tip of Lake Rudolf. For our purposes here the important phrase in 
the relevant Order in Council refers to ’a straight line, or such a 
line as would leave to Uganda the customary grazing grounds of the 
Turlcana tribe1. Here again was an attempt to consider tribal interests 
of a pastoral people and it soon became apparent that the grazing 
grounds of the Turkana were some way from being capable of being 
expressed in a straight geometrical line. Not until 1931, in fact, 
were these ’customary grazing lands’ delimited by what is known as 
the 'Red Line’ (Figure 9 ). As Brownlie (1979, pp.917-8) points out, 
this Red Line involved a ’northerly intrusion of Kenyan civil admin­
istration in the area of the Ilemi (or Ilembi) Triangle’, In 1938 the 
Red Line, with some modifications, was established on the ground.
There is now uncertainty about the exact legal status of these 
alternative boundaries - whether the Red Line or the straight line is 
the interntional boundary, and whether the Red Line is simply an 
administrative boundary (see also McEwen, 1971, p.134; Taha, 1973).
In spite of this confusion, there has been no challenging 
of the boundaries since independence, and the straight line boundary 
is now most commonly used on modern maps. After all, neither line seems 
to have controlled movements of people across the boundary. As McEwen 
(op.cit., p.134) puts it, ’The Red Line, as finally demarcated, failed 
to prevent tribal raids, although it did include all the grazing land
that could fairly he claimed by the Turkana to be theirs by custom1.
He goes on to note that another line - the Blue Line, lying even 
further to the north - has been suggested, and this Blue Line offers, 
so it is said, 'strategic advantages' that are not possessed by the 
Red Line, Kenya, with the permission of the Sudan government, maintains 
a number of police posts between the Red and Blue lines; one post, 
at Kibbish, actually lies to the north of the Blue Line. Legally, 
however, the 1914 section of the former boundary between Uganda and 
Sudan is still the official international boundary between Kenya and Sudan, 
Experience to date indicates that no line, of whatever 'colour', can 
solve the 'problem' here* All that is required is that, as in many 
other instances, free movement of pastoral groups be allowed back and 
forth across the boundary where the purpose is simply to maintain a 
nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. The Turkana tacitly occupy the 
Ilemi Triangle which, owing to its inaccessibility, is administered by 




































(v) THE SUDAN-ZAIRE. BOUNDARY
It is arguable whether this, particular international boundary should 
be considered as falling at any point within the Nile Basin, for it 
is defined throughout as following the watershed between the Nile 
and Congo River systems (figure 10). This dates back to the 1894 
Agreement between Britain and King Leopold, representing the Congo 
Free State, and this was followed by the 1906 Agreement which estab­
lished the principle of the alignment as the line of the watershed 
between the Nile and the Congo basins, but provides no further des­
cription CHertslet, Vol.II, 19.09; Brownlie, 19.79, p.683). Since 1906 
there has been no further elaboration and no demarcation.
The problem is simple - the watershed hereabouts is diff­
icult if not impossible to determine on the ground because of the 
flat and featureless nature of the countryside (Christy, 1917). This 
international boundary, then - and this is the justification for 
including it in the present study - is one which depends almost entirely 
upon mutual recognition and administrative practice rather than upon 
any clear demarcation.
Another point to make about this boundary is that it is one 
of those classic, oft-quoted, examples of an international boundary 
which cuts through the traditional lands of a particular group of 
people - in this case the Azande (Harbour, 1961). However, no actual 
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Fig. 11. The Uganda-Kenya Boundary
(vi) THE UGANDA-KENYA INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
The Uganda-Kenya international boundary is unusual among the cases 
examined in this study in that it has been subjected to substantial 
changes since first being delimited. As Figure 11 shows, the original 
eastern boundary of Uganda, or what was then the Buganda Kingdom, 
lay well to the east of the present boundary running northwards from 
near Lake Naivasha in the south to cut through Lake Rudolf in the 
north. This line was established in 1900 as a result of the Agree­
ment between Britain and the Kabaka of Buganda. The alignment of this 
boundary was clearly influenced by topographical details for it 
followed the eastern wall of the Rift Valley. But Britain was 
indecisive, hesitant and generally tentative about establishing firm 
boundaries in this part of Africa (Ingham, 1958; Barber, 1968). The 
merger of the Uganda Protectorate and the British East Africa 
Protectorate was initially thought of as a distinct possibility so 
that the boundary between the two protectorates - termed a 1 frontier’ 
in official documents - was thought of as a matter of administrative 
policy rather than as a matter of really critical importance 
(Brownlie, 1979).
The British East Africa Protectorate was expanded westwards 
in 1902, however, resulting in a-large part of Uganda being lost to 
its eastern neighbour (Figure IB . The East Africa Protectorate now 
had a substantial frontage on to Lake Victoria and the port facilities 
of Kisumu, reflecting the desire, especially of the British East 
Africa Company, to reach the markets and resources of the populous 
shores of Lake Victoria as well as the Kingdom of Buganda. This 
westwards shift also gave to Kenya the fertile highlands of the Nakuru-
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Naivasha area and the west rift highlands, which, were to become so 
important in subsequent agricultural developments (Ominde, 1975).
The boundary running southwards from Mount Elgon has not changed 
since that date (1902), but from Mount Elgon the new boundary at 
that time followed roughly the River Turkwell down to Lake Rudolf.
While the main purpose of shifting the international boundary west­
wards in this way was undoubtedly to widen commercial opportunities 
in the interior around Lake Victoria, the principle on which 
demarcation took place on the ground was primarily that of avoiding 
cutting through homogenous tribal groups and their lands. Thus it 
was decided that all the Kavirondo should be included within the 
East Africa Protectorate. Only where such a criterion was found to 
be impractical, as on Mount Elgon and on the islands of Berkley Bay 
(where the Kavirondo inhabitants were placed in Uganda) was this 
general principle rejected.
Apart from a very minor adjustment in the Mount Elgon 
region in 1910, there was no further change in the boundary until 
1926, when what remained of Uganda's Rudolf Province was transferred 
to Kenya, although administration had in fact been transferred in 
practice some years earlier, in 1919. Administrative convenience 
was the stated reason for this change, which not only gave Kenya 
access to the whole western shore of Lake Rudolf, but also give it 
direct access to Sudan (Figure 11) a But,once again, it is important 
for our purposes to note that this new 1926 boundary with Uganda was 
quite explicitly drawn with careful reference to tribal distributions - 
according to Brownlie (1979) this is a 'tribal boundary' - leaving 
the Turkana and Suk (Pokot) within Kenya and leaving the Karamojong 
in Uganda.
The boundary as it now stands is, with only minor changes, 
the 1926 boundary (Figure 11). To describe it in more detail, it begins
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in the south at the tripoint in Lake Victoria at 1° south latitude.
From there it runs, due north to the westernmost points of Pyramid 
and Ilemba islands, Kiringiti Island and Mageta Island. From this 
point the boundary runs in a straight line northwest to Sumba Island 
and then by a straight line north-east to the centre of the mouth 
of the River Sio. The first land section of the boundary follows the 
centre of the River Sio upstream to its confluence with the River 
Sango. The boundary continues north-eastwards, following generally 
the centres of this river (Sango) and the River Lwakalca towards the 
highest point of Mount Elgon, although certain small stretches 
involve straight lines and a road/river intersection. From the 
highest point of Mount Elgon the boundary follows a straight line 
north-easterly to a point where the more north-westerly of the two 
streams forming the River Turkwell (River Suam) emerges from Mount 
Elgon's crater. The centre of this river's course is now followed 
downstream to its confluence with, the River Bukwa (Kibukwa). From 
there the boundary swings north-north-west, defined successively by 
streams, rivers, rocky ridges, hills and the base of the Turkana 
Escarpment, finally reaching the tripoint with Sudan just north-east 
of Mount Zulia. This whole boundary is often loosely described and 
was not originally accompanied by a map. It is still only partly 
demarcated.
Two issues are raised by the present boundary. Just as Amin 
in Uganda used the historical question of the Kagera salient( s-de. •^‘U) 
as justification for his attack on Tanzania in 1978, so he complained 
about the transfers of land from Uganda to Kenya during the colonial 
period (Guardian, 1978). As in the case of Kagera, however, it was 
never interpreted by either side as a critical or even very significant 
issue compared with the very bad relations that existed for quite 
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Tanzania.
The second issue of note - the Karasuk salient - is of
particular interest to our study, as it once again refers to ethnic
distributions and includes also the important consideration of water
supply for a nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral people. Between 1932
and 1970 the mountainous Karasuk region of Kenya was under Ugandan
administration (Figure 12) . The inhabitants of this region, covering 
2
some 1,800 m , are known as the Suk or Pokot (Bonsnett, 1958; Dyson- 
Eudson, 1966). The problem revolves around conflict between the 
Karamojong and the Suk, as well as with other groups, like the 
Turkana, living on the Kenya side of the boundary. Both the 
Karamojong and Suk are pastoral peoples and the Karamojong felt 
themselves to have been pushed westwards out of their traditional 
dry-season grazing lands with their water holes in Karasuk by the 
Suk, especially as the 1926 international boundary lost them access 
to the Turkwell River. In their turn, the Suk have been subjected to 
constant pressure from the Turkana. Here is an excellent example of 
that common phenomenon in the Nile Basin states where the idea of a 
rigid boundary between nomadic groups is completely unknown, 
traditional territorial limits being considered to be flexible and 
apt to change according to ecological circumstances (Dyson-Hudson, 
1966). In times of stress, such as drought, the theoretical unoccupied 
buffer zones between groups of peoples may quickly disappear (Figure 13
The almost forty years of the boundary change which gave 
administration of Karasuk to Uganda in 1932 (though no de jure 
alteration was made) was designed as a purely ad hoc measure to allow 
the Suk access to grazing and water in Karamoja, to bring -the border 
area under one administration, to control inter-tribal raiding and to 
avoid the difficulty that had been found in recognising and administer­
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ing the 1926 boundary.
Here,it might at first seem, the 1926 boundary had caused 
and perpetuated conflict between groups whose traditional grazing 
lands had been cut through by an international boundary; and this 
boundary had to be changed to try to reduce this conflict. In fact, 
the 1932-70 expedient produced no improvement at all: inter-tribal
conflict persisted and the problems of the area were frequently 
exacerbated by drought and erosion from overgrazing and stock increases, 
especially among the Karamojong. In its 1961 Report the Karamojong 
Security Committee identified three underlying causes of conflict 
in the area, none of which was basically a boundary problem: ’First 
is the high prestige associated with the possession of a large number 
of cattle, and the glorification of the homicide connected with their 
acquisition. Secondly, the fact that a man’s social standing is 
enhanced by his having a number of wives, whose brideprice is payable 
only in cows, is a further incentive to cattle raiding. Thirdly, 
ancient disputes over grazing grounds and watering places demand the 
continuation of hostilities against traditional enemies and the 
seizure of their cattle’ (Karamoja Security Committee, 1961).
Some attention was given to the possibility of making the 
de jure boundary coincide with the de facto boundary introduced in 
1932, but there was no evidence that this would have produced any 
improvement in relations between the conflicting groups. In 1970, 
therefore, Karasuk was returned wholly to Kenya, reasserting the 
alignment of the 1926 boundary. Both governments - Ugandan and 
Kenyan - have now accepted that the only course of action is to 
permit the dominant tribes in the area to cross the international 
boundary in search of water and pasture for their cattle. The inter­
national boundary itself is now generally recognised as being in no
85
way the cause of local and inter-ethnic rivalries, and conflicts in 
the area.
86
v .  S U D A N
50 km
Koboko
Lad o E n c l a v e
Z A I R E
M ahagi P o r t® !
L. A lb e r t
Fort P orta l
M argh arita  At ' &
Peak I <£e> U G A N D A
L. E d w a rd
Ishasha
L. VictoriaR. Ishasha
R. Iv w i
T A N Z A N I A
Kasindifs 
R.Lubitia Chako
R. M ururtgu  
x'
M t .  N kabw a
M t .  Sabinio (3 'J\ RWANDA \
Fig* ]A. The Uganda-Zaire Boundary
87
(vii) THE UGANDA-ZAIRE BOUNDARY
The Uganda-Zaire international boundary is long and varied, but is 
often referred to as a good example of a boundary which is determined 
mainly by well-marked natural features - two rift-valley lakes (Albert 
and Edward), an important watershed (between the Nile and Congo basins), 
a group of volcanoes (Mufumbiro) and an impressive mountain range 
(the Ruwenzori) (Figure L4). The boundary, however, resulted not from 
any careful selection of the boundary but represents ’the culmination 
of an evolutionary process in which power struggle, political expediency, 
commercial exploitation, and administrative convenience have all played 
their part’ (McEwen, 1971, p.230), Britain, Belgium, France, Germany 
and King Leopold - all were involved in the evolution of the present 
boundary.
Starting in the north, the boundary runs due south from the 
Sudan, Uganda, Zaire tripoint along the Congo-Nile watershed, and this 
section remains as it was established by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement 
of May, 1894, whereas the remainder of the international boundary 
further south dates back to the February 1915 Anglo-Belgium Agreement, 
though this agreement is based largely on the Anglo-Belgian protocol 
of 1910, with the modifications made by the mixed commission of 1911 
and 1913. South of the Congo-Nile watershed the international boundary 
begins in the extreme south at Mount Sabinio and runs northwards to 
Mount Nkabwa from where it follows the River Ishasha down to and 
across Lake Edward, thence follows the Lubilia River upstream before 
striking along the Ruwenzori Range to pass through the highest point 
(Margharita Peak). The international boundary then follows the River 
Semliki down to Lake Albert. From there the boundary follows the 
centre of the lake until it reaches the shore; it then strikes north-
west near Mahagi until it meets the Congo-Nile watershed section 
referred to above. This last watershed section has never been arti­
ficially demarcated, apparently because it is not necessary for, as 
Thomas and Spencer put it ’the boundary is mutually well known, for 
it follows for the most part the crest of a gentle treeless undulation, 
and the absence of monuments- has given rise to no difficulty’
(Thomas and Spencer, 193'S, p„10).
Comprising as it does very largely a series of clear 
natural features, the international boundary does however raise a few 
points of interest to this study. First, there are the lakes. In Lake 
Edward the boundary consists simply of a straight line from the north 
of the Ishasha River on the southern shore to the mouth of the River 
Lublia-Chako on the northern shore. In Lake Albert the boundary is 
represented by a series of straight lines running roughly north­
eastwards along the centre of the lake, beginning at the mouth of the 
River Sem .1 iki in both cases, it should be noted, the boundary line
through the lakes is based on artificial straight lines, thereby avoid­
ing the necessity of employing the inconvenient theoretical median 
used elsewhere, for instance in Lake Tanganyika.
Secondly, it is worth pointing out that the Lake Albert 
section of the boundary was arrived at by the British foregoing their 
right to the north-western shorelands of the lake. Before the 1907-8 
mapping of the boundary hereabouts it had been believed that the water­
shed north-west of the lake lay some way inland from the lake shore.
But the survey disclosed that the watershed ran very close to the 
lake shore and that ’the much vaunted British territory on the west of 
Lake Albert was apparently reduced to a strip not a mile wide of rough, 
rocky, ground falling sheer into the Lake1 (Jack, 1914, p.134). The 
British abandoned this cliff face to the Belgians and agreed on the
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boundary line being drawn through the Lake. (Kinks? 1921), This is 
a good example of the selection of a natural feature to delimit a 
boundary being proved to be unsuitable in the absence of detailed 
cartographic information.
Assessing the boundary today? it is difficult to find any 
kind of evidence of inter-state conflict resulting from the nature 
or precise alignment of the international boundary. To some extent 
this must be due to the peripheral location of the boundary vis-a- 
vis Zaire and Uganda as well as to the mountains and lakes of this 
western rift valley country on the western edge of the East African 
Plateau. According to Brownlie (1979) 'the only issue at stake along this 
boundary is the need for demarcation (by means of buoys) of the waters in Lake 
Albert off the Semliki delta, and in Lake Edward off the mouth of the 
Ishasha River,
And yet this international boundary is often cited as a 'bad' 
boundary in that it cuts through several ethnic communities. The cases 
of the Bwaamba and Butalinga are discussed in some detail in a later chapter, 
but the example of the Lugbara is perhaps the best-known, As Middleton (196b) 
indicates, the Lugbara, split by the international boundary today between 
Uganda and Zaire - and for a time partly in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
during the Lado enclave period - seem to have been little affected by 
their lands being divided politically. Emigration southwards into Uganda 
by younger men has long been an important feature of Lugbara life and 
there is no evidence that this movement has ever been impe ded’by the. 


























(viii) THE TANZANIA-UGANDA BOUNDARY
Just as the Tanzania-Kenya Boundary represents agreement between 
the Germans and the British in Kenya, so the Tanzania-Uganda boundary 
reflects negotiations between Germany and Britain in Uganda.
Similarly, it changed its nature, though not its alignment, when in 
1914 Tanzania passed out of German hands and was mandated to Britain.
The eastern two'-thirds of the Tanzania-Uganda boundary 
simply follows the 1° S. parallel, commencing at the tripoint between 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda near the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. 
Once it reaches the western shore of the lake it continues to follow
the parallel to as far as the second crossing of this line by the
River Kagera; from there the boundary follows the thalweg of the 
River Kagera, upstream, to its confluence with the River Kalcitumba, 
This international boundary, then, is defined solely either by a line 
of latitude or by the thalweg of the River Kagera (FigureX5).
The line of latitude section of this boundary, both in the 
lake and on land, was established in the same 1914 draft agreement 
between Britain and Germany referred to in the Kenya-Tanzania boundary
and has remained as such ever since; it was reproduced in the Ugandan
Constitution of 1967.
The main issue to note in more detail here is the way in 
which the parallel is used for part of the land boundary rather than 
the thalweg of the River Kagera from its mouth to the tripoint with 
Uganda and Rwanda. As Figure 1 5makes clear, this use of the straight 
line parallel created the 'Kagera Triangle' and 'Kagera Salient', 
about which a good deal has been written. Maclcay (in Stanley, 1890, 
p.392) noted the absurdity of using the parallel of 1° S, latitude
because it cut the Buganda kingdom into two halves - in other 
words it was yet another case of dividing an ethnic group, In fact,
however, this was not really so. The ICagera Salient is traditionally a
part of Ankole country, as well as of Buganda. On the other hand, 
the Kagera Triangle includes part of the country traditionally belonging 
to the Uhaga group in Tanzania. Stanley, like Mackay, believed 
that the ’natural' boundary between the Buganda kingdom in the north 
and the peoples to the south was the Kagera river. Delme-Radcliffe 
argued that the Kagera Triangle should be given to Germany in 
exchange for the Kagera Salient, This, he argued, would have
produced a ’practical boundary'. Britain would have acquired a
larger area of territory - even though much of it is 'a pitiless 
swamp, an expanse of virgin forest, and tsetse-infested waterless, 
uninhabited jungle (Delme-Radcliffe, 1905 ? p4 76.) - ftut this
advantage would have been balanced by Tanganyika acquiring Mizinda, 
the only British harbour on the western shore of Lake Victoria.
Moreover, 'administration would be facilitated, since neither 
government would have to cross the Kagera river. Each state would 
control one bank of the river up to the mouth of the Kakitumba and 
would thus have full use of the river as a means of communication.
Also the Kagera itself formed a natural obstacle, impossible to 
cross without boats, and would therefore provide a strong boundary 
tending to reduce raids and other border incidents' (Brownlie, 1979>P*906). 
But all this advice, like many subsequent suggestions, was rejected 
and the parallel has remained the international boundary in this 
section.
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Just as the Kenya-Tanzania boundary is often cited as a 
classic example of a boundary cutting through a homogeneous ethnic 
group, so this Tanzania-Uganda boundary is often cited as a classic 
example of bad delimitation which has resulted in a boundary 'which 
is not only anomalous but approaches the absurd' (McEwen, 1971, P.265).
As we have seen, it divides several ethnic groups. It may well be that 
had the area to the south of the 1914 Anglo-German line not 
subsequently been part of British mandated territory, then this 
boundary might not have remained as it has. Nevertheless, and in 
spite of the theoretical objections to this boundary, there is no 
evidence that in practice it has created any conflict between the 
two states.
The one possible argument against such a conclusion is the 
invasion of Uganda by Tanzania in October, 1978, Earlier that year 
Uganda troops had invaded Tanzania and occupied part of the Kagera 
salient which Amin proclaimed as a 'new' province of Uganda. There is 
no doubt, however, that this boundary infringement was in no way a 
major cause of the subsequent massive invasion of Uganda by Nyerere's 
troops. As Aluko (1981) has pointed out, there were other compelling 
political, moral and military reasons behind Tanzania's intervention.
While it could be argued that Amin had some justification for laying 
claim to the Kagera Salient on 'historic grounds' (Guardian, Sept.28,1972); 
and while the years of tension along this border suggests that the 
technical problems of the straight-line geometrical boundary in 
difficult country provides a basis for 'more or less accidental 
border incursions by military patrols and consequent threats of piece' 
(Brownlie, 1979,p .1016); the Amin case is probably very much a special case.
After all, Amin simply used the Kagera Salient issue as a pretext for 
invading this 710 square mile salient. His army ravaged the whole 
area; over 40,000 people disappeared into the hush; 10,000 were 
unaccounted for; and 12,000 cattle were stolen. The Organization of 
African Unity recommended a ceasefire and a return to the original 
borders. Subsequently, when Tanzania invaded Ugandan territory there 
was very little public criticism of Tanzania. This is significant, since 
this was the first time in Africa that a regime had been overthrown 
largely through the intervention of a neighbouring state.
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,(ix) THE KENYA-TANZANIA BOUNDARY
The section of the international boundary between Kenya and Tanzania 
with which we are concerned here is that which stretches from Lake. 
Victoria in the west to just north, of Loliondo where the eastern 
limits of the Lake Plateau Basin run northwards along the watershed 
between the headwaters of the River Mara (running into Lake Victoria) 
and the Ewaso Ngiro River, flowing into Lake Natron QFigure ld^This 
section of the boundary is: as described in the draft Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1914 - an agreement which was- never signed due to the 
outbreak of the First World War, On the other hand, it is accepted 
by both Kenya and Tanzania as correct and it is well demarcated on 
the ground. Thus in spite of the apparently unsatisfactory nature of 
this boundary from a strictly legal point of view, it is not contested 
on the ground by either Tanzania (independent since 1961) or Kenya 
(independent since 1963).
This portion of the boundary was demarcated by an Anglo- 
German commission which began its work at Lake Victoria in April 1904. 
Its western end had already been delimited in 1886 and 189.0 as xthe 
point of intersection of the eastern side of the lake with the parallel 
of 1 S. latitude. This sounds more precise than it really was, 
because the lake shore at this point is in fact an irregularly shaped 
peninsula whose shoreline is cut by the 1° S„ parallel at seventeen 
different places. The commissioners chose the most westerly of these 
many intersections as the firm western end of the international 
boundary, but this point was redefined in the 1914 agreement as stand­
ing along the parallel l| kms. west of the peninsula, thereby avoiding 
the awkwardness of the multiple intersections and the resulting con­
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point in Lake Victoria with a place called Loitokitok, some 450 kms. 
to the south-east, well outside the Lake Plateau Basin. The commiss­
ioners followed the description contained in the 1893 Anglo-German 
agreement but faced difficulties resulting from local road and track 
routes having disappeared, some of them, interestingly enough, because 
the building of the railway through Kenya had had its impact on the 
traditional pattern of routes in the area. However, demarcation with 
pillars or piles of stones was accomplished and mapping completed by 
the end of 1905.
The 1914 boundary agreement was based wholly on the work 
done by the Anglo-German commission of 1904-5 and, as indicated above, 
has in practice been regarded as an issue no longer open to dispute.
A glance at the detailed description and accompanying maps makes it 
clear that the boundary line in simply a straight line through the 
boundary pillars established in 1904-5.
The international boundary is therefore one of real simplic­
ity and is not of itself an issue over which there is any legal 
dispute. Nor does it provide any kind of basis for potential inter­
state conflict with one theoretical exception - the case of the 
Masai people. Indeed, this particular boundary, and especially its 
eastern continuation beyond the section examined here, is commonly 
cited as an example of a European-imposed colonial boundary, that 
cuts through a 'homogeneous tribal territory' quite arbitrarily and 
with disastrous effects on the people concerned. As Figure 17 shows, 
neither the Luo ,the Kuria nor the Gusii are seriously split by the 
boundary. In 1929 the Hilton Young Commission referred to the Masai 
problem, noting that the boundary cuts the Masai people in two,
’with no more concern for their ideas or for the justice or convenience 
of their administration than the scythe has for a blade of grass’
(HMSO, 1929, p.300), It may have been true that the nature of the 
distribution of the Masai people was not known in the 1880s - 
especially their seasonal movements - but the harmful effects of the 
boundary on the Masai were certainly known by 1914. Indeed Hardinge 
in 1898 described an incident when a Masai warrior 'informed us that 
we were labouring under a misapprehension, as the land belonged, not 
to the Europeans, but to his own tribe; if any dispute on the point 
existed, it must he settled between Lenana and Sendeyo, the heirs of 
their great medicine man, M'batian, It was futile to quote European 
treaties to a primitive savage (sic) so we merely explained that, if 
any future question affecting his people's rights should arise, it must 
be referred both to us and to the Germans' (Hardinge, 1928, p.232). 
Certainly the Masai refused to recognise the boundary and crossed it 
at will. The Masai are pastoralists, living in an area with only two 
permanent rivers, the Ewaso Ngiro and the Ruvu (Pangani), both of which 
lie outside the Lake Plateau strictly speaking. Yet while we are 
dealing with only the western portion of Masailand, the same general 
principle arises. In practice, it must be emphasised that the im- 
practicality of controlling this long boundary in a sparsely populated, 
often drought-affected area has meant that it has not acted as a 
barrier to movement of the Masai. Thus in 1928 Ford noted that the 
Masai moved freely across the boundary in search of water and grazing, 
disclaiming 'any knowledge of the boundary's whereabouts'(Ford, 1928).
Suggestions to amalgamate the Masai under one or other 
administration (Kenya or the Tanganyika Mandate) were made in the 1920s, 
but it was argued that the 'difficulties' experienced on the boundary 
were not serious enough to justify amalgamation of the Masai, even if 
this were possible. Yet agitation continued from time to time, the 
Masai petitioning the British Government for unification and separate
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independence. But all such proposals and petitions came to nothing 
and the Masai still remain today living athwart the boundary 
originally drawn by Britain and Germany.
This is a most interesting and important case, which 
relates not only to the splitting of a ’homogeneous tribal group’ but 
also to the ppoblem of water supply and grazing land for pastoralists. 
More will be said about this in a later chapter.
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(x, xi)THE TANZANIA-RWANDA AND TANZANIA-BURUNDI BOUNDARY
These two boundaries are considered here together because, although 
they are today two separate boundary lines between the two small 
independent states and Tanzania along their eastern borders, Rwanda 
and Burundi before independence in 1962 were a single unit, administer-' 
ed by Belgium and known as Ruanda-HBrundi. Until the end of the first 
World War Ruanda-Urundi was part of German East Africa and was then 
mandated to Belgium and later, after the Second World War, the 
territory was administered by Belgium under the United Nations 
Trusteeship,
The original boundary line to the east of the territory was 
laid down in 1919 and confirmed in 1922, This line in effect divided 
the Belgian and British area of mandate responsibility and lay some 
50-60 kms. west of the present boundary in the northern (Rwanda) 
section (Figure 18). Subsequently the Belgians objected to the Per­
manent Mandates Commission about this boundary which, it was argued, 
now effectively partitioned the important and heavily populated 
Kingdom of Ruanda. In particular, the district of Kissaka had been 
excluded from the Kingdom of Ruanda and included in the British man­
dated territory to the east. These objections emphasised ’ the social, 
political and economic harm caused by the imposition of this arbitary 
division’ and went on to urge ’the eastward extension of the boundary 
to the "natural frontier" of the Kagera River’ (McEwen, 1971, pp.154-55). 
It was further suggested that the British were more interested in 
securing north-south railway connection through Ruanda country than in 
protecting one of the ’richest and most civilised tracts of the 
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accepted these objections and a 1924 Protocol established the 
boundary as it is today. The Kagera River, however, turned out to
be not such a clear natural boundary as had been suggested; it
was found to take a winding and uncertain course through papyrus 
swamps. Fishing or navigation rights were far from clear. The 
boundary line along the Kagera was therefore redefined later on in 
1934 so as to make the shore-line of the river valley the boundary 
of the dry land near the marking pillars, thereby placing all islands 
on one side or other of the boundary. Fishing and navigation rights 
were made free of access to the people on each bank; moreover, tin
mining in the valley was now possible.
Clearly, then, the actual and potential problems of the 
international boundary between what were to become Ruanda and Tanzania 
were realised and dealt with at a fairly early stage by changing 
the boundary quite substantially (in Kissalca District) and along the 
Kagera River.
Further south, however, the Burundi-Tanzania boundary today 
is entirely as originally laid down in the 1924 agreement (Figure 
19). It follows rivers for the most part, though the same practice 
was followed as with the River Kagera further north when it came to 
demarcation. The only matter of dispute ever raised, though not today, 
refers to the tract of land known as Bugufi, lying between the Kagera 
and Ruvuvu rivers in Tanzania. Although it may well have been admin­
istered as part of the Kingdom of TJrundi during the German colonial 
period, the Bugufi issue is now ra circumstance of no modern legal 
significance1(Brownlie, 1979, p.752). Burundi, like Rwanda, today 
accepts the boundaries with Tanzania as firmly established and no 
current boundary issue is known to exist. Even the problems arising in 
1972-3 during the conflict between Tutsis and Hutus of Burundi, which
led to the flight of refugees, into Tanzania and action by Burundi 
aircraft against Tanzanian villages was at no time nor by any party 
explained in terms of the alignment of the boundary (Times, July 23,
1973).
It is occasionally pointed out that in German times (pre-1914) 
an area lying between the Kagera and Ruvuvu rivers in what is now Tanzania 
was administered as part of the Urundi Kingdom, But this is assumed to be of 


































(tfii) THE RWANDA-BURUNDI BOUNDARY
This international boundary, though little mentioned in the literature ^ 
is interesting for several reasons. First, the boundary as an Inter­
national boundary dates back only to 1962, when the two constituent 
elements of the former Ruanda-Urundi became separately independent and 
were renamed the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi. This, 
then, is easily the most recent international boundary among the Nile 
Basin states. Secondly, even though Ruanda-Urundi had fallen under 
German colonial (indirect) rule by 1898, the two indigenous kingdoms, 
were recognised by the Germans in that their two residencies were based 
quite simply on the existing African kingdoms. Although Ruanda- 
Urundi passed to Belgian mandate and later to Trusteeship status -under 
Belgian administration after the Second World War, the boundary 
today remains more or less exactly as it was under the Germans. During 
the Belgian trusteeship period the line was formalised to some extent 
in the 1949 (modified 1958) Ordinance though as yet.no international 
agreement relates to the boundary. As Figure 20 shows, the boundary 
line is largely along rivers, streams and lakes; there are a few 
straight line sections but no demarcation has occurred as yet. Finally, 
so far as is known this international boundary has never been the 
source of any conflict, however local, and this is significant in 
view of the heavily populated country through which much of the bound­

































(Xi i i) THE UGANDA-RWANDA ' BOUNDARY
This boundary is best thought of as the western extension of the 
Uganda-Tanzania boundary, for Rwanda was administered as part of 
German East Africa by 1898. Competition between Britain and Germany 
led, first, to the adoption of the 1° S. latitude line westwards to 
the frontier of the Congo Free State, then described as lying along 
the 30th meridian. Over the twenty years 1890-1910 negotiations 
between Britain and Germany - confused about uncertainties over the 
exact location of the Mfumbiro volcanic mass and even of the 30th 
meridian - resulted eventually in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1910, 
to which was added a Protocol in 1911, From this date the internation­
al boundary has remained unchanged; the boundary was described in 
exactly the same way in the (unsigned) Anglo-German Agreement of 1914 
referred to in the section on the Uganda-Tanzania boundary.
Starting from the Uganda-Tanzania-Rwanda tripoint, at the 
confluence of the thalwegs of the Kagera and Kakitumba rivers, the 
boundary then follows the thalweg upstream along the Kakitumba, thence 
along the thalweg of the River Kissinga to its source. From there the 
boundary follows ridges, watersheds and streams until it reaches, in 
the west, the Uganda- Zaire-Rwanda tripoint at Mount Sabinio in the 
Mfumbiro group of volcanic mountains. After the First World War, Rwanda 
was mandated to Belgium, subsequently held by Belgium under United 
Nations Trusteeship, and finally achieved independence in 1962, the same 
year as did Uganda. Rwanda's early absorption with German East Africa, 
therefore, lasted only until the First World War; thereafter it was on 
the highland periphery of Belgium's vast colonial territory centred on 
the Congo Basin rather than orientated towards the east coast of Africa
at Dar es Salaam.
Examining the 1910 Anglo-German Agreement, on which the 
present boundary is based, several points of interest to our study 
emerge. First, the commissioners were given authority to deviate 
from the delimited straight line 'so as to make the frontier coincide 
with natural features where this is possible. The deviation shall not, 
however, exceed 5 kilometres on either side of the straight lines, 
and neither the total area of British territory nor the total area 
of German territory shall be altered thereby'. The advantages of 
following natural physical features in an area such as this where there 
are many clear, unambiguous natural features to refer to were always 
taken into account, especially in the demarcation exercise. This, 
of course, is in marked contrast to the situation further east where 
the Uganda-Tanzania boundary was not delimited with reference primarily 
to natural features.
A second point to note is that the commissioners were 
guided by the principle that 'districts belonging politically to 
Ruanda shall if possible, remain part of Ruanda', For this reason the 
commissioners were encouraged to look especially at thoseparts of the 
delimited boundary which cut right across people from the same group. 
Thus for the section A and B on Figure 21 it was noted that districts 
were being cut off which, belonged politically to the Chief of 
Katreia; these people were therefore to be given six months from the 
completion of demarcation to move with 'all their movable property 
into German territory and of harvesting even after the expiration of 
the six months the crops standing at the time of their removal’. The 
same principle was to be applied to all other portions of the 'frontier' 
though, as Low (1961, p.104) points out, the demarcation of 1911 did 
in fact leave a segment of traditional Rwanda within the Kigezi
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District of Uganda, In this case, at least, good intentions were not 
always fulfilled. Nevertheless there appears to he no record at any 
time of any dispute over at least this international boundary within 
the Nile Basin.
On the other hand, there have been movements of refugees across 
the border. In October, 19^2, especially, Uganda agreed to keep Rwandan 
refugees on its territory in certain fixed areas after talks on the refugee 
problem along their border. The Ugandan authorities stated that the 
displaced people were for the most part Rwandans who arrived in Uganda 
between 1959 ant^  1973, fleeing from ethnic unrest there. The Rwandan 




SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE HYPOTHESIS RE-EXAMINED
The boundaries examined in the previous chapter suggest a 
number of summary comments of particular reference to our study. The 
purpose of the present study is to discuss these comments and then 
to go on to use this evidence to examine the hypothesis stated at 
the beginning of the thesis.
Summary Comments on the Evidence The study area chosen for this
research covers a large area in north-eastern Africa and covers a 
wide range of ecological and human circumstances. Although it re­
presents only one - albeit large - river basin, it does contain within it 
thirteen international boundaries which together provide a sub­
stantial body of evidence for examining the hypothesis about the present- 
day significance of international boundaries in inter-state relations.
It is not suggested that these boundaries are necessarily typical of 
all international boundaries, or even of all African boundaries, but it 
is contended that they are sufficiently varied and representative to 
provide some justification for coming to some decision about the 
validity or otherwise of the initial hypothesis. Seven summary comments 
may be made:
1. The international boundaries examined include examples of almost 
all major types of boundaries - hills and mountains, watersheds, 
crests and foothills; rivers and streams; lakes; lines of 
latitude, other straight lines drawn between specified points, 
and geometrical arcs.
2. Many of these international boundaries are still only delimited 
and not demarcated (e.g. Sudan-Zaire).
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3. The boundaries include two clear examples of the distinction 
to be drawn between an administrative boundary (in practice) 
and an international boundary (in law)- Examples are the Egypt- 
Sudan boundary (eastern section) and the Sudan-Kenya boundary 
(Ilemi triangle).
4. Historically there is abundant evidence of attempts on the 
part of boundary commissioners to consider human groups of 
various kinds - traditional political kingdoms and ethnic 
or tribal distributions.
5. Historically there was always the problem of inadequate know­
ledge of the topographical features and human geography of the 
area being delimited. Local problems that arose at particular 
boundaries were in some cases dealt with by subsequent re­
defining of the boundary lines as more accurate information 
became available. The device of ’administrative1 boundaries 
mentioned above in (3) was also introduced to deal with such 
problems.
6. Even in those cases where international boundaries cut through 
the territories of particular'groups, agreements have commonly 
been reached to allow the free movement of peoples and their 
stock back and forth in the traditional way (e.g. the Masai
at the Kenya-Tanzania border).
7. There is no evidence at all of any significant current (1984) 
border dispute at any one of the international boundaries 
examined in the previous chapter.
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Evidence by Types of Boundaries Before looking carefully at the 
hypothesis for a re-examination in the light of the evidence presented in 
the previous chapter it will he useful to summarise the various examples 
given which represent the different types of boundaries mentioned in 
chapter one, The order will he the same as that presented in chapter one.
Watershed boundaries are surprisingly few and often discontinuous 
in the Nile Basin, The western section of the Uganda-Rwanda boundary 
follows the watershed up to Mt. Sabinio; and northwards from this point 
the Uganda-Zaire follows the watershed between the westwards and eastwards 
drainage lines. But the most important example of the use of watersheds 
is certainly further north where the Congo-Nile watershed is for some 
145 kms used to delimit the Uganda-Zaire boundary; and this continues 
along the Sudan-Zaire boundary. In many places it is not easy for a 
visitor to determine the watershed on the ground but according to one 
authority it is 'mutually well known, for it follows the crest (sic) 
of a gentle treeless undulation, and the absence of monuments has 
given rise to no difficulty' (Thomas and Spencer, 1938, p.37).
Much more common among the Nile Basin international boundaries 
is the use of crest lines. As the previous chapter showed, examples exist on 
the Uganda-Zaire, Uganda-Rwanda, Uganda-Sudan and Kenya-Sudan boundaries. 
Examination of the detailed descriptions shows that on the Uganda-Kenya 
boundary the words crest and watershed have been consciously avoided and 
straight lines joining named peaks have frequently be used in this last case. 
As McEwen points out, however, where detailed surveying took place after 
delimitation, then the crest is intended to be a series of straight lines
joining the prominent features referred to in the text 'rather than as a line 
which at every point conforms to the sinuosity of the theoretical and, at the 
time, unsurveyed, watershed,1 On the other hand, where, as on the Uganda- 
Zaire and Uganda-Rwanda boundaries, careful topographical surveys preceded the 
final boundary agreement, 'there is more justification for interpreting 
the words crest and watershed strictly and separately' (McEwen, 1971? P.73).
As for foothills, probably the most vague and unreliable type of 
feature used for boundary delimitation, there are several examples in the 
Nile Basin, West of the Nile on the Uganda-Sudan boundary, for example, 
the boundary description refers to 'a straight line due west to the 
bottom of the foothills of the escarpment running north-west from Jebel 
Elengua' (McEwen, 1971? P.74). But the longest and clearest example of 
of this type of boundary is on that part of the U ganda-K enya  boundary where the 
boundary line runs 'to the base of the Turkana Escarpment; thence the 
boundary follows the base of that escarpment in a generally north-westerly 
direction'(ibid,, p.74).
R.ivers provide the basis for many of the international boundaries of 
of the Nile Basin, There are many examples in which the thalweg is used 
quite specifically - the Kachwamba-Kakitumba and Eagerq rivers between 
Uganda and Tanzania; the Khor Eayu, Kaia and Unyama rivers between Uganda and 
Sudan; and many other examples on the Uganda-Zaire and Tansania-Burundi 
boundaries. The 'course' rather than the thalweg is used more commonly 
between Uganda and Kenya, however (the Sio, Sango and Suam-Turkwell rivers).
Of particular interest is the Tanzania-Rwanda boundary, which presents some 
difficult problems and is a unique riparian limit in the Nile Basin, with 
respect to both delimitation and demarcation. Moreover, the Kagera River 
boundary here takes into account quite specifically the question of water
rights affecting diversion of waters, mining and industrial operations, 
irrigation, fishing and other rights to be shared by inhabitants of 
adjacent states, The main problem of this river boundary however is 
that the river follows a winding course through wide papyrus swamps; it was 
therefore decided to define a portion of the boundary as a combination 
of stretches of shore-line and straight-line segments between artificial 
boundary pillars placed on dry land,
The use of a river bank is nowhere significant in the Nile Basin, 
but the 1mouth' of a river is used on a number of occasions. Nowhere does
the use of the mouth appear to have caused problems, in spite of the
theoretical limitations of a feature that is by nature imprecise in 
definition. Examples in the Nile Basin include the use of the mouths of 
the River Sio's mouth in Lake Victoria, used to define a 'fixed point' for 
the Uganda-Kenya boundary; and the mouth of the River Semliki in Lake
Albert to help define the boundary between Uganda and Zaire. As for using
the source of a river, usually as a fixed point, the previous chapter 
gives a specific example - the Uganda-Zaire boundary where the sources 
of the Chako and Lamia rivers are used* in this, as in most other cases, 
however, the use of pillars as identification points for these; sources 
effectively dismisses the obvious theoretical objections to using the 
source of a river as a reference points it does not matter whether the 
pillar marks the true source of a river, as long as the pillar is 
accepted as a valid marker. Finally, as far as rivers are concerned, 
the question of islands in boundary rivers is theoretically difficult but 
in the Nile Basin at least this has caused no serious problem. The most 
striking case referred to in the previous chapter is that of the River 
Kagera between Tanzania and Burundi.
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Lakes are significant natural features as far as the drawing 
of boundaries in the Mile Basin are concerned. One interesting point 
not so far mentioned in the literature is that of Lake Nasser flooding 
the Mile Valley below Wadi Haifa? this creation of a lake completely 
solved the ’Wadi Haifa problem1 at the Egypt-Sudan boundary, making it 
necessary to resettle the very people over whom differences of opinion had 
previously existed. Otherwise in the Mile Basin several examples have been 
mentioned in the earlier discussions on the various international 
boundaries. In practice, again, the theoretical difficulties do not 
seem to have created any serious problems,.In'Lakes Edward and Albert on the 
Uganda-Zaire border approximate centre lines are drawn - though not 
necessarily properly demarcated - through the lakes to give some appearance 
of supporting the principle of equitable distribution. Lake Victoria, as 
mentioned in chapter one, is a special case. It is the largest of the lakes 
and helps to divide Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. But no attempt has ever 
been made here to ensure an equitable distribution of water. As noted in 
chapter two Kenya’s boundaries did not extend to the lake until 1902; before 
that date the lake had been divided along the arbitrary 1° south line of 
latitude between Britain and Germany in I89O,
Turning now to mathematical or geometrical lines, these are very 
common in the Mile Basin - the international boundary between Egypt and 
Sudan? the boundary between Uganda and Tanzania; the boundary between Kenya 
and Tanzania; and sections of many other boundaries are well-known 
examples. And these examples are often cited to prove the arbitrary and 
unsatisfactory nature of such boundaries. The evidence from the Mile 
Basin, however, does not support such a criticism. Indeed, it could be 
argued that as all boundaries are abstractions, artificial and to some 
extent arbitrary, then a straight line, such as a line of latitude, is
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likely to lie as satisfactory as - and even more s atisfactory than - any 
other type of boundary. This appears to be so for two reasons. First, 
the use of any other criteria or features for boundary drawing, as along 
the Uganda-Zaire boundary, raises difficulties inherent in the nature 
of those criteria or features. In no sense can the Tanzania-Burundi 
boundary along the River ICagera be said to be satisfactory either in 
terms of demarcation or in terms of the utilisation of the waters of the 
river. Secondly, in the Kile Basin those international boundaries which 
follow lines of latitude or are simply straight lines drawn between fixed 
points tend to be drawn very largely through areas where population 
densities are so low that there is little point in considering any 
physical or human factor in drawing the boundary. Even in the cases where 
nomadic pastoralists use land on both sides of a straight-line boundary 
the very precise yet entirely abstract nature of the boundary line seems to 
facilitate the ad hoc ignoring of the boundary line by neighbouring 
governments. This is certainly true of the Masai in relation to the 
Kenya-Tanzania boundary.
Finally, what does the evidence given in the previous chapter 
suggest about the use of non-physical, essentially human geographical 
features as criteria for boundary-drawing in the Kile Basin? Kumerous 
instances were given of attempts on the part of European powers to take 
human, especially tribal, distributions into account in drawing the 
international boundaries in their respective areas. However, certainly 
at the time of initial delimitation and to some extent even today, not 
nearly enough has been known about the peoples, their ways of life, or 
their distributions for it to be possible to avoid splitting ethnic groups 
in one way or another. Moreover, as indicated earlier, there has always
been a great deal of confusion about human group classifications and 
terminology, both between officials and between academics from different 
disciplines, or even from the same discipline. Then there is the important 
point that neither the nature of a group nor its distribution can ever 
be static. An international boundary, however, must be fixed so that there 
is always the possibility of human distributions and activities 
ignoring or wishing to ignore boundaries. In the Kile Basin, it should 
be emphasised, those human groups that are split by a boundary are 
surprisingly few, considering the size of the area and the number of 
ethnic groups contained within it. As for modern economic features, 
it must be remembered that all such developments post-date the drawing 
of the boundaries, so that it can hardly be argued that the drawing 
of boundaries has disturbed modern economic developments and activities.
The same can be said of modern population movements, distributions and 
urbanization. The one major and continuing difficulty in the Kile Valley 
arising from the pattern of states arising from the international boundaries 
is the land-locked nature of three states - Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.
But more will be said on this matter in chapters five and six.
The Hypothesis Re-Examined The hypothesis stated at the beginning 
of this thesis may now be re-stated in the form of three sentences:
(i) The international boundaries of the Kile Basin states are 
arbitrary and do not accord with geographical realities,
(ii) For this reason they are a cause of tension between states,
(iii) The international boundaries therefore militate against 
effective inter-state cooperation in the region. This hypothesis is 
widely accepted as conventional wisdom or as a truism, and it is now 
time to examine it carefully and decide how valid it is on the basis 
of the evidence available from the Nile Basin boundaries. To begin 
with, each of the three sentences or statements of the hypothesis will 
be examined separately.
(i) 'The international boundaries of the Nile States are arbitrary 
and do not accord with geographical realities1 
All boundaries are artificial in that they involve the drawing of a 
line on a map and, in some cases, laying out visible markers on the 
ground; they are nevertheless all abstractions. If, therefore, the 
notion is accepted that states must have international boundaries 
between them, then it must also be accepted that these boundaries 
will be artificial. The first question here, however, is whether they 
are arbitrary, defined as 'derived from mere opinion; capricious; 
unrestrained' (O.E.D.). Certainly many if not most of the boundaries 
examined here were derived from mere opinion in that, as already 
pointed out, they had to be drawn at a time when little accurate 
information and no accurate maps were available to enable boundaries 
to be drawn on the basis of anything else but opinion - or at best 
informed opinion. During and immediately after the 'Scramble for 
Africa', as well as at the 1884-5 Berlin Conference there was no time 
to await detailed field surveys and studies of human populations and 
groups - their distributions, preferences and migrations. Indeed, it 
is probably true to say that only today - at the earliest since 1945 - 
has sufficient detailed survey work been accomplished to enable really
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accurate information to be available. As for the terms ’capricious’ 
and 'unrestrained', there is an implication here that the boundaries 
could have been better drawn at the time and that a conscious 
decision was taken not to use what information there was available.
At least at the level or stage of demarcation there is no evidence 
from the cases examined that this was ever so; indeed, the instances 
of attempts to consider the local circumstances of physical and 
human geography are numerous. It seems reasonable to conclude, there­
fore, that the international boundaries of the Nile Basin are 
arbitrary, but only in the sense that they were drawn on the basis 
of the best opinion available at the time of delimitation and 
demarcation.
As for the phrase 'they do not accord with geographical 
realities', the same point about inadequate information at the time 
of delimitation must first be made - not as an excuse but as an 
explanation. But that said, there is no doubt that many of the 
boundaries do not accord with geographical realities - by which is 
presumably meant the features and distributions of physical and 
human geography. The lines of latitude and other straight lines must 
come into this category - notably between Egypt and Sudan, Kenya and 
Tanzania and part of the Tanzanian-Ugandan boundary - as most parts 
of the Uganda-Zaire and Tanzanian-Rwanda boundaries where rivers and 
straight-line sections exist. The problem here, however, is that 
whether,for example, a river is a 'good' or 'bad' boundary is very much 
a matter of opinion and depends on the kinds of considerations 
mentioned in chapter one. Moreover, the use of the administrative 
boundary device has been used to take into account the 'geographical 
realities' associated with the distribution of 'tribes’ in the eastern 
sector of the Egypt-Sudan boundary and along the Sudan-Kenya boundary.
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More fundamentally, perhaps, the notion of ’geographical 
realities’ implies some objective interpretation of a set of circum­
stances in a particular place which, would provide the basis for more 
satisfactory boundary drawing. To take just one example, it is often 
suggested that a major factor ignored by boundaries in the Wile Basin, 
as elsewhere in Africa, is the distribution of homogeneous ethnic or 
tribal or ethno-linguistic groups. But this assumes that such groups 
exist and that we know sufficiently accurately the nature of the 
community in terms of its extent, numbers, composition, dynamics or 
homogeneity. Yet when we come to look at any particular case - the 
Masai, Luo, Gisu or Pokot for example - it is impossible to arrive 
at any clear definition of their extent or even characteristics; 
even less is: it possible to determine their political sphere of in­
fluence. For, as Barbour (1961) pointed out, ’the term tribe is cap­
able of several meanings: it may be used for a group of persons who 
speak the same language and observe a generally similar pattern of 
dress and customs, or it may mean all the persons who acknowledge 
a common political head, whether they are culturally identical or 
not' (Barbour, 1961, pp.314-15). The term ’Pokot’, for instance, in 
the context of the Uganda-ICenya boundary issue is not defined in the 
same way as the area over which some other single criterion, such as 
any one form of social organization,is found to operate. Indeed as 
another writer has pointed out, it is a problem of boundary studies 
in Africa that a great deal of dependence has to be placed on 
descriptions of communities and their distributions made by other 
scholars - ethnographers, linguists and social anthropologists -
for their own specialist purposes. And none of these interpretations 
can be accepted uncritically as necessarily accurate in the context 
of boundary studies (Hodder, 1968). The same problem of subjective
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interpretation surrounds most other elements of the physical and 
human landscape of any border region.
It seems reasonable to conclude that many of the inter­
national boundaries of the Wile Basin are arbitrary - based on
opinion in the absence of fact - and that they do not accord with
geographical realities in so far as such realities can be assumed to 
exist. And the evidence from the Nile Basin suggests that neither 
at the time of original boundary drawing nor in the present day, 
could boundaries be drawn that were any less arbitrary or any more 
in accord with geographical realities. All boundaries in all 
countries and at all times can be criticised for exactly the same 
reasons. If international boundaries have to exist for the sake of 
defining the territorial limits of a state, then whoever draws them 
up runs the occupational risks of all boundary makers.
(ii) 'For this reason they are a cause of tension between states1 
This second statement involves two assumptions - first, that the 
boundaries of the Nile Basin could and should have been drawn else­
where so as to preclude inter-state disputes; and secondly, that 'bad' 
boundaries can cause tension between states. The first assumption 
has implicitly been dealt with in the previous section. But to 
illustrate further from the issue of ethnic groups. Even if it were 
possible to define precisely the limits of particular groups, where 
would the boundary line be redrawn? However it is redrawn it could 
not avoid two problems: (i) ignoring the realities of some other 
perhaps equally important criterion (such as water resources or trade 
routes); and (ii) either creating a ridiculously large number of 
'states1 or simply rearranging boundaries so that a slightly different 
'mix' of communities is embraced by the new boundary, thereby in­
fringing the territorial rights of one state on the grounds of the
presumed dominance of one selected factor.
As for the second assumption - that boundaries, especially 
'bad1 boundaries, can be a cause of friction or tension between 
states - this view has been elevated in the literature to the status of 
a self-evident truth, though it conflicts of course with the views 
of writers like Ancel (1938) mentioned earlier in chapter one. But 
let us look first at the evidence from the Nile Basin state boundaries. 
Historically, there have been a number of boundary disputes and 
these are detailed in the previous chapter - the Wadi Haifa salient, 
the eastern section of the Egypt-Sudan boundary, the Ilemi triangle, 
the Kagera salient, the Kagera triangle, the Karasuk territory, and the 
Masai problem at the Kenya-Tanzania boundary. To examine the nature 
of such disputes, however, two examples may be look at in a little 
more detail. The first is the Egypt-Sudan boundary.
The Egypt-Sudan boundary is simply based on a line of latitude 
(22° N.), though the administrative boundary deviates substantially 
from the parallel in its eastern section. Geographical conditions 
and modes of life are almost identical on both sides of the border, 
including the Nile river section. Conditions have traditionally been 
very peaceful, the people on both sides having close racial and 
linguistic affinities. The Barabra - the generic term used locally - 
claim to have Arab affinities but historical and anthropological 
evidence shows that they are a mixture of Caucasians, who immigrated 
to the Sudan in ancient Egyptian times, and the original Negro 
inhabitants (Abbas, 1951 j pp.2-3), Situated on the main trade routes
between Egypt and Central Africa, the rulers of the local tribes 
undoubtedly profited from the passage of caravans, but their 
subsistence depended on their agriculture, perhaps more extensive 
than it is today (Tothill, 1952).
Egypt, for clear reasons, has therefore long displayed 
ambitions towards the area now known as the Sudan, and these 
ambitions can be seen in the light of the historical fluctuations 
of Egypt’s southern border, reflecting the ’millenia-old urge to 
control the upper Nile' (Touval, 1969? P.109)•
But what exactly led to the conflict between Egypt and Sudan in 
1958? A brief military confrontation occurred in February, 1958} 
when Egypt briefly occupied Sudanese territory and then, threatened 
with a United Nations’ debate, withdrew. As a current report put it, 
a small Egyptian force crossing the border in that month provoked the 
Sudan government into revealing that Egypt was claiming two pockets 
of Sudanese territory. Sudan reported this ’aggression' to the 
United Nations Security Council and Egypt speedily withdrew its forces. 
As for the real reason for this boundary infringement, the Egyptian 
move was reported 'as an attempt to influence the voters in favour 
of those who stand for some closer relationship, if not unity, between 
Sudan and Egypt' (African Affairs, 1958> P.96). Another writer, 
however, believes that Egypt's incursion in 1958 can be interpreted 
in one of two ways. First it could be mainly a symptom of the 
fundamental tensions between the two countries, stemming from Egypt's 
age-long drive for influence over the upper reaches of the Nile and
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her disappointment at the Sudan having opted for independence 
rather than union with Egypt, Secondly, and alternatively, Egyptian 
claims could he interpreted as a lever to extract concessions 
from the Sudan over two matters then "being negotiated overs (i) the 
amount of compensation to be paid by Egypt to Sudan for the flooding 
of the Wadi Haifa region and the consequent resettlement of the local 
population resulting from the flooding of the valley there; and (ii) 
the request then being made by Sudan for a revision of the earlier 
1929 Nile Waters Agreement. Both these issues were subsequently dealt 
with satisfactorily in the following year - in 1 9 5 9 *
A second example is afforded by the central section of the Uganda- 
Zaire boundary (Figure 14), Langlands (1967) notes that this boundary 
seems to be more satisfactory than the earlier 30° meridian east line 
and the abortive attempt to distinguish the Congo-Nile divide referred to 
earlier. But although the Ruwenzori massif appears to be a 'natural 
frontier1, its passes are crossable and the boundary here is difficult 
to police; early local political movements demonstrated this fact. 
Politicians like Van Gotzen who argued for the establishment of river 
courses rather than geometric lines and watersheds as the ’natural 
boundaries' for the Congo may think that rivers make satisfactory 
boundaries; but geography demonstrates the falsity of their claims.
Thus, whereas Milner in 1919 could argue that 'the logical frontier' 
between the Belgian and British possessions in Africa was the great 
lakes and their tributaries, the Ruzizi and Seraliki rivers demonstrate 
the illogicality of river courses for boundary purposes. It is just
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as "illogical" to divide the Semliki valley laterally by its thalweg 
as to divide it into lower and upper sections as was done by the 
thirtieth meridian east and by the 1910 convention.
The way in which this particular boundary has had undesir­
able effects on ethnic distributions can be illustrated again (Fig.l) from the 
ethnic groups Bwamba and Butalinga both of which lie in remote 
corners of their respective countries. The heart of the Bwamba country 
lies isolated from the rest of Uganda to the west of the Ruwenzori 
range. Butalinga is equally isolated in the eastern extremity of 
Zaire. This area of habitation is cut off from the rest of the 
country by the barrier of the Ituri Forest and by its extension east­
wards as the Semliki Forest. The relatively higher social and 
economic level of the Bwamba and the generally low standard of life 
in Butalinga should not overshadow the two facts that the two 
districts are both generally less developed in their respective 
states and that the two are remote parts. Butalinga, which is only 
411 kilometres from Kampala, is about 3,200 kilometres from Kinshasa 
while Bwamba is about 400 kilometres from Kampala. Whatever economic 
or social plans were made in each country, the Bwamba domain was 
always at the bottom of the receiving end and this was no fault of 
either government but lies in the geographical isolation of the area.
The political geographer engaged in studies in this part of Africa 
must therefore take this isolation into account. (Kibulya, 1967).
By the 1959 Census there were 32,000 Baamba in Bwamba 
country, plus 17,500 Kanjo and nearly 7,000 Toro. The total population 
was 59,000 and would have included a few hundred Buganda and even a 
few Zanzibaris who were left over from the slave and ivory trade of 
Stanley’s time. The population now must be 70,000 living in an area 
roughly comparable to that of Butalinga with only 13,000. Land
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pressure has become so acute that settlements extend right up to 
the boundary on the Uganda side but the Congo government has 
deliberately avoided settlement within two miles of the boundary.
Since 1963, the Baamba have found themselves greatly 
puzzled. A few metres away lies the fertile Busegya land with its 
thick, loam, black soils being wasted. Before independence the
Baamba used to cross into this area freely. It was not uncommon to
see Baamba rice fields along the Busegya road. But since 1964,
Uganda and Zaire have broken the traditional ’blind eye’ approach 
to this boundary. Faced with civil war in that year, the state 
closed all its boundaries and some troops were stationed half a 
mile from the crossing. In retaliation, Uganda closed its borders 
and placed its troops about 180 metres from the crossing. In May,
1965, Ugandan troops crossed over the boundary and ambushed members 
of the Congolese army and killed two of them. This skirmish 
created hatred between the Butalinga and Bwamba and the wounds have 
never been healed. The boundary has remained constantly under the 
supervision of the army on the Uganda side, but in Butalinga the 
troops have left and now there is only a customs office to fill the
vacuum. The Baamba who could have spilled over into Nsungu have been
arrested by the new stringent rules on the boundary. They may still 
visit relatives in Zaire. But they must not carry anything with them. 
Above all, they must not cultivate any piece of land in Zaire. All 
along the boundary, therefore, the Baamba population is swelling. Once 
again the western-oriented Baamba have been stopped at the boundary 
by the new policies governing this arbitrary separation. The Batalinga, 
on the other hand, may buy anything they need from Nyahuka and in 
fact can settle peacefully in Bwamba.
’The parcel of territory bearing the name of Uganda Pro­
tectorate varied considerably in extent from its establishment in
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Buganda in 1894 until 1926* (Brownlie, 1979, p.691). Since the 
Protectorate Government solved the 1926 dispute in favour of the 
right of the Kingdom of Toro government in the area, and although 
economic prosperity increased by the 1960s, 'the Bwamba began to 
resent the presence of Batoro chiefs over them and became disgruntled 
at the apparent exclusion of key offices to them and saw themselves 
discriminated against in various ways. During the course of this 
disturbance the Baamba re-iterated the argument that they have never 
been part of the Kingdom of Toro and that the severance from their 
kingdom on the other side of the Semliki by an international 
boundary left them weaker vis-a-vis the Batoro than would otherwise 
have been the case'. One may see, therefore, the germs of the dis­
satisfaction of the 1960s in the international settlements occurring 
up till 1910 and the internal settlement up to 1926.
Clearly,then, there have been - and to some extent still 
are - problems at the international boundaries for particular 
groups of peoples and these have in some cases been dealt with by 
one or more devices - slight changes of the boundary, the use of 
the ’administrative’ boundary device, agreements between the relevant 
governments that bona fide members (like the Masai) may cross freely 
when their economies and ways of life cannot be contained within 
any formal territorial framework. In all cases within the Nile 
Basin it is true to say that no significant boundary dispute of a 
local nature now concerns the various governments. But this is not 
really what we have to examine. The statement being examined is that 
an unsatisfactory boundary (however defined) is the cause of tension 
between states. In the cases examined here, however, it may have 
been true in the past - notably between Egypt and Sudan from 1956- 
1958 (see pp.5Y-;0) “ but according to the most recent authorities,
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notably Brownlie, ’no disputes are known to exist1 occurs frequently 
in his comments on the particular boundaries under review in this 
thesis. This is not to suggest that there are no international border 
problems elsewhere in Africa which are still causing tension between 
states - the case of Ethiopia and Somalia suggests that. But at 
least in the Nile Basin a stage in the development of inter-state 
relations has apparently been reached in which any difficulties at 
the boundaries are viewed solely as local problems capable of local 
solution. Such inter-state tension that does or has existed - for 
instance between Kenya and Tanzania over the closing down of the 
East African Community (which led to the closing of the international 
boundary between the two countries) and the invasion of Uganda by 
Tanzanian troops towards the end of the Amin regime - could not by 
any stretch of the imagination be seen as having been caused by the 
international boundaries.
The conclusion therefore seems to be clear: 'arbitrary' 
boundaries have caused tension between states in the past in the Nile 
Basin, but more frequently such boundaries cause only local, not 
inter-state disputes] and the major causes of inter-state tension 
have nothing to do with the boundaries themselves, however often they 
are used as excuses for conflict.
(iii) ’The international boundaries therefore militate against 
effective inter-state cooperation in the region’
More will be said on this matter in the final two chapters of this 
thesis, which look at inter-state cooperation in the Nile Basin in 
the context of water resources and then, more generally, in the 
context of regional and Pan-African Unity. At its simplest, the 
statement being examined here implies that if the international 











































geographical realities - then they would assist in inter-state 
cooperation. Putting it diagrammatically ( Diagram 2) it suggests 
that diagram A will encourage cooperation; that diagram B will 
militate against cooperation. In diagram A the international 
boundary follows the crest of a mountain range; this forms the 
watershed between rivers flowing in opposite directions; and the 
international boundary cuts neatly between two homogeneous ethnic 
groups. In case B the international boundary cuts through a single 
river and a mountain range; it also cuts through a homogeneous 
tribal territory. These are not extreme, exaggerated models; in 
the case of B, certainly, it bears a remarkable resemblance to the 
case of the Egypt-Sudan international boundary.
But exactly how far is. it true that diagram A is more 
satisfactory than diagram B in representing ideal circumstances for 
cooperation between states? It must first of all be remembered that 
cooperation between states is primarily a matter of mutual decision 
for mutual benefits based not on solving boundary problems but on a 
much wider complex of social, economic, political and, perhaps,' 
strategic issues. But even allowing for this, it could be argued that 
diagram B represents a more positive basis for cooperation than does 
diagram A which seems to follow the 'ideal* boundary notion of authors 
like Holdich and Curzon discussed in chapter two - that is, that a 
'good* boundary should be a barrier and have good defensive qualities. 
Today, however, such a line of thought seems anachronistic and 
negative as well as anti-cooperation. On the other hand, diagram B 
indicates a situation where the international boundary cuts across 
all natural and human features and clearly cannot operate as a 
barrier or defensive boundary in any way. The need for and opportunity 
for cooperation is therefore so great that cooperation is more likely 
to occur, and we shall see in the next chapter how this has in fact
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operated In the case of the utilisation of the Nile waters throughout 
the entire basin.
It is this kind of thinking that led to the decision by the 
Organisation of African Unity to establish in 1964 the principle 
of sacrosanct boundaries in Africa: that all boundaries should remain
as they are. This too will be examined later. It is also this kind 
of thinking that has led so many African leaders to argue for 
accepting existing boundaries and making them work in the cause of 
cooperation. As President Nyerere of Tanzania put it in 1963 (p.2)
’in the sphere of boundaries, as in all others, we must start our 
quest for African unity from the facts of our historical inheritance... 
we must use the African national states as instruments for the re­
unification of Africa, and not... as tools for dividing Africa’.
Divided peoples, divided rivers, divided mineral resources, divided 
economic systems - all these can and perhaps now must be viewed not 
as problems but as opportunities, providing a common and realistic 




THE NILE WATERS AND INTER-STATE COOPERATION
The argument developed in the previous chapter was to some extent 
subjectively based on empirical evidence, both from examples within 
the Nile Basin states and from comparative analyses elsewhere. The 
present chapter, however, provides much more solid evidence by treating 
the Nile Basin as an integrated river system and focussing in some 
detail on the allocation of the Nile water resources among the con­
stituent states.
International Boundaries and the Nile Basin The first point to make 
is clear from Eigure 22 : the major rivers of the Nile drainage
system cross the major international boundaries at right angles (Egypt- 
Sudan, Sudan-Ethiopia, Sudan-Uganda) and only a few of its important 
rivers are actually used as international boundaries (the Kagera). The 
main natural drainage reservoir lake (Lake Victoria) is also cut 
through by international boundaries (Uganda-Tanzania especially) and 
other lakes in the system (Albert and Edward) are likewise divided 
politically. Finally, the major man-made lake (Lake Nasser) is cut by 
the Egypt-Sudan boundary. In other words, all the major elements 
(rivers, natural lakes and man-made lakes) are cut through by inter­
national boundaries. And the significance of this fact for our present 
discussion needs no further emphasis. It clearly provides plenty of 
additional justification for the opinion that the international 
boundaries of the Nile Basin are Tbad' boundaries. But it also gives 
strong support for the view, concluded in the previous chapter, that 
there is here a great need and opportunity for inter-state cooperation.
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The Nile Waters The main facts about the Nile Waters have already- 
been touched upon (pp.40-2), but a summary of the river system’s 
present-day characteristics is presented in Figure 22. In the 
extreme south the inland drainage basin of Lake Victoria receives its 
waters from the east (up to the rim of. the eastern rift valley) and 
from the west (especially the River Kagera, which rises almost 4° S. 
near Lake Tanganyika, and Lakes Edward and George, via a number of indetermi­
nate streams a In the western rift valley, Lake Edward is also connected 
through rivers (Semliki) to Lake Albert where it is joined by the 
Victoria Nile which flows northwards from Lake Victoria through Lake 
Kioga. Passing over the Uganda-Sudan boundary, the Bahr El-Jebel 
passes through the sudd region of swamps and indeterminate drainage, 
and receives several tributaries, notably the Sobat which rises in 
Ethiopia, At Khartoum the White Nile meets with the Blue Nile, which 
also rises in Ethiopia at Lake Tana. Some way farther north the 
Atbara joins the main river from Ethiopia. The Nile continues north­
wards to cross the Egypt-Sudan boundary at Wadi Haifa where Lake 
Nasser has been formed as a result of the Aswan High Dam constructed 
over the boundary in Egypt.
Any description of this kind - even a much more sophisticated 
and detailed one than seems appropriate here - does, however, fail 
to focus on the most important and relevant issue for our purposes - 
the size and allocation of the water resources, their seasonal fluctua­
tions, and the water losses that occur in several parts of the basin.
Figure 22, and Diagram 3 summarise some of the information
about these issues. But from our point of view here the importance of 
this information is that it emphasizes the absolute necessity of 
integrated water control of the Nile waters, from whatever part of the 
basin they come.
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To examine this issue in some detail, the discussion 
will deal with the development of schemes and projects for the in­
tegration of the Nile water resources, both historically and geo­
graphically, beginning with the northern sections of the Nile system.
The Northern Nile Basin Appendix I provides a summary of the 
documentation on the various agreements and commissions undertaken 
between Egypt and Sudan in attempts to reach effective agreements 
on how to control and allocate equitably the waters of the Nile in 
this part of the basin. It will be remembered that the main use of 
the Nile water in Egypt and Sudan is for irrigation waters:fthe 
need for artificial irrigation from the Nile River is almost ex­
clusive to Egypt and the northern part of the Sudan1(Megahed, 1973, 
p.9). Concern with the control of the Nile goes back to the first 
half of the nineteenth century when perennial irrigation began to 
replace the traditional basin irrigation system. Barrages began to 
be built and, after British occupation and influence began in 1882, 
a wider series of international treaties were negotiated with 
interested governments in the upstream sections of the Nile system 
in and around the Lake Plateau. So even before the end of the nine­
teenth century it was recognised that the Nile Basin waters had to 
be seen as an integrated system and internationally agreements 
reached to ensure their full and reliable utilisation, more especially 
in the interests of Egypt and Sudan. Population increases and 
agricultural developments continued to make increasing demands on the 
Nile Waters; and as the need for irrigation within Sudan became more 
apparent, so a series of projects, including the Sennar dam, was 
built to launch agricultural development in the Gezira, lying between 
the White and Blue Niles.
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By 1920 the Sennar Dam was incorporated into a series of 
projects and proposals encapsulated in the Nile Projects Commission 
of that year. Of particular interest is the way this commission was 
interested in waters even further upstream - conservation works in 
the sudd to avoid the swamps5 storage reservoirs on the Lake Plateau, 
centring on Lake Victoria; and a dam on Lake Tana to save some of 
the Blue Nile’s flood water. Another commission of 1925 was followed 
hy the Nile Waters agreement of 1929> concerned solely with the 
allocation of water between Egypt and Sudan, Disagreements and 
disputes ensued and £.gypt decided to go ahead with her High Lam project 
while Sudan was determined to go ahead with building the Eoseires 
Lam for the Manquil extension to the Geaira irrigation scheme. Mention 
must also be made of Egypt's interest in the Lake Plateau where in 1948 
construction of the Owen Palls Lam at Jinja (Uganda) was begun and 
completed by 1954. Egypt paid a large extra sum to enable the dam to be 
built one metre higher than originally planned so as to increase storage 
in the Lake; the main objective of the dam, however, was to regulate the 
discharge from the lake and to generate 150 megawatts of hydro-electricity 
annually for industry in Uganda and Kenya (Waterbury, 1979)*
The Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 (Appendix i) led to the settlement 
of any water allocation dispute between the two countries. This agreement, 
however, was still concerned primarily with Egypt-Sudan relations and the 
allocation of water resources between them.
The Southern Nile Basin In southern Sudan and the rest of the Nile 
Basin the control of water for irrigation has not yet become so important 
a factor as it has for long been in Egypt and Sudan, Here in 
the south, of course, rainfall amounts are greater and rain-fed 
agriculture the norm, though it is becoming clear that the seasonal
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nature and unreliability of the rainfall will increasingly
necessitate the use of the Nile Waters for irrigation if substantially
higher levels of productivity are to be achieved in the southern
parts of the Nile Basin.
Initially, however, control of the upper Nile waters in
southern Sudan and the Lake Plateau around Lake Victoria was concerned
primarily with the interests of Egypt and Sudan, as the ultimate users
of most of the water.
First, the most significant scheme was the Century Storage
Scheme, designed to remove the unpredictable element from the Nile
discharge by storing several successive animal floods: that is, by
storing the annual difference between real needs and total discharge.
In this manner a series of reservoirs could be used to bank water
against low years or to hold excess water if the flood promised to
be especially high.
The Century Storage Scheme was intended to coordinate a
series of complicated engineering projects over a period of twenty
years among several African states in the southern Nile Basin. The
linchpin of the proposed system was Lake Victoria (today Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda are all riparian states of the lake), which was
to be used as the major storage reservoir. Lake Victoria, with a
2surface area of 67,000 km , is the second largest lake in the world,
and raising its level by just one metre would represent an increment
3m  stored water of 67 billion m - the equivalent of almost 80 per 
cent of the Nile system’s entire annual discharge. However, only 
about 5 billion of the additional stored water could be delivered 
into the Bahr el-Jebel River at the lake’s outlet each year. Supple­
menting the over-year storage function of Victoria would be Lake 
Edward in north-west Uganda, and Lake Tana, at the headwaters of
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the Blue Nile. Lakes Kioga and Albert would have operated in tandem 
with Victoria and Edward respectively so as to regulate the discharge 
into the Victoria Nile and the Bahr el-Jebel River. Though nothing 
came of this project it demonstrated both the need and the possibilities. 
After all, as Hamdan (1981) notes, the resources of the lakes alone
3are immense. The volume of Lake Victoria is approximately 200 billion m
3and that of Lake Albert about 155 billion m . Lake Victoria derives 
advantage from its great surface area and the need for only a low dam, 
both in structure and cost; while Lake Albert, by its tremendous 
depth in the rift valley, can be treated like a moat and loses 
relatively little water from evaporation.
Later, in 1939, Egypt submitted to Sudan a proposal involving 
storage in the equatorial lakes and the building of dams at the 
outlets of Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert. The main objectives of 
this proposal - known as the 'Equatorial Nile Project' - was to 
provide more water for irrigation in Egypt at the time of the year 
when the Nile's natural flow was inadequate. During that period, 
the stored water could be released, thus ensuring for Egypt an 
increased and reliable source of supply throughout the year. The 
major part of the water would be transmitted through twin canals 
carrying 55 million cubic metres a day during the dry season and 
17 million cubic metres a day when Egypt had adequate water supplies.
This project, if implemented, would have lead to a complete reversal 
of natural seasonal fluctuations with flooding of the grazing areas 
of the sudd during the dry season, bringing serious hardship to the 
cattle-owning people of the area. Regulating and reducing the flow 
of the White Nile when the river was normally in flood would also 
have resulted in a serious diminution of the main swamps and a 
reduction of the Sudd's fishery resources.
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The Equatorial Nile Project (ENP) was subjected to detailed 
study from 1946 to 1954 by the Jonglei Investigation Team appointed 
by-the Sudanese Government, and their counter-proposals, contained in 
four volumes, have since been described as ’perhaps the Third World's 
first environmental impact study'* While accepting the need for 
storage in the great lakes of East Africa, the investigation team 
suggested a modification of the original project to maintain the 
natural regime of the Nile and thereby avoid many of the ENP's 
dangers. It was further suggested that the discharge capacity of the
canals be reduced to a constant flow of 35 million cubic metres a day
during normal operations.
These plans, however, went no further. Following the I959 
signing of the Nile Waters Agreement? Egypt constructed the Aswan High 
Dam for storage purposes and the entire project was dropped for some 
time (Awuol, 1982).
The next important proposal involved the Hydrometeorological 
Survey of the Catchments of Lakes Victoria. Kioga and Albert. This 
project was inaugurated on the 22nd March, 19 68 and was one of the 
largest of its kind, intended to arrange for the collection of data 
for a comprehensive study of the Upper Nile Basin in East Africa (Appendix II),
Lake Victoria lies in an open trough running from north to
south. The hills to the north and the south are quite low and the
watersheds are ill-defined; whilst to the east and the west the land 
rises to mountainous heights along the edges of the two arms of the 
rift valley system. Mean annual precipitation is extremely varied 
over the catchment. Although based on rather limited information, 
particularly on the central portion of the lake itself, rainfall over 
the lake proper seems to vary from more than 2000mm along the 
western edge to less than 750mm near the eastern shore.
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These variations in topographical and meteorological 
conditions produce corresponding variations in hydrological 
characteristics. The Kagera on the west in Tanzania and the Nyando 
in the east in Kenya are perennial rivers; whereas the streams in 
the semi-arid lake shores in Sukumaland in Tanzania are seasonal 
and flashy and the northern lake shore and the Katonga basin in 
Uganda are swampy. Mean annual runoff varies from about five to six 
hundred cubic metres per second for some of the smaller rivers.
Swift and steep rivers in the vicinity of Mt. Elgon in Kenya are 
in sharp contrast to the sinuous meanders in the lower reaches and 
extensive swamps in the lacustrine ends of tributary streams.
Hydrometeorology has a vital role to play in water 
resources development, involving the development of irrigation, 
hydropower, flood control and navigation. Schemes for the conservation 
and utilization of river water for irrigation involve a detailed 
understanding of the variations in river runoff from season to season 
within a year; and, year to year in a succession of years. Schemes 
for power development require a knowledge of the quantum of continuous 
flow than can be expected in a river and the periods for which flows 
above and below the normal would occur in order to evolve a suitable 
pattern for power generation. All schemes involving storage entail 
provision for surplussing devices as adjuncts to the storage structures 
so that works for disposal of flood waters have to be suitably designed. 
The design of spillways makes necessary a detailed study of the 
behaviour of storms, their depths, durations and frequencies over the 
catchment area upstream. Flood control structures require a study of 
the behaviour and pattern of floods in the basin which in turn are 
caused by meteorological phenomena.
Inland navigation, swamp reclamation, urban, rural and 
industrial water supplies, fisheries, recreational facilities and
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tourism are often combined with irrigation and power development 
and flood control in plans for comprehensive and integrated multiple 
purpose river basin development. In the particular instance of the 
equatorial lakes it is all the more important in view of the fact that 
the three lakes, Victoria, Kioga and Albert, are inter-connected by 
the Victoria Nile, apart from their own independent tributaries; 
any scheme for regulation of the lakes must therefore be based on a 
determination of the water balance of the lake system in which 
hydrometeorology plays a significant part. Particularly in inter­
national river basins, the feasibility of a project may sometimes 
depend upon its effect on the streamflow at some downstream point.
In the case of Lake Victoria, there have also been 
proposals under consideration from time to time for a fuller utiliz­
ation of the potential storage by adopting commonly acceptable 
regulation procedures. A scientific consideration of these various 
proposals for regulation of the lake system and possible future 
negotiations on the allocation of waters amongst the riparian 
states needs a comprehensive determination of the water balance of the 
lake system and the hydrometeorological analysis of the several 
involved parameters like rainfall, evaporation, inflows and outflows 
on a commonly acceptable basis.
While the data for such a scientific determination is 
adequate in some parts of the Upper Nile Basin in East Africa, it is 
notably inadequate in most locations. It is estimated that, at the 
present time, streams draining a third of the land area of the Lake 
Victoria catchment are gauged (less than two-thirds of the 'estimated 
total surface flow).
The Objectives of the Project:’ Therefore, the major objectives of the 
Project undertaken, by the Governments of Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Egypt
and Uganda with the assistance of the UNDP and the WHO are Mthe 
collection and analysis of hydrometeorological data of the catchments" 
of the lakes "in order to study the water balance of the Upper Nile.
The data collected and the study are expected to assist the countries 
in the planning of the water conservation and development and to 
provide the ground work for intern-governmental co-operation in the 
storage, regulation and use of the Nile."
The proposal additions to the stream gauging network are 
expected to increase the gauged areas to about 90% of the total. The 
following specific tasks are assigned to the Project:
(i) setting up additional data-collecting stations (24 hydro- 
meterological, 156 rainfall, 67 hydrological and 14 lake level 
recording), and up-grading some of the existing stations, in order 
to complete an adequate network from which basic hydrometeoro­
logical data can be collected and analysed,
(ii) establishing seven small index catchments for intensive studies 
of rainfall-runoff relationships for application to other parts 
of the catchment areas;
(iii)aerial photography and ground survey of those sections of the 
lake shore areas which are flat and which will be most subject 
to change with variations in the levels; and a hydrographic 
survey of Lake Kioga;
(iv) analysis and interpretation of data collected; and,
(v) training staff of the participating Governments in hydrometeoro­
logical work.
1
The Project thus represents one of the largest and most 
outstanding examples of inter-regional co-operation in the sphere of
1. The Headquarters of this project was located at Entebbe from 1968 
till 1978, then transferred to Nairobi when the War between 
Uganda and Tanzania took place.
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economic resources for the common benefit. The valuable data collected 
and the findings of the scientific analysis will be accessible to the 
professionals of the participating countries to assist them in the 
planning of water conservation and development not only for the good 
of the peoples of the country concerned, but in a manner which would 
not jeopardize the aspirations and interests of the other sister 
countries.
Another satisfactory aspect of the Project is that the 
professional and other staff drawn from the participating countries 
are working together in full co-operation and harmony. It is not 
only the training in the field of hydrometeorology which these staff 
would gain but, by the mere fact that they are working and living 
together, they would get to know each other much better than before 
and that in itself will bring these countries into even closer contact.
Thus by virtue of their geographical position, ’the peoples 
of the Nile, by their free will, are now wielding the Nile and 
Victoria to fulfil their historic mission of serving and unifying the 
countries on their banks.’ (UNDP and WMO, 1968, p.71).
In the late sixties of this century Rwanda, Burundi and 
Zaire joined this Hydrometeorological Survey, and in the meantime 
Ethiopia accepted the invitation of the Nile States - as an observer, 
as it is out of the Lake Plateau - to attend the sessions of the' 
works of the Hydrometeorological Survey. Thus, the meeting of all 
nine Nile Basin states has been realised, and the Hydrometeorological 
Survey has been extended several times. In April, 1983, the 
Egyptian Minister of Irrigation and his Sudanese counterpart de­
clared ’that they have contacted with the Nile States to realise the 
co-operation between all of them, and all the Nile States have agreed 
to extend the project of the Hydrometeorological Survey for another
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five years starting from this year, and the technical committees 
are preparing the projects suggested by the Nile States,1 (Al-Ahram, 
April 10, 1983),
Organisation for the Establishment and Development of the Kagera 
River Basin
A study of the development potential of the Kagera river basin has 
been jointly undertaken by the United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Burundi, and, more recently, joint arrangements were worked out 
between the States concerned for a study of the water resources and 
developmental problems of Lakes Tanganyika and Kivu (UNWC, 1977).
The main objective of the project was to assist the Governments 
of Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania in elaborating a plan for the develop­
ment of land and water resources of the Kagera River Basin, in the 
training of personnel who would secure the implementation of such an 
organisation, and in the elaboration of an institutional system for 
that evaluation. (KRBO, 1979).
With a view to preparing a work programme,,evaluating the 
required inputs, examining secretarial institutional needs, and 
preparing the donors’ Conference, the UNDP sent on site two missions 
of short-term consultants. The main objectives of the studies 
included the preparation of an optimal plan for the development of 
land and water resources in the Basin, taking into account the National 
Development Plans of the three countries and the statement of pro­
positions to the Member States for the creation of an institutional 
system to implement that plan.
With this in view, the project had adequately to evaluate 
all ecological and socio-economic conditions, to review existing 
development projects and to evaluate the advantages that would result
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for the peoples of the three countries from a rational development 
of land, water and other resources of the Basin. To be considered 
were the socio-economic advantages and drawbacks that would result 
from various development projects as well as the ecological changes 
that would result.
The main objective of the study was to define the changes 
in ecological systems resulting from variations in swamps' water 
levels caused by projected hydraulic variations without degrading 
the ecological system; and to evaluate the economic losses due to 
the changes in ecological systems.
The report analyses the available meteorological and 
hydrological data of the Basin; checks their validity; fills the 
gaps by various statistical methods; establishes correlations between 
different series and types of data; and, finally, uses the study 
results to establish a mathematical model for the generation of 
deliveries at the different points of the river.
Jonglei Canal: The Jonglei Canal is yet another project - this time
in Sudan - which is a link in a chain of projects which started 
around the turn of this century and is aimed at harnessing the 
River Nile and increasing its water yield for agriculture and other 
areas throughout the Nile Basin.
With accelerating p opulation growth and economic develop- 
ment, the demand for water by Egypt and the Sudan also accelerated.
In order to increase the supply of water, the control system was 
planned to develop from a simple localized flood protection mechanism 
to a more elaborate system encompassing damming for annual storage 
and, more recently, with the completion of the High Dam to century 
storage.
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However, with the beginning of the decade of the 1980s,
both Egypt and Sudan reached full utilization of their respective
3
shares of the Nile waters, estimated to average 84 billion M per 
annum at Aswan. On the other hand, they plan to increase their 
arable land area by over 50% over the next 25 years, that is, in 
addition to reaching higher intensity rates in the currently cul­
tivated areas. Accordingly, means of increasing the Nile waters
yield to both countries over and above its current 84 billion 
3 -M level npist be urgently sought.
The needed increase in Nile water yield could be ascertained 
from two main sources which are in fact interrelated. One, through 
reduction of water losses of the river and its main tributaries, 
particularly in the Southern Sudan (sudd region); and the other 
through storage schemes on the Lake Plateau. Needless to say, implement­
ing the latter without the former would be rather futile - if not 
useless - since the bulk of the stored water would be lost in the 
sudd region.
The Jonglei. Canal Project aims at reducing the heavy water 
losses in the sudd region which is estimated to reach a level of two- 
thirds or more of the river1s total water discharges passing 
Mongalla during flood periods (the annual average is 50%). This is 
to be achieved through the construction of a diversion canal from Bahr 
El Jebel (near the village of Jonglei) to carry the water discharges in 
excess of Bahr El Jebelfs conveyance capacity without undue loss 
(Montasser, 1980).
Just what all this will do for and to the people of the Nile - 
especially the Nuer, Dinlca, and Shilluk tribesmen of the southern 
Sudan - has become a matter of extended debate. Supporters of the 
overall project - the Nile Waters Agreement - promise that millions
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of acres of desert and swampland will become arable and that dozens 
of new Industrias will spring up once the Nile is tamed. Opponents 
charge that a tragic environmental debacle is in the making. They 
say that the region’s fragile ecosystem will be destroyed, the 
tribesmen of the southern Sudan will be driven from their traditional 
homelands, and hundreds of endangered species of wildlife will be 
threatened.
The Jonglg/ Canal, currently being excavated, is a project 
to conserve the waters of the White Nile which are otherwise lost 
in the sudd. It is estimated, for example, that of the water that 
flows into the sudd,only about half emerges again at the other end, 
the other half disappearing through evaporation and a limited amount 
of seepage. Hydrological studies indicate that approximately 15 
billion cubic metres of water are lost annually in this way.
Resulting from this project will be an increased annual 
yield of 3.8 billion cubic metres of Nile waters at Aswan - 4.7 
billion at Malalcal - to be divided equally between Egypt and Sudan. 
The two countries will also share the project costs for the 
excavation of a canal to divert a quarter of the flow of the White 
Nile from the sudd to Lower Sudan, and the construction of head and 
tail regulators as well as navigation locks. Substantial funds will 
also be allocated for research and development.
Originally, it was decided that the canal would be dug from 
the mouth of the Sobat River near Malalcal to Jonglei, a village on 
the River Atem, a distance of 280 kilometres. Now, however, the 
Jonglei Canal has been aligned well to the east of Jonglei, joining 
the mean flow of the White Nile, or Bahr El Jebel, just north of the 
provincial centre, Bor. The new length of the canal is estimated at 
360 kilometres. Eully navigable, the average width will be 52 metres
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and the depth 4 metres and, when completed, it will divert 20 
million cubic metres of Nile waters a day from the sudd and so 
contribute significantly to the available water resources of the 
Nile downstream.
The Nile Basin Board Finally, mentioned must be made of the pro­
posal to establish a Board for the Nile Basin. This initiative 
justifies much of the argument presented in this thesis - that 
cooperation between the Nile Basin States is nowhere seriously 
hindered by the location of international boundaries; that in any 
case the OAU decision of 1964 means that the present international 
boundaries should be made to work; and that there are immense 
opportunities for cooperation between the nine states of the Nile 
Basin. The invitation to the Nile Basin states came initially from 
Egypt and Sudan, inviting the other seven states - Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi - to participate in 
establishing the Nile Basin Board (Al-Akhbar, August 19, 1981, p.5; 
Al-Ahram, June 26, 1983, p.6). The nine states are still studying 
this proposal as a positive initiative for practical cooperation and 
’unification’ (sic). Such cooperation, it is argued, would put an end 
to inter-state disputes of all kinds and enable steps to be taken 
towards ensuring the welfare of all the peoples of the Nile Basin.
More recently, the Egyptian Gazette (April 29, 19^4) lias given 
further details on these proposalss ’The importance of conferring 
between the countries of the Nile Basin on the establishment of projects
or dams on the Nile course was stated in the initial report of the 
committee of Arab and Foreign Affairs and National Security. The 
report, that centred round fields of cooperation between countries of 
the Nile Basin, was discussed yesterday (28 April, 1984) at a session 
of the Shura Council. As for concurrence regarding regional security 
between these countries, the report stressed the necessity of 
achieving Nile Basin security as the foundation of Egyptian and Sudanese 
national security, Such security is not confined to the course of 
the Nile in Egypt and Sudan but extends to the Ethiopian and tropical 
sources of the Nile,
Concerning economic cooperation, the report stressed that the Nile 
Basin countries should seek effective solutions for their economic 
problems. Among such solutions is the establishment of funds to secure 
the prices of exportable outputs and diversification of these exports 
to avoid the dangers resulting from the exporting of one single 
commodity.
Moreover the report recommended the formation of economic bodies 
between the Nile Basin countries. These would integrate the fields of 
economy, commercial exchange, means of increasing production, and the 
exchange of technical expertise,
Relating to foreign affairs, the report also urged the bodies 
concerned to study the possibility of establishing a regional 
organization comprising the nine countries of the Nile Basin in order 
to coordinate their efforts and strengthen relations between them,1 
Written after the present thesis had been written, such comments 




INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND INTER-STATE COOPERATION
The case for some kind of inter-state arrangements for maximising and 
rationalising the Nile Waters resources, their allocation and utilisa­
tion, has long been appreciated among the various states of the 
Nile Basin. And, as the last chapter demonstrated, a series of bi­
lateral and multi-lateral agreements or arrangements has developed 
over the years, culminating in the Nile Basin proposal mentioned 
at the end of the previous chapter. This kind of proposal' has a 
long way to go, but it is clearly indicative of the need for inter­
state cooperation determined by the nature and distribution of the 
basin's water resources. But there is a great deal of difference 
between ad hoc water-resource arrangements of this relatively 
simple kind - where mutuality of interests is so obvious and clear- 
cut - '.and the more wide-ranging economic or political cooperation 
between states where the complexities and often apparent conflict 
of interests pose formidable difficulties, if not obstacles, to even 
the desire for cooperation. Nevertheless, the existence of boundaries 
and real or supposed boundary problems is now frequently invoked in 
support of policies of closer cooperation or unification, especially 
where traditional migration and trade continues to take place across 
a boundary line. Such fundamental regional economic and, perhaps 
eventually, political cooperation or unity is now commonly argued as 
the necessary end to which all states should aspire. Clearly, if the 
conclusions reached in the chapter four of this thesis are valid, 
then the existence of international boundaries is not the chief or 
even the important cause of failure to achieve inter-state cooperation. 
It is therefore on the geography of the areas being bounded (i.e. the
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states)rather than on the geography of their boundaries that our 
major attention should be focussed. Yet the sheer size and complexity 
of the issue of regional economic cooperation deters analysis of any 
depth - even leaving aside the difficulty of adequate data. The 
problems are numerous, related to a host of interrelated physical, 
positional, social, economic and political factors.
Take for instance, the economic issues on the question of 
international boundaries and inter-state cooperation in the Nile 
Basin. Balkanisation by the imposition of European colonial boundaries, 
which have become firmer and more like barriers since independence, 
has led to economies which are generally in no sense complementary: 
they are essentially artificially contrived national economies 
operating within former colonial boundaries. There are obvious 
pressures, therefore, to loosen these international boundaries,for 
in varying degrees they are obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
persons and capital between states. The state boundaries of the Nile 
Basin have created a series of relatively small, underdeveloped 
economies. 'There are, therefore, strong theoretical arguments - 
assuming economic development as a desirable goal - for an economic 
loosening of the boundaries'(Svendsen, 1969, p.59), Again, theoretically, 
internal markets must for long remain too small - both in size and 
more especially in purchasing power - if they are to continue to be 
confined solely within existing international boundaries.
This point can be eloquently demons trated by the example of 
the transport problems of the three landlocked states of the Nile 
Basin - Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. No study of these states comparable 
to the detailed study of the West African land-locked states by 
Hilling (1968) has yet been attempted, and this is not the place to 












Capital Port Mode of Transport





locked states of West Africa are highly relevant to tke East African 
case. At present the only practicable transport route for Uganda's 
exports and imports is through Kenya. As for Rwanda and Burundi, 
they possess no rail link and only poor quality road links which 
again, for obvious logistical reasons, look eastwards to the Indian 
Ocean coast through Uganda and Kenya - sometimes including the Lake 
Victoria steamer route from Bukoba to Kisumu - or through Tanzania 
(Figure 22), joining the Tanzanian railway or road system, both of 
which are far from reliable in this area.
Throughout the Nile Basin, as Figure 22 shows there is 
only one cross-boundary railway - that between Kenya and Uganda.- 
though there is another rail link across the Kenya-Tanzania boundary 
outside the Nile Basin region just beyond Mt. Kilimanjaro. Otherwise, 
the Egyptian and Sudanese railway systems are not linked, the former 
finishing at Aswan High Dam, the latter at Wadi Haifa at the 
southern tip of Lake Nasser. On the other hand the potential for 
further rail links across international boundaries is considerable. 
Plans are already being made to link Egypt and Sudan with a rail line 
around Lake Nasser. The western branch of the Sudan railway system 
is planned to link up with the Zairean system, while the eastern 
branch at two points - P.oseires and Kassala - is very close to the 
Ethiopian boundary. Further south, Uganda's sole link with Kenya 
could be supplemented by building an extension southwards from the 
Ugandan railway east of Lake Victoria to meet a northwards extension 
of the Tanzanian railway from Mwanza, The Mwanza line extension and 
an . extension northwards of the line presently terminating at Kigoma 
on Lake Tanganyika could also serve admirably the land-locked states 
of Rwanda and Burundi.
A further illustration of the problems of inter-state co-
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operation can be taken from the political field, notably the 
widely differing political systems, philosophies and ideologies 
existing among the constituent states of the Nile Basin. Using 
Young’s (1982) taxonomy, Ethiopia .is an 'Afro-Marxist* state,
Tanzania and Egypt are ’Populist-Socialist’ states, and Kenya is 
an ’African Capitalist’ state. This means that aims, priorities, 
attitudes and criteria of ’success' differ markedly from state to 
state.
Clearly many of these wider questions - whether economic, 
political or anything else - raise issues and problems which lie 
outside the central focus of the present thesis. But some attempt, 
however selective, must be made to identify some of the most relevant 
issues. The present chapter examines first a well-known case of 
an attempt at regional unity - the now defunct East African Community; 
discusses wider regional groupings; relates the whole question of 
inter-state cooperation across existing international boundaries to 
the issue of nationalism and national unity; and, finally, places the 
whole discussion within the context of the aims, functions and 
operations of the Organization of African Unity.
The East African Community This is perhaps the best-known of attempts 
of any group of members in the Nile Basin States to achieve any 
substantial degree of cooperation for wide-ranging economic development. 
The East African Community, now defunct, had relatively early origins 
in that its earliest progenitor was the East African Common Market, 
established in the 1920s when the purpose of uniting Kenya, and 
Tanganyika behind a common tariff wall was primarily to protect the 
then 'White Highlands’ agriculture of Kenya and the emerging 
industrialisation of the Nairobi and Mombasa areas - also in Kenya 
and also dominated by European settlers and companies. After the war,
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in 1948, the East African High Commission was established specifically 
for joint transport and communication facilities between the three 
countries; this move resulted in a substantial rise in trade within the 
three countries across international boundaries - so substantial (by 
African standards) that it accounted for some 20 per cent of all 
external trade for the three countries involved. In 1961 the 
East African High Commission was replaced by the East African Common 
Services Organisation (EACSO). Its functions were widened and 
specified to cover more than only common transport and communications, 
together with common external tariffs. EACSO also involved a common 
monetary, banking and financial system; common research, administrative 
operations and consultations; and the setting up in 1962 of the 
joint University of East Africa. Centrifugal strains, however, 
developed, partly because of the increasing emphasis on individual 
and divergent state interests, plans and policies: and partly because 
of the inequitable distribution of the gains, Kenya benefitting at 
the expense of Uganda and, particularly, of Tanzania. Major develop­
ments, investments and industries were increasingly being concentrated 
in Kenya and, in 1964, the Kampala Agreement, amended at Mbale in 
1965, provided for the relocation of some industries (beer, shoes, 
cement); the allocation of some new industries to Tanzania and Uganda; 
and jointly agreed quotas to protect new industries in Uganda and 
Tanzania against competition from Kenya. Individual state interests, 
however, made progress difficult and it was recognised that political 
union of some kind was a necessary concomitant of effective economic 
cooperation in the region - a realisation which recalls the Casablanca- 
Monrovia argument to be raised later in this chapter. The East 
African Community of 1965 was therefore constituted within a formal 
treaty framework (Green and Seidman, 1968). This lasted until 1977 
when it broke down, directly as a result of Tanzania's closing of the
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boundary with Kenya and the grounding of East African Airways (EAA).
The EAG has now been replaced by a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) 
which covers several countries outside the former EAC in East,
Central and Southern Africa,
The case of East Africa shows very clearly the difficulties 
of maintaining cooperation between states 'even where some tradition 
of it has already been established between areas formerly under the 
rule of a single imperial power, and where its economic advantages
i
have already been clearly demonstrated (Fisher, 1968, p.9), Langlands 
identifies the intrinsic conflicts between national, regional and 
federal interests, putting much of the blame on 'the essentially 
arbitrary political units’ imposed by the British who, in drawing 
their colonial boundaries, seldom took into account the interests 
of the indigenous people’ (Langlands, 1968, p.286). This kind of 
explanation has already been examined critically in an earlier chapter; 
but later on in the same article Langlands agrees that there is now 
general agreement in East Africa that the international boundaries 
are accepted as sacrosanct. 'The state area is given, and it is 
assumed that if anything has to change it is the attitude of the people, 
not the area' (ibid.,p.286).
When the border between Kenya and Tanzania was closed in 
1978 it seemed that the main reason was not so much the demise of the 
EAC but rather disagreement over the issue of assets and liabilities 
of the former community - railway rolling stock and the like.
With the closing of the Tanzanian-Kenyan boundary each 
country seized whatever joint property it could find within its 
borders inthe form of movable assets; fixed assets became nationalized, 
by the countries in which they were based. Relations between the 
East African states became so bad, with the main protagonists, Kenya
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and Tanzania, accusing each other of expropriating EAC property 
and assets, that a mediator from the World Bank had to be appointed 
to work out a formula for sharing the assets and liabilities. The 
economic effects of the closure of the Kenya-Tanzania boundary were 
catastrophic, denying the Kenyan.' and Tanzanian market some Shs.
180 million a year. Kenyan trade with Zambia was also seriously 
disrupted, previous transportation through Tanzanian roads and 
railways having been replaced by the costlier and more risky route 
from Kenya through Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. Industrial 
production in Kenya was thus a casualty, leading to labour layoffs 
for lack of orders (Africa, Mag.,, 1984, No. 149).
In November, 1983 the border was reopened and President 
MoiTs analysis of the position today is particularly relevant.
Moi sees the reopening of the border not as a way of reviving the 
EAC but rather as a means of enhancing regional cooperation through 
increased trade cooperation - once again going back to a much 
narrower ad hoc form of cooperation. Moreover, he sees the new 
regional basis for such trade cooperation^not the former narrow 
basis of three sta'tes but a much larger economic unit similar to 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Countries 
within East, Central and Southern African have agreed 6n the establish­
ment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA). Here again, the new basis 
is designed to look not northwards but southwards and south-westwards. 
Moi argues that the EAC was too small and its authority vulnerable 
to internal differences, usually resulting $ith two of its three members 
siding together against the third. Also its scope, area of cooperation 
and political base were rather narrow. The PTA has a broader 
operational base and more viable economic integration unity within its 
area 'Although the East African Community is dead, the spirit of
cooperation among the people of East Africa still survives1 
(Fadugba, 1984, p.26). This'spirit of cooperation1 is expressed less 
formally - but perhaps more effectively - than before by a series of 
ad hoc arrangements. Thus top defence, immigration and administrative 
officials of the two border regions between Kenya and Tanzania met 
to work out agreements on immigration and movement of people and 
goods across the re-opened border; cattle-rustling; poaching; and 
the repatriation of unwanted persons. Both countries also pledged 
not to carry out military exercises along the border. Ministers 
responsible for communications, transport trade and tourism have also 
met to cooperate in these fields of activity of mutual importance 
to both governments.
Moi's reluctance to resuscitate the EAC is understandable 
on many counts, including those mentioned earlier. But an additional 
reason is that the closure of the boundary between Kenya and Tanzania 
had some clear positive effects on the Tanzanian economy. Tanzania 
was forced to set up a number of industries which now produce 
virtually all the consumer items previously imported from Kenya.
Uganda, after the disruption, disorder and chaos of the 
Amin period, is viewed differently as a partner in cooperation, on 
however ad hoc a basis. It also views the collapse of the EAC from 
the point of view of a seriously land-locked state. As Obote has put 
it 'The biggest problem facing African unity is one of communication.. 
Take,for example, we in Uganda. In order to communicate with Rwanda 
our neighbour, by telephone or by telex, we have to route all these 
systems through Europe.1 (AfricaMag. ,1984, January). Obote argues that 
the most important issue in aspiring to unity at any”level is 
communication in all its forms, both technological and human.
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Wider Regional Groupings In examining the attempts to override the
divisive effects of existing international boundaries on social,
economic and political developments within the Nile Basin, it must
be borne in mind that the Nile Basin does not exist in a vacuum,
and that its constituent states have interests and responsibilities
elsewhere as well as in the Nile Basin. There indeed have been -
and in many cases there still are - strong centrifugal forces at work
within the Nile Basin states. Indeed, in some senses there appear to be
few grounds for cooperation betweeen the constituent states beyond
the water-resource issue. Several states have outside organizational,
regional or simply emotional attachments with groups of states outside
the Nile Basin. To give some examples. In 1975 Sudan and Egypt were
associated with Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania in
the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, known generally as
BADEA. As its name implies this organisation is concerned with the
1financing of economic development. A decade earlier, m  1965, Rwanda 
and Burundi became members of the African Francophone group OCAM 
(Organization Commune Africaine et Mauricienne). This has a fluctuating 
membership and has its origins in the Brazzaville group of 1960 
(mentioned later in this chapter). Its main functions are to do with 
posts and telecommunications, tourism, industrial patents and 
development banks. As for Tanzania, its orientation is to a significant 
extent southern and south-western: Tanzania is one of the 'front­
line states’ confronting the Republic of South Africa and it possesses 
the important Tazara rail link with the copper fields of Zambia. More 
recently still, Tanzania became in 1979 one of the member states of 
SADCC (Southern African Development and Coordinating Committee). Then 
all the Nile Basin states except for Egypt, which has only observer 
status, are members of the Conference of East and Central African
1. Clearly? this grouping was among states of the Arab League,
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States, established in 1967. Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire are the three 
members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries 
established in 1976 to discuss economic matters. In 1975 the Lakes 
Tanganyika and Kivu Basin Commission was set up to coordinate hydro­
meteorological research for the area and Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Zaire became members. In 1969 Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire founded 
the Organization Commune pour la Cooperation Economique de lTAfrique 
Centrale for economic cooperation. Coordination of planning and 
construction of a trans-African highway included among its members 
Kenya, Uganda and Zaire when the Trans-African Highway Coordinating 
Committee was set up in 1971. Finally, as already indicated, Kenya’s 
initiative has recently set up the Preferential Trade Area of which 
all the Lake Plateau states of the Nile Basin are members.
These various groupings vary very much in their purpose - 
ranging ostensibly from full economic cooperation to a narrow single­
purpose aim. They also vary very much in their efficiency. But they 
do indicate the need always to consider the external ties and respon­
sibilities the individual states of the Nile Basin have with states 
outside the region.
The Economic Commission for Africa The Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) was set up in 1958 when most of Africa was still under 
colonial control, but it now acts in close partnership with the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be discussed in a later 
section. A summary judgement on its operations must be that ECA has 
had remarkably little success in Its aims to support 'rapid economic 
development, especially industrialization, aimed at achieving economies 
of scale in production and correspondingly large internal markets’. 
Within the Nile Basin it has had a regional base in Kisenyi (Rwanda)
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and it has been associated with such matters as geothermal research 
programmes for electric power production in Kenya and Ethiopia.
But its problem throughout has been that to be effective it has to 
operate at a supra-national level, most states being too small in 
population and resources to provide viable units for ECA's operations. 
EGA's plans for integrated transport systems, for example, and for 
the location of basic industries, have often been unrealistic in 
that the immediate benefits would have been very unequally distributed 
among the states concerned. The ECA therefore encourages regional 
economic groupings, acts in an economic advisory capacity to African 
states, and produces statistical and other information relating to 
international trade, resources and economies. It is also responsible 
for the operations of the African Development Bank, similarly 
associated with the OAU.
Nationalism It is significant that all attempts at inter-state 
cooperation face difficulties from and usually founder upon the 
national interests of individual states. Where a conflict arises - as 
it inevitably must at some stage - between the interests of a nation 
operating within clearly defined international boundaries and the 
interests of a wider grouping for some form of cooperation which to 
some extent must ignore the existence of those international 
boundaries, then national interests tend to override the interests 
of a wider regional grouping - after all, exactly the same process 
can be seen operating in the European Economic Community. And it must 
be remembered that the national identity of modern states formed 
within previous colonial boundaries has only existed in most cases 
for some 25-30 years. Too much should not therefore be expected too 
soon, especially as the main problems facing all the individual
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nations of the Nile Basin are not, in their own perception, problems 
of conflict or cooperation with other states, but rather they are 
problems of achieving true independence and national unity within 
their own international boundaries. Many African states, on 
attaining independence, found themselves facing serious problems of 
internal dissension arising from, for example, tribal or ethnic 
differences among their people and totally lacking in that sense 
of unity and cohesion which is an essential prerequisite of the 
nation state (Boateng, 1975).
Perhaps the best-known instance of a Nile Basin state 
suffering from internal problems of national cohesion and unity is 
the Sudan. This country’s difficulties arise primarily not from its 
numerous and often 'bad* boundaries with Egypt, Chad, Central African 
Republic, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya or Ethiopia. They arise much more 
from the way the international boundaries bequeathed to the nation 
by European powers simply lumped areas and peoples together into 
one ’state’ and so created internal divisions and centrifugal forces 
within the state. Above all in the Sudan there is the serious and 
intractable north-south problem - the north is largely part of the 
Arab world, the south contains the Nilotes, Nilo-Hamites and Negroes 
of the Sudanic linguistic group. Thus while most of the northern 
peoples are Arabicized and have come under the unifying influence 
of Islam, the diverse peoples of the south have remained ethnically 
distinct and politically fragmented. Swamps and forests in the south 
have inhibited communication and perpetuated separate tribal units. 
Movement and contact between north and south have always been 
difficult because of the swamps, and until the late nineteenth 
century even the main Nile was unnavigable. Except along the Nile 
itself, an empty area - empty because of poor water supplies and early
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depopulation b'^  tribal raids - separates the two regions. During the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule this lack of contact was accentuated, 
entry of northerners into the south being restricted and Arab 
influences from the north discouraged. Conversely, few southerners 
were allowed to move to the north. The south was consciously isolated 
culturally and religiously, Christian missionary activity there being 
pursued energetically. The south’s lingua franca became English while 
that of the north remained Arabic. The south is relatively backward 
and poor. President Nimeiri's attempts to unify north and south have 
concentrated mainly on Arabization of the south, according to his 
critics,butnertainlythe underlying lackof unity between north and south 
remains a fundamental problem in his attempts to improve conditions.
To some extent there are similar though not necessarily 
north-south centrifugal tendencies in all the Nile Basin states.
In two states there is the added problem that the present international 
boundaries represent the merging of two former units - Ethiopia at 
present still includes the former Eritrea, over which there is a 
long drawn-out war of secession in progress; and Tanzania has had 
occasional periods of tension with Zanzibar, incorporated into the 
former Tanganyika to create the present state of Tanzania in 1964.
The relevance of all this to our main point is clear. Throughout the 
region the internal divisions within each state are of more immediate 
significance to the people and, probably, to the governments than 
are the external tensions at or beyond a state’s boundaries. Whether 
internal cohesion and national unity are a necessary prerequisite for 
regional groupings is of course another matter. What is certain is 
that the pattern, timing and form of the transfer from colonial to 
independent status made such preoccupation with internal national 
unity inevitable for a long time to come.
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The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Although the OAU exists 
for much more than simply to deal with boundary problems in Africa, 
its resolutions have had a great effect in influencing the degree of 
conflict over such international boundary issues as there are and 
upon the attitude of both academics and practical men. Above all, 
the 1963 OAU Charter, as Appendix III indicates, includes quite 
specific reference to international boundary issues, for it has as 
one of its chief aims a determination to defend the sovereignity, 
territorial integrity and independence of all African states. The OAU, 
then, supports the belief expressed in this thesis that the present 
international boundaries, however illogical and even absurd they may 
appear, should be viewed as immutable and sacrosanct. To understand 
the context of this decision that all international boundaries must 
remain as they are it is important to appreciate the way in which the 
OAU was set up (Appendix III).
The Charter of the OAU is something of a compromise between 
two previous ’groupings’ - one at Casablanca in 1961, which provided 
for a fair degree of political union between states and so for some 
giving up of sovereignity; and one at Monrovia in the same year which 
approved basic principles of cooperation but did not imply any kind of 
political integration. Its summary aims are:
1. To promote unity and solidarity among African states.
2. To intensify and co-ordinate efforts to improve living standards 
in Africa.
3. To defend the sovereignity, territorial integrity and independence 
of African states.
4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.
5. To promote international co-operation in keeping with the Charter 
of the United Nations.
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The OAU is essentially a political organisation of equal 
and sovereign member states whose effectiveness in terms of actual 
action, like the United Nations, is limited by the important 
constraint that it cannot interfere in the internal affairs of any 
member country. This is at once a weakness and a strength - a weakness 
because it renders the Organisation powerless to offer assistance 
even where the internal actions of a member state clearly conflict 
with the spirit of the Organisation’s Charter; a strength because 
by removing the Organisation from involvement in the internal affairs 
of its members it protects it from any possible charge of partisan­
ship and therefore makes its authority more acceptable to all its 
members. However, in addition to its strictly political functions 
the Organisation also aims to coordinate and intensify the efforts 
of members to improve living standards in the continent as a whole 
and to promote international cooperation within and outside Africa, 
having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The 1964 Cairo summit meeting of the Organisation of 
African Unity pledged all member states to respect the borders 
existing upon achievement of independence. The OAU has since 
successfully intervened in border disputes between Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea and Senegal, and Morocco and Algeria, but 
a few troubled borders remain, notably between Somalia and Ethiopia.
In August 1976 a Mediation Committee, set up to arbitrate in the 
Ogaden war, reaffirmed the inviolability of colonial boundaries.
The OAU continues to operate on the principle that even 
though boundaries may not be justified on ethnic - or indeed most 
other - grounds any adjustment oi" any international boundary in 
Africa would simply create other problems. The OAU accepts that the
169
nation state will continue to remain the organizing unit and that 
all inter-state problems must be solved by solutions other than by 
changing international boundaries. For all these reasons the July 
1964 resolution of the OAU Solemnly declares that all Member States 
pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of independence.'
The fact that the OAU has set its face against changing 
Africa’s international boundaries does not mean that all states 
accept the principle of immutable or sacrosanct boundaries. There 
have been many violations of existing boundaries since 1964 - in 
our study area between Tanzania and Uganda and between Egypt and 
Sudan, for example. Moreover, a number of writers argue quite 
specifically against the principle, and it may well be that internal 
tensions and inter-state conflicts over a whole host of issues might 
lead to many other attempts to change the existing state pattern.
On simple practical grounds, while an acceptance of the status quo 
may be justified in terms of the international stability it fosters, 
the economic consequences may be serious - especially for the land­
locked states of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Chime (1969) is unhappy 
with the OAU’s stance on boundaries for a quite different reason.
He argues that the OAU was meant to be the culmination of the Pan- 
African dream to eradicate the boundaries bequeathed by colonial 
powers. To allow the continued existence of colonial boundaries is, 
so he believes, to condone neo-colonialism. Unsatisfactory and 
arbitrary boundaries must be changed as they have, according to 
Chime, proved to be 'stumbling blocks in the relations between 
African states' (ibid., p.66). According to Chime and many other 
authorities of this school of thought, the case for rejecting the 
immutability of international boundaries in Africa is stronger than
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in any other part of the world. For Africa has a uniquely high 
concentration of states 'whose boundaries are drawn with little 
regard for those elements of geography - national entities or ethnic 
groups, convenience of economic activity or lines of communication1 
(ibid., p .65) .
Those authorities who support the 0AUTs policy of main­
taining the status quo of boundaries in Africa produce a number of 
arguments other than those implied in the OAU statements and Charter. 
Allott (1969) notes that the strong interest in preserving the status 
quo as far as African boundaries are concerned embodies a notion 
expressed in its strongest form in the international law doctrine 
of uti possidetis, which was borrowed from Roman law: that an 
existing state of affairs should be preserved, whether its origin 
was lawful or not. Touval (1969) points out that the reason some 
authorities (and governments) do not accept the status quo in 
respect of former colonial boundaries is that they think in terms 
of ’geographical determinism’, laying too much emphasis - as did 
Curzon and Holdich - on the geographical (and defensive) factors of 
a boundary. Such authorities are still making value judgements about 
’good' and ’bad’ boundaries, by which they mean the degree to which 
boundaries respect 'geographical realities'. Until recently - certainly 
in practice - the idea of defence and protection against attack was 
very strong and uppermost in people's minds when fixing international 
boundaries. But this attitude was in itself a cause of conflict and 
the idea of protective or defensive boundaries has now probably 
been rendered obsolete by technological advances in weaponry. As 
Touval argues,so-called boundary problems arise not from the facts of 
geography - the location of the boundary or the way it cuts through 
physical or human features - but from what he calls 'the realm of
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politics’. He cites the example of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, 
widely quoted as an example of a 'bad' boundary on all geographical 
grounds. But, as Touval puts it, 'no doubt, the Somali tribes' need 
to cross annually the border from Somalia into Ethiopia for grazing, 
and friction between these tribesmen and the Ethiopian authorities, 
have contributed much to the conflict between the two states. But 
arrangements for grazing for the tribes could have been made without 
the issue becoming a major territorial dispute.1 At this point it 
can be pointed out that this is exactly what has happend with the 
Masai problem, where the Tanzanian and Kenyan authorities have made 
such arrangements. But, as Touval goes on to say, 'Somalia chose 
to pursue irredentism, and did not seek a solution through arrange­
ments to facilitate trans-frontier grazing' (Touval, 1969, p.104).
There is no doubt that the vast weight of opinion -
especially among African leaders - is today against shifting the
existing boundaries. Most governments now fully accept Article III,
paragraph 3, of the OAU Charter which pledges all states 'to respect
for the sovereignity and territorial integrity of each state and
for its inalienable right to independent existence'; there is,too,
general support for Article 19 which set up the machinery to preserve
1the status quo of boundaries between African states. As President 
Tsiranana of Madagascar put it, 'it is no longer possible, nor 
desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the pretext of 
social, religious, or linguistic criteria' (Tsiranana, 1966).
Together with this essentially practical view, backed up by the 
OAU, there are those who clearly accept the opinion, expressed in this 
thesis, that the policies or the cupidity of states create friction, 
not the boundaries which frame them. This is well put by Zartman 
(1969, p.79): 'any African state can have boundary problems if it
1. The Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation Committee.
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wants' and ’there are so many real and possible boundary problems 
in Africa that it is a living museum for taxonomy and analysis... 
Boundary problems are policy problems. A government decides whether 




The final section of the previous chapter dealt with what is 
undoubtedly the most central and practical point of relevance to any 
contemporary study of international boundaries and inter-state cooperation 
in Africa - the decision by the OAU to support the existing former colonial 
boundaries as the territorial frameworks for the independent nations 
of Africa today* In spite of all the weaknesses of existing boundaries - 
at least according to academic and, especially, European writers - it is 
recognised among Africans themselves that any alternative boundaries would 
create more problems than they would solve* After almost a quarter of a 
century of static international boundaries in the Nile Basin, at least, 
there is now no significant move or desire to change them, and the earlier 
comment by Barbour (1961, p*303) that 'the present pattern of countries and 
boundaries may not be destined to endure for long1 does not now represent 
a tenable position. The fact that the boundaries have existed unchanged for 
so long into independence and are now sanctioned by the OAU means that today 
the international boundaries of the Basin are not critical features in 
inter-state relations! certainly they are not anything like Curzon's 
"razors edge" referred to in chapter one.
In practice, then, the international boundaries of the Nile Basin 
tend to reject the hypothesis that the boundaries themselves qua boundaries 
are today significant causal factors in conflicts between states. Inter-state 
conflicts have existed within the Basin, and will no doubt occur again; but, 
as with the break-up of the East African Community, 'border problems' are 
seen to be the expression and symptom of or the excuse for such conflict, 
not its cause. On the other hand, while it may be true that boundary problems
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involving large areas and large-scale attempts to resolve them are likely to 
decline in Africa, Zartman (1969, p. 10) makes the point that border 
disputes - the result of local hazards implicit in the exact demarcation 
of a line on the ground - will continue to arise. To this writer, Zartman*s 
distinction between a *problem' and a 'dispute' is too arbitrary to be 
of much value in any particular analysis. But there is little doubt that 
certain types of problems may well increase: there are, for instance, the 
problems of refugees, the problem of 'shiftas' and the difficulties arising 
from supporting cross-border guerrillas. There have been many cases of all 
these types of problem in the Rile Basin: for example, real friction between 
Ethiopia and Sudan only developed after the 1964 Ethiopian revolution when 
Sudan's policy of tolerating bases in the Sudan for the Ethiopian separatist 
movement led to inter-state conflict. Yet in all these types of problem, 
the evidence and analysis presented in the present thesis supports the
contention that the actual boundary has in no case caused the problem: the
problem is expressed at the boundary but is not caused by the location or 
nature of the boundary.
Without in any way trying to provide an apologia for colonial
partioning and boundary-making, the present study firmly suggests that the
causative role of international boundaries in inter-state disputes or
conflicts in the Nile Basin is very slight at most. Both bilaterally and
multilaterally within different regional groupings, the major problem
is the nature of a state - its government, ideology, economic status,
\
social cohesion and the like - vis a vis another state. In other words, to 
follow Ancel, the problem is between nations, not about boundaries. 
Furthermore, according to Widstrand (1969* p.168), this means that only 
an idiographic approach is legitimate in the study of boundaries. No 
useful generalizations are possible, he argues, for 'every boundary problem 
is unique and can only be solved to a limited extent by analogy'.
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Looking to the future, what kind of inter-state cooperation is likely?
At the level of water resources, there seems little doubt that the Nile Basin 
states have enough mutuality of interest to guarantee this kind of cooperation# 
Outside this field of activity, however, it is likely that national interests 
will continue to supersede those of larger groupings or regions. Ad hoc 
agreements or arrangements may well proliferate, as in East Africa, but formal 
1communities' or organisations are unlikely to get very far. As for political 
union of some kind, this seems further away than at independence. However 
unsatisfactory national boundaries may appear in theory, in practice they 
do represent the territorial limits of administration and it is within these 
limits that the interests and loyalties of a state are now - perhaps 
increasingly - focussed. Inter-state cooperation, in spite of the theoretical 
opportunities for such cooperation provided by the 'arbitrary' boundaries, 
does not seem to be occurring at any substantial economic, let alone 
political, level. A possible exception lies in the northern part of the Nile 
Basin, where somekind of closer linkage, perhaps even involving the setting 
up of confederation, may well be achieved between Egypt and Sudan.
This raises an important question that underlies much of the argument 
in the present thesis. Is nationalism, expressing itself within national 
boundaries, a desirable end in itself or a desirable precondition for 
subsequent inter-state cooperation? Whatever may be said of nationalism, 
and in whatever way it may be evaluated, there seems little doubt that in 
the 1980s there are clear signs of trends towards the more parochial forms 
of nationalism and away from the kind of inter-state cooperation discussed 
in the final chapter. Cooperation is viewed as rhetoric: nationalism is the 
reality# International boundaries today - throughout the Nile Basin - have 
never acted so clearly as barriers as they have increasingly become since 
independence. This was, of course, to be expected, and not only because
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boundaries define territory and nationality. For during the colonial 
period 'the weight of imperial power on each side held the position steady, 
and the border remained open, subject to customs and visa requirements, 
except when the European states quarrelled among themselves1 (Austin, 1963, 
p.1^3). Moreover, it is clear that boundary problems arise from the efforts 
of states to achieve coincidence among its three units of interest and 
identity - 'the popular unit or nation, the organizational unit or party- 
government, and the territorial unit or country* (Zartman, 1969* p.BO).
And this even well-established, developed countries are finding it difficult 
to achieve.
Though the evidence examined in this study suggests strongly that 
international boundaries are not a significant cause of friction or 
conflict between states in the Nile Basin; and although the OATI's resolution 
supports the immutability of the present boundaries in perpetuity; at the 
same time there is no substantial evidence that these international 
boundaries are likely to be used as the basis for inter-state cooperation 
in the immediate future. This is a pity. For, to quote Nyerere once again, 
'we must use the existing pattern of states as an instrument for unifying 
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1, Before 1906 The main agreements between Britain and the upstream
powers of the Nile Basin concerning Egyptian and Sudanese interests
are as follows:
(i) In the protocol of April 15th, 1891 signed in Rome between Great 
Britain and Italy, it was agreed by article 3, not to construct 
"on the River Atbara any works which might sensibly modify its 
flow into the Nile".
(ii) According to article 3 of the treaty of May 15th, 1902 between 
Great Britain and Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Government engaged 
itself not to construct or allow to be constructed, without 
British and Sudanese consent, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake 
Tana or Sobat, "which would arrest the flow of their waters"*
(iii) In 1906, the Agreement concerning Ethiopia, between Great Britain, 
France, and Italy, stipulated that they, while resolved to maintain 
the integrity of Ethiopia in case of trouble, "in any case... 
will be concerned with safeguarding the interests of Great Britain 
and Egypt in the Nile Basin and especially that which concern 
the regulation of the waters in the River and its tributaries...".
(iv) By article 3 of the London Agreement of May 9th, 1906 between
Great Britain and the Independent Congo State, the latter under­
took not to construct, or allow to be constructed, without the 
consent of the Sudanese Government, any work which would diminish 
the volume of water entering Lake Albert from two of its 
tributaries.
2. 1925 Nile Commission Report The main findings are the following:
(i) The natural flow of the river should be reserved for the benefit 
of Egypt from the 19th January to the 15th July (at Sennar), 
subject to the pumping in the Sudan as defined below.
(ii) The Gezira Canal may begin to draw on the natural flow of the 
river on the 16th July, the Canal being gradually raised to full 
supply level by the 31st July, according to the scale fixed in 
"Nile Control", contained in Appendix D, provided at Sennar and 
Malalcal during the preceeding five days, allowing for a ten days 
lag in the case of the latter.
(iii)From the 1st August to the 31st December the Gezira Canal may, 
subject to the progressive scale laid down in paragraph 57 of 
this Report (Cmd. 3348, p.20), drawn the following volumes from 
the river:
The 1st August to 30th November, 168 cubic meters a second. The 
1st to 31st December, 160 cubic meters a second, provided that, 
in any year which the total flow of the natural river in December 
at Aswan is less than 4,700 million cubic meters, 80 cubic 
meters a second shall be taken from the natural river during
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the whole of December, and the balance shall be taken from the 
natural river, up cubic meters by which the actual total December 
natural river in that years falls short of 4,700 million cubic 
meters.
(iv)The Gezira Canal may not draw during the ninth of January more 
than the volumes provided in "Nile Control", i.e., 80 cubic 
metres a second from the 1st to 15th, and 52 cubic meters a 
second from the 16th to 18th, a total of 117 million cubic meters.
(v) The final filling of the Sennar Reservoir from the level required 
to give full supply in the Canal to the full storage level of 
the reservoir should be carried out in November, as provided in 
"Nile Control".
(vi)Any further flood pumping carried out in the Sudan up to the end 
of February should be considered as drawing its supply from the 
Sennar Reservoir after the 31st December. In other words, a 
volume equal to that consumed on these areas after the 31st Dec­
ember, according to ascertained data, should be discharged from 
the reservoir as compensation to Egypt, and the Sennar Reservoir, 
should be worked so as to provide the additional storage required 
to cover the compensation volumes as above.
(vii)After the end of February only perennial pumping as referred to 
in paragraph 81 (Cmd.3348, p.27), should be carried out in the 
Sudan.
The commission came to the following conclusion:
(1) "The Commission foresees that it will be necessary from time to 
time to review the questions discussed in this Report. It regards 
it as essential that all established irrigation should be 
respected in any future review of the question. In particular 
the Sudan should only take from the natural river in January, 
exclusive of pumping rights as now existing, the ’Nile Control’ 
volume of 117 million cubic metres. All other requirements till 
July should be provided by the Sudan from storage or other 
conservation works".
(2) "The Commission has been impressed by the fact that future develop­
ment in Egypt may require the construction of works in the Sudan 
and neighbouring territories, such as Uganda, Kenya, and 
Tanganyika, and it feels that Egypt should be able to count on 
receiving all assistance from the administrative authorities in the 
Sudan in respect of schemes undertaken in the Sudan, as well as 
from the British Government in any questions concerning the neigh­
bouring territories."
(3) "The Commission has endeavoured to find a practical and workable 
basis for irrigation, and to foresee, and, as far as possible, to 
provide for, any difficulties that may arise in' the future. But
it is aware that doubtful points may well arise in the interpreta­
tion of any document, and that differences of opinion as to fact 
cannot fail to occur from time to time in such matters as the 
volumes of water flowing in a river or canal, discharged through 
sluices, or lost by evaporation or seepage. It does not feel 
called upon to make proposals with regard to special arrangements
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for dealing with such doubts and differences, which seem to be 
outside the sphere of a technical commission. It does, however, 
desire to record emphatically the view that neither the elaborate 
drafting of an agreement nor the provision of special machinery 
for adjudication should be allowed to obscure the importance of 
mutual confidence and co-operation in all matters concerning the 
river and its waters."
(4) "Finally, the Commission desires to draw attention to the very 
great importance of continued study of the river and systematic 
record of the statistics. A very good hydrological organization 
has been built up, and its continued efficiency is absolutely 
essential, not only to fresh development work, but also to the 
correct working of the arrangement proposed in this Report, or, 
indeed, of any other arrangements that could be desired."
3. 1929 Nile Waters Agreement "Exchange of notes between Egyptian
and British Government in regard of the use of the waters of the 
river Nile for irrigation purposes."
The elaborate report of the 1925 Nile Commission referred to in 
the Notes, is not here reproduced. It was published by the Government 
Press, Cairo, in 1928, and by the Stationery Office of the British 
Government in 1929 (Cmd.3348).
The 1928 publication also contains, under the title of "Nile Waters 
Agreement" a statement of Working Arrangements for Controlling 
Irrigation in the Sudan for the year 1929, signed on March 20, by the 
Egyptian Minister of Public Works and the Irrigation Adviser of the 
Sudan Government.
No. 1
Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha to Lord Lloyd
Presidence du Conseil des Ministres 
Cairo, May 7, 1929
Excellency,
In confirmation of our recent conversations, I have the honour 
to communicate to your Excellency the views of the Egyptian Government 
in regard those irrigation questions which have been the subject of 
our discussions.
(1) The Egyptian Government agree that a settlement of these questions 
cannot be deferred until such time as it may be possible for the 
two Governments to come to an agreement on the status of 'the 
Sudan, but, in concluding the present agreements, expressly reserve 
their full liberty on the occasion of any negotiations which may 
precede such an agreement..
(2) It is realised that the development of the Sudan requires a quantity 
of the Nile water greater than which has been so far utilised by 
the Sudan. As your Excellency is aware, the Egyptian Government
has always been anxious to encourage such development, and will 
therefore continue that policy, and be willing to agree with His
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Majesty’s Government upon such an increase of this quantity as 
does not infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the 
waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension, 
subject to satisfactory assurances as to the safeguarding of 
Egyptian interests as detailed in later paragraphs of this note.
(3) The Egyptian Government therefore accept the findings of the 1925 
Nile Commission, whose report is annexed hereto, and is considered 
an integral part of the present agreement. They propose, however, 
that, in view of the delay in the construction of the Gebel
Aulia Dam, which under paragraph 40 of the Nile Commission’s Report, 
is regarded as a counterpart of the Gezira scheme, the dates and 
quantities of gradual withdrawals of water from the Nile by the 
Sudan in flood months as given in article 57 of the Commission’s 
Report be modified in such a manner that the Sudan should not 
withdraw more than 126 cubic meters per second before 1936, it 
being understood that the schedule contained in the abovementioned 
article will remain unaltered until the discharge of 126 cubic 
meters per second is reached. These quantities are based on the 
Nile Commission’s Report, and are therefore subject to revision 
as foreseen therein.
(4) It is further understood that the following arrangements will be 
observed in respect of irrigation works on the Nile:
(i) The Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Service in the 
Sudan, his staff, or any other officials whom the Minister of 
Public Works may nominate, shall have the full liberty to co­
operate with the Resident Engineer of the Sennar Dam in the 
measurement of discharges and records to satisfy the Egyptian 
Government that the distribution of water and the regulation of 
the dam are carried out in accordance with the agreement reached. 
Detailed working arrangements agreed upon between the Minister
of Public Works and the Irrigation Adviser to the Sudan Government 
will take effect as from the date of the confirmation of this role.
(ii)Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no 
irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or 
taken on the river Nile and its branches, or in countries under 
British administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail 
any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the 
quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its 
arrival, or its level.
(iii)The Egyptian Government,in carrying out all the necessary
measures required for the complete study and record of the hydrol­
ogy of the River Nile in the Sudan, will have all the necessary 
facilities for so doing.
(iv)In case the Egyptian Government decided to construct in the 
Sudan any works on the river and its branches, or to take any 
measures with a view to increasing the water supply for the 
benefit of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local 
authorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding local 
interests. The construction, maintenance and administration of 
the above-mentioned works' shall be under the direct control of 
the Egyptian Government.
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(v) His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of 
Great-Britain and Northern Ireland shall use their good offices 
so that the carrying out of surveys, measurements, studies and 
works of the nature mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs
is facilitated by the Governments of those regions under British 
influence.
(vi) It is recognised that in the course of the operations here 
contemplated uncertainty may still arise from time to time either 
as to the correct interpretation of a question of principle or
as to technical or administrative details. Every question of the 
this kind will be approached in a spirit of mutual good faith.
In case of any difference of opinion arising as to the inter- 
pretation of execution of any of the preceding provisions, or as 
to any contravention thereof, which the two Governments find 
themselves unable to settle, the matter shall be referred to an 
independent body with a view to arbitration.
(5) The present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting 
the control of the river, which is reserved for free discussion 
between the two Governments in the negotiations on the 
question of the Sudan.




Lord Lloyd to Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha
The Presidency, Cairo 
May 7, 1929
Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the note which your
Excellency has been good enough to address to me to-day.
(2) In confirming the arrangements mutually agreed upon as recited 
in your Excellency’s note, I am to express the gratification 
of His Britainnic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that these discussions 
have led to a settlement which cannot fail to facilitate develop­
ment and to promote prosperity in Egypt and the Sudan.
(3) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concur in your 
Excellency's view that this agreement is, and should be, 
essentially directed towards the regulation of irrigation 
arrangements on basis of the Nile Commission Report, and has no 
bearing on the status-quo in the Sudan.
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In conclusion, I would remind your Excellency that his Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom have already acknowledged the natural 
and historical rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile. I am to 
state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard the 
safeguardings of those rights as a fundamental principle of British 
Policy, and to convey to your Excellency the most positive assurances 
that this principle and the detailed provisions of this agreement 
will be observed at all times and under any conditions that may arise.
I avail, etc.
Lloyd, High Commissioner,
4. 1952 Modifications of the Nile Waters Agreement, 1929
The following is the official statement issued under date of 
October 18, 1952, by the Public Relations Office, Khartoum.
A Communique was issued in December 1950 which said that 
technical discussions between representatives of the Sudan and 
Egyptian Government were proceeding on the raising of Sennar 
reservoir level, the construction of a dam on the Fourth Cataract 
near Merowe, and the Sudan's further requirements in Nile Waters. 
These discussions were interrupted and prolonged by other events but, 
happily, agreement has now been reached. Stated simply, it has been 
agreed:
(1) that the Sudan can raise the level of water in Sennar reservoir 
by one metre subject,until the construction of the proposed 
Lake Tana dam, to special conditions in the case of very low 
years;
(2) that Egypt can build the Fourth Cataract dam and the Sudan 
will give all possible help, as in the case of Jebel Aulia;
(3) that when the necessary data have been collected there will be 
technical discussions to decide the respective shares of the 
Sudan and Egypt in the additional water available on the 
completion of new projects, including the Fourth Cataract dam; 
the Sudan will begin to benefit from the first project to be 
completed: the shares in cost will be agreed for each project 
in proportion to the shares in benefit: the shares in the Lake 
Tana project remain as originally agreed, half to Egypt and 
half to the Sudan.
In addition, agreement has been reached on means of making 
available to the Sudan surplus "flood" water which can be 
stored. Investigations are now being made to establish how much 
can be stored in the Jebel Aulia reservoir without affecting 
existing pump schemes, saqias, etc. In consequence of this 
agreement an additional allocation of water has already been 
made to the Pumps Control Board.
5. 1959 Nile Waters Agreement
As the River Nile needs projects, for its full control and for
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increasing its yield for the full utilization of its waters by the 
Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) on technical 
working arrangements other than those now applied:
And as these works require for their execution and administration, 
full agreement and co-operation between the two Republics in order 
to regulate their benefits and utilize the Nile waters in a manner 
which secures the present and future requirements of the two 
countries.
And as the Nile Waters Agreement concluded in 1929 provided only 
for the partial use of the Nile Waters and did not extend to include 
a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have agreed 
on the following:
First: THE PRESENT ACQUIRED RIGHTS
(1) That the amount of the Nile waters used by the United Arab
Republic until this Agreement is signed shall be her acquired
right before obtaining the benefits of the Nile Control Projects 
and the Projects which will increase its yield and which projects 
are referred to in this Agreement. The total of this acquired 
rights is 48 millards of cubic meters per year as measured
at Aswan.
(2) That the amount of the waters used at present by the Republic
of Sudan shall be her acquired right before obtaining the
benefits of the projects referred to above. The total amount
of this acquired right is 4 millards of cubic meters per year 
as measured at Aswan.
Second*. THE NILE CONTROL PROJECTS AND THE DIVISION OF
THEIR BENEFITS BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS
(1) In order to regulate the River waters and control their flow 
into the sea, the two Republics agree that the United Arab 
Republic constructs the Sadd el Aali(High Dam) at Aswan as the first 
link of a series of projects on the Nile for over-year storage.
(2) In order to enable the Sudan to utilize its share of the water,
the two Republics agree that the Republic of Sudan shall con­
struct the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other works 
which the Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the 
utilisation of its share.
(3) The net benefit from the Sadd el Aali Reservoir shall be
calculated on the basis of the average natural River yield of 
water at Aswan in the years of this century, which is estimated 
at about 84 milliards of cubic meters per year. The acquired 
rights of the two Republics referred to in Article "First"
as measured at Aswan, and the average of losses of over-year 
storage of the Sadd el Aali Reservoir shall be deducted from 
this yield, and the balance shall be the net benefit which 
shall be divided between the two Republics.
(4) The net benefit from the Sadd el Aali Reservoir mentioned in 
the previous item, shall be divided between the two Republics
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at the ratio of 14 1/2 for the Sudan and 7 1/2 for the United 
Arab Republic ao long as the average river yield remains in 
future within the limits of the average yield referred to in 
the previous paragraph. This means that, if the average yield 
remains the same as the average of the previous years of this 
century which is estimated at 84 milliards and if the losses 
of over~year storage remain equal to the present estimate of 
10 milliards, the net benefit of the Sadd el Aali Reservoir 
shall be 14 1/2 milliards and the share of the United Arab 
Republic shall be 7 1/2 milliards. By adding these shares to 
their acquired rights, the total share from the net yield of the 
Nile after the full operation of the Sadd el Aali Reservoir 
shall be 18 1/2 milliards for the Republic of the Sudan and 55 
1/2 milliards for the United Arab Republic.
But if the average yield increases, the resulting net benefit 
from this increase shall be divided between the two Republics 
in equal shares.
(5) As the net benefit from the Sadd el Aali (referred to in item 
3 Article Second) is calculated on the basis of the average 
natural yield of the river at Aswan in the years of this century 
after the deduction therefrom of the acquired rights of the
two Republics and the average losses of over-year storage at the 
Sadd el Aali Reservoir, it is agreed that this net benefit shall 
be the subject of revision by the two parties at reasonable 
intervals to be agreed upon after starting the full operation 
of the Sadd el Aali Reservoir.
(6) The United Arab Republic agrees to pay to the Sudan Republic 
15 million Egyptian Pounds as full compensation for the damage 
resulting to the Sudanese existing properties as a result of the 
storage in the Sadd el Aali Reservoir up to a reduced level of 
182 meters (survey datum) . The payment of this compensation 
shall be effected in accordance with the annexed agreement 
between the two parties.
(7) The Republic of the Sudan undertakes to arrange before July 1963,
the final transfer of the population of Haifa and all other
Sudanese inhabitants whose lands shall be submerged by the 
stored water.
(8) It is understood that when the Sadd el Aali is fully operated
for over-year storage, the United Arab Republic will not
required storing any water at Gebel Aulia Dam. And the two 
contracting parties will in due course, discuss all matters 
related to this renunciation.
Third: PROJECTS FOR THE UTILISATION OF LOST
WATERS IN THE NILE BASIN
In view of the fact that at present, considerable volumes of 
the Nile Basin Waters are lost in the swamps of Bahr El Jebel, Bahr 
El Zeraf, Bahr El Ghazal and the Sobat River, and as it is essential 
that efforts should be exerted in order to prevent these losses and 
to increase the yield of the River for use in agricultural expansion
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in the two Republics, the two Republics agree to the following:
(1) The Republic of the Sudan in agreement with the United Arab 
Republic shall construct projects for the increase of the 
River yield by preventing losses of waters of the Nile 
Basin the swamps of Bahr El Jebel, Bahr El Zeraf, Bahr El 
Ghazal and its tributaries, the Sobat River and its 
tributaries and the White Nile Basin, The net yield of these 
projects shall be divided equally between the two Republics 
and each of them shall also contribute equally to the costs.
The Republic of the Sudan shall finance the above-mentioned
projects out of its own funds and the United Arab Republic
shall pay its share in the costs in the same ratio of 50%
allotted for her in the yield of these projects.
(2) If the United Arab Republic, on account of the progress in 
its planned agricultural expansion, should find it necessary 
to start on any of the increase of the Nile yield projects, 
referred to in the previous paragraph, after is approval by 
the two Governments and at a time when the Sudan Republic
does not, need such project, the United Arab Republic shall
notify the Sudan Republic of the time convenient for the 
former to start the execution of the project. And each of the 
two Republics shall, within two years after such notification, 
present a date-phased programme for the utilisation of its 
share of the waters saved by the project, and each of the 
said programmes shall bind the two parties. The United Arab 
Republic shall at the expiry of the two years, start the 
execution of the projects, at its own expense. And when the 
Republic of Sudan is ready to utilise its share according to 
the agreed programme, it shall pay to the United Arab Republic 
a share of all the expenses in the same ratio as the Sudan's 
share in benefit is to the total benefit of the project, 
provided that the share of either Republic shall not exceed 
one half of the total benefit of the project.
Fourth: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
THE TWO REPUBLICS
(1) In order to ensure the technical co-operation between the
Governments of the two Republics, to continue the research
and study necessary for the Nile control projects and the 
increase of its yield and to continue the hydrological survey 
of its upper reaches, the two Republics agree that immediately 
after the signing of this Agreement a Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission shall be formed of an equal number of 
members from both parties; and its functions shall be:
(i) The drawing of the basic outlines of projects for the increase
of the Nile yield, and for the supervision of the studies
necessary for the finalising of projects, before presentation 
of the same to the Governments of the two Republics for 
approval.










The drawing up of the working arrangements for any works to 
be constructed on the Nile, within the boundaries of the 
Sudan, and also for those to be constructed outside the 
boundaries of the Sudan, by agreement with the authorities 
concerned in the countries iniiiich such works are constructed.
The supervision of the application of all the working 
arrangements mentioned in (c) above in connection with works 
constructed within the boundaries of Sudan and also in 
connection with the Sadd el Aali Reservoir and Aswan Dam, 
through official engineers delegated for the purpose by the 
two Republics; and the supervision of the working of the 
Upper Nile projects, as provided in the agreements concluded 
with the countries in which such projects are constructed.
As it is probable that a series of low years may occur, and a 
succession of low levels in the Sadd el Aali Reservoir may 
result to such an extent as not to permit in any one year the 
drawing of the full requirements of the two Republics, the 
Technical Commission is charged with the task of devising a 
fair arrangement for the two Republics to follow. And the 
recommendations of the Commission shall be presented to the 
two Governments for approval.
In order to enable the Commission to exercise the functions 
enumerated in.the above item, and in order to ensure the 
continuation of the Nile gauging and to keep observations on 
all its upper reaches, these duties shall be carried out 
under the technical supervision of the Commission by the 
engineers of the Sudan Republic, and of Uganda.
The two Governments shall form the Joint Technical Commission 
by a joint decree, and shall provide it with its necessary 
funds from their budgets.. The Commission may, according to 
the requirements of work hold its meetings in Cairo or in 
Khartoum. The Commission shall subject to the approval of 
the two Governments, lay down regulations for the organisation 
of its meetings and its technical, administrative and 
financial activities.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
If it becomes necessary to hold any negotiations concerning 
the Nile waters, with any riparian state, outside the 
boundaries of the two Republics, the Governments of the Sudan 
Republic and the United Arab Republic shall agree on a unified 
view after the subject is studied by the said Technical 
Commission. The said unified view shall be the basis of any 
negotiations by the Commission with the said states.
If the negotiations result in an agreement to construct any 
works on the river, outside the boundaries of the two Republics, 
the joint Technical Commission shall after consulting the 
authorities in the Governments of the States concerned, draw 
all the technical executions details and the working and 
maintenance arrangements. And the Commission shall, after the
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sanction of the same by the Governments concerned, supervise 
the carrying out of the said technical agreements.
(2) As the reparian states, other than the two Republics, claim
a share in the Nile waters, the two Republics have agreed that 
they shall jointly consider and reach one unified view regarding 
the said claims. And if the said consideration results in the 
acceptance allotting an amount of the Nile water to one or the 
other of the said states, the accepted amount shall be deducted 
from the shares of the two Republics in equal parts, as 
calculated at Aswan.
The Technical Commission mentioned in this agreement shall make 
the necessary arrangements with the states concerned, in order 
to ensure that their water consumption shall not exceed the 
amounts agreed upon.
Sixth: TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEFORE BENEFITING
As the benefiting of the two Republics from their appointed 
shares in the net benefit of the Sadd el Aali Reservoir, shall not 
start before the construction and the full utilisation of the 
Reservoir the two parties shall agree on their agricultural expansion 
programmes, in the transitional period from now up to the completion 
of the Sadd el Aali, without prejudice to their present water 
requirements.
This agreement shall come into force after its sanction by the 
two contracting parties, provided that either party shall notify the 
other party of the date of its sanction, through the diplomatic 
channels.
Annex (1) and Annex (2, A and B) attached to this Agreement 
shall be considered as an integral part of this Agreement.
Written in Cairo in two Arabic original copies this 7th day of 
Gumada El Oula 1379, the 8th day of November 1959.
FROM THE COMPLETE SADD EL AALI RESERVOIR
Seventh:
Eighth:
For the Republic of Sudan 
(SIGNED)
For the United Arab Republic 
(SIGNED)
MOHAMED TALAAT FARID ZAKARIA MOHIE EL DIN
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APPENDIX II
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME'(SPECIAL FUND)
PLAN OF OPERATION
Country: Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, United Arab Republic (Egypt) and
United Republic of Tanzania
Title of Project: Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments of
Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert
1967
Summary Data:
Special Fund allocation ....
Consisting of:
Special Fund contribution ....
Government contribution towards 





  USS 1,959,400
  USS 1,821,100
  USS 138,300




The Technical Committee 
for the Hydrometeoro­
logical Survey of the 
Catchments of Lakes 
Victoria, Kioga and 
Albert
PREAMBLE
For the purpose of a hydrometeorological survey of the catchments of 
Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert to be undertaken by the Governments 
of Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, United Arab Republic (Egypt) and the United 
Republic of Tanzania with the assistance of the Special Fund, for which 
the World Meteorological Organisation shall act as Executive Agency, 
this Plan of Operation shall be the Plan of Operation provided for in 
Article I, paragraph 2, of the Agreement signed by the Governments of 
Kenya on 5 October 1964, Sudan on 2 May 1960, Uganda on 22 March 1963, 
United Arab Republic on 21 March 1960 and the United Republic of 
Tanzania on 17 July 1962, and the Special Fund. It has been established 
in seven original copies.
I. PURPOSE AND DESCRIPTION
The objectives of the project are the collection and analysis 
of hydrometeorological data of the Catchments, of Lakes Victoria, 
Kioga and Albert in order to study the water balance of the 
Upper Nile. The data collected and the study are expected to 
assist the countries in the planning of water conservation and 
development and to provide the ground work for inter-governmental 
co-operation in the regulation and use of the Nile,
The project will undertake the following specific tasks:
Setting up additional data collecting stations (24 hydrometeoro­
logical, 156 rainfall including 6 rainfall recorders, 67 hydro- 
logical and 14 lake level recording) and upgrading some of the 
existing stations, in order to complete an adequate network from 
which basic hydrometeorological data can be collected and 
analysed;
establishing of seven small indax-catchments for intensive 
studies of rainfall-runoff relationships for application to 
other parts of the catchment areas;
aerial photography and ground survey of those sections of the 
lake shore areas which, are flat and which will be most subject 
to change with variations in levels of the lakes. Since only 
a few contours above and below lake water level will he required, 
aerial photography will be used to prepare planimetric maps and 
the contours will be properly located by topographic survey;
devising and proposing analytical procedures for the various 
parameters involved in the water balance of the Lakes, using the 
data collected from the new and existing stations, and from the 
index catchments; and
training staff of the participating Governments in hydrometeoro­
logical work.
The area to be covered by the survey is shown on the attached 
map. Essentially it represents the part of the catchments, within 
the three East African participating countries.
Close co-ordination will be maintained between this project and 
the UNDP/Special Fund assisted project surveys and pilot demon­
stration schemes leading to the reclamation of the Yala Swamp, 
which is under execution in Kenya, to study the effects of 
natural and artificial changes in swamp conditions on the water 
balance.
The observational programme and any studies that will be carried 
out during the project period will be co-ordinated with. UNESCO 
WITHIN THE PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED IN EACH COUNTRY FOR THE Inter­
national Hydrological Decade. In fact, this project may be con­
sidered as part of the region's contribution to the Hydrological 
Decade.
The Headquarters of the Project will be located in Entebbe, Uganda.
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IX, PRIOR OBLIGATIONS
2.1 Prior to the Commencements of operations in the project, the 
Governments shall establish a Technical Committee for the 
Hydrometeorological Survey of Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert 
which, shall assume overall responsibility on behalf of the 
Governments for the execution of the project and which will act 
as- the co-ordinating agency vis^a-vis the Executive Agency and 
the Special Fund.
2.1.1 The Committee shall be constituted of five Members representing 
the participating Governments as follows;
Kenya - Director of Water Development
Sudan - Executive Member, Permanent Joint Technical Commission 
for Nile Waters
Uganda - Commissioner of Water Development
United Arab Republic - Executive Member, Permanent Joint
Technical Commission for Nile Waters
United Republic of Tanzania - Director of Water Development and
Irrigation
2.1.2 The Director of the East African Meteorological Department or 




ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY - - OAU
The Charter of the Organization of African Unity was signed on May 
25th, 1963 in Addis Abaha, Ethiopia. It superseded the Charter for the 
"Union of African States" adopted in January 1961 at a conference in 
Casablanca, Morocco, which provided for a degree of political union, 
and the association formed at a conference in Monrovia, Liberia, which 
approved basic principles later incorporated into the OAU Charter but 
did not imply political integration. All but two of the then 32 inde­
pendent black African nations signed the Charter. The remaining two, 
Morocco and Togo, signed later and since that time all African states 
have joined the OAU upon gaining independence. The aims of the OAU are:
1. To promote unity and solidarity among African states.
2. To intensify and co-ordinate efforts to improve living standards
in Africa.
3. To defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
African states.
4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.
5. To promote international co-operation in keeping with the Charter
of the United Nations.
HISTORY
There were various attempts at establishing an inter-African organiza­
tion before the OAU Charter was drawn up. In November 1958 Ghana and 
Guinea (later joined by Mali) drafted a Charter which was to form 
the basis of a Union of African States. In January 1961 a conference
was held at Casablance. An African Charter was adopted and it was 
decided to set up an African Military Command and an African Common 
Market.
Between October 1960 and March 1961 three conferences were 
held by French-speaking African countries, at Abidjan, Brazzaville and 
Yaounde. None of the twelve countries which attended these meetings 
had been present at the Casablanca Conference. These conferences led 
eventually to the signing in September 1961, at Tananarive, of a charter 
establishing the Union Africaine et Malgache, now the Organisation 
commune Africaine et Mauricienne.
In May 1961 a conference was held at Monrovia, attended by the 
heads of state or representatives of nineteen countries. They met again 
in January 1962 at Lagos, and set up a permanent secretariat and a 
standing committee of Finance Ministers, and accepted a draft charter for 
an Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States.
It was the Conference of Addis Ababa, held in 1963, which 
finally brought together African states despite the regional, political
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and linguistic differences which divided them. The Foreign Ministers 
of 32 African states attended the Preparatory Meeting held in May.
The topics discussed by the meeting were: (1) creation of 
the Organisation of African States; C2) co-operation among African 
states in the following fields: economic and social; education, culture 
and science, collective defence; (3) decolonization; (4) apartheid 
and racial discrimination; (5) effects of economic groupings on the 
economic development of Africa; (6) disarmament; (7) creation of a 
Permanent Conciliation Commission; (8) Africa and the United Nations.
The Heads of State Conference which opened on May 23rd drew 
up the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which was then 
signed by the heads of thirty states on May 25th, 1963. The Charter 
was essentially functional and reflected a compromise between the 
concept of a loose association of states favoured by the Monrovia 
Group and the federal idea supported by the Casablanca Group, and in 
particular by Ghana.
ARTICLE III OF THE O.A.U. CHARTER (1963)
Member states adhere to the principles of sovereign equality, non­
interference in internal affairs of member states, respect for 
territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, condemnation 
of political subversion, dedication to the emancipation of dependent 
African territories, and international non-alignment. *
* The O.A.U. has consistently insisted on the immutability of the 
former colonial boundaries. For example, in 1977 a Mediation 
Committee was set up to arbitrate in the Ogaden war and to 
reaffirm the inviolability of colonial boundaries.
